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ABSTRACT

The world situation, and life, in the contemporary West, since the rise o f
modernity, has been described most frequently as one of crisis, marked by a breakdown
o f life's intelligibility. It is the aftermath o f the "death o f God," the disappearance o f
humanity's relationship to a transcendent reality which historically has served as the
center o f meaning, effecting what has been called the world's disenchantment or the lifeworld's despiritualization, marked by a loss o f soul. This process has involved a
reduction o f what constitutes the cosmos and human existence in it. In addition, reason,
believed in as humanity's guiding principle, has become reduced to a tool in the service o f
technical society. The "soul" o f reason, grounded in the question o f the good, has been
%

lost, in this way, followed by a growing indictment against reason itself as the source o f
contemporary woes.
The intent o f this study is to explore this crisis o f Western culture, particularly to
identify and investigate its origin and development as the logic or reign o f "death" in
human consciousness. The aim is to look into the ensuing spiritual crisis: from the
"death o f God" to the "death" o f faith, o f the cosmos, o f the human subject, and also o f
reason. Required is an inquiry into the "kernel" o f Western Civilization which can be,
perhaps, most accurately depicted as the relentless pursuit o f reason and an unwavering
faith in it as humanity's hope for achieving the knowledge o f the good, and the good
itself and the true and beautiful—the legacy o f Plato, and Socrates. Such involves an
attempt to elucidate the relationship between reason and faith, and their historical

vii
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dissociation and antagonism, and also to understand the project o f education, as the
guardian o f reason and the avenue through which human faith in reason is expressed, and
the crisis in which this project, too, has culminated. Advocated is a reconciliation o f
faith and reason, a redemption o f the foundational insight from which education in the
West emerged, seemingly lost or forgotten, that the unexamined life is not worth living

viii
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PROLOGUE: GOING OUT, NOT KNOWING WHITHER

By faith Abraham, when he was called to go o u t..., went out,
not knowing whither he went. (The Holv Bible. 1985, Hebrews 11:8)
It is required o f me that I begin this work with an introduction, a beginning by
which to bring my reader into the life and purpose o f this work, hi truth, I grasp for
such a beginning, yet find myself unable to find one, or unable to settle upon one among
many possible beginnings. The task amounts to rendering an account for what I have
said, to granting the reader some insight into the questions and understandings which
have led me to say what I have said in the way that I have said it, and even to telling and
explaining to the reader what I have in fact actually said in this work. Thus, I begin with
Abraham, because like him, I not only presently "go out" not knowing exactly whither,
but also I have "gone out" in this work, in my own education, and in my life, because o f
a certain call, though definitively an uncertain one, shrouded in mystery, not knowing,
and not knowing whither I went. This autobiographical confession is, as well, not only
significant with regard to the project which I have here taken up, but directly related to
it, in fact.
The call o f which I speak, for lack o f a better language, is the call o f faith, o f
spirit, o f the sacred, o f the inescapable and essential mystery o f life. In a very real sense,
it is the call o f the universal, o f the eternal, and o f the divine, as well, and the recognition
of its import and place in the particularity, historicity and temporality o f human life. For
humanity, the being whose very being is at issue and whose existential meaning is care in
its temporality (Heidegger, 1927/1962), faith is universal (Derrida, 1994, October 3); in
1
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2
the words o f Paul Tillich (1957), faith is "the state o f being ultimately concerned" (p. t).
According to Clement o f Alexandria, "faith is the ear o f the soul" (cited in Mead, 1989,
p. 131). It hears and hearkens, and, more often than not, is compelled to go out not
knowing whither. "Faith is the daring o f the soul to go farther than it can see" (Clarke,
cited in Mead, 1989, p. 131).
Yet faith can be sorely tried and lost, in the sense o f having been forgotten or
denied, or become idolatrous, perversely directed against life and spirit, the animating
principle o f life, toward the visible only. In this way, it is possible for humanity, in
forgetfUlness, to set under erasure even the idea o f the invisible, and the very question of
ultimacy and concern itself: ideals regarding the good, the true and the beautiful in the
life-world not taken for granted or argued over even, but completely buried and entirely
unthought. As it is said, "Where there is no vision, the people perish..." (The Holy
Bible, 1985, Proverbs 29:18) because faith is perishing, the imagination and language o f
vision, "the heart o f the mind” (Anonymous, cited in Mead, 1989, p. 129).
This dire possibility is that which my soul has heard, an actuality practically, in
fact, in the W estern world, to which my soul has been summoned to respond. By
whatever description—"the disenchantment o f the world," in the words o f Max Weber;
the "despiritualization" o f the life-world and o f human existence, in the thought o f Joel
Kovel—the consciousness which pervades and prevails in the West today is secular
consciousness—our knowledge o f ourselves, o f the world, o f life and human existence
nearly void o f any notions o f the sacred or transcendent. While this situation may be
viewed as admirable in these post-Nietzschean times, and a mark o f human progress,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

3
enlightenment and liberation, it seems that, in our attempts to gain this world, we have,
in the process, lost our souls.
Tillich (1988b) describes our world situation, our historically constitutive
interpretation o f existence, as one o f crisis, marked by this loss o f "soul." The relation of
the human subject and o f human society to a transcendent reality, which historically has
served as the center o f meaning for humanity, is gone or no longer has power. In
addition, reason, believed in as humanity's guiding principle, has become sacrificed as
"the power o f truth and justice embodied in man as man" (p. 4) for "technical reason," a
tool in the service o f technical society, usually at the expense o f the common good, or of
personal good. The "soul" o f reason has been lost, as well, one could say. He goes on
to say that in our attempts to control nature, a "second nature" has arisen, born o f
humankind, but not subject to humankind—a Leviathan, a Frankenstein, threatening to
swallow or strangle us whole. In effect, "the decisive feature o f the period ... is the loss
of control by human reason over man's historical existence" (p. 7, emphasis in original).
Thus, this crisis ensues: o f faith, o f reason, o f human existence and subjectivity in the
world.
The psychoanalytic scholar Robert Romanyshyn (1989) states it in these terms:
Having dominated the earth out o f our increasing distance’from it, we
have come to believe that we are masters, and even creators. And in so
doing we have lost the sense that we are sponsored, which means
supported, upheld, and already sent on the way. hi this respect, we have
lost something o f the religious sense o f human life, in the root meaning o f
that term, the sense that we are already bound, and connected to, and
limited by something beyond ourselves, h i breaking the bond o f gravity
[via space technology] we have broken more than a physical restraint.
We have broken the spiritual condition o f humanity, (p. 25)

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

4
The resultant loss is the dismissal o f the spiritual, the absence o f depth. For Tillich
(1988a), the loss o f the dimension o f depth is, in fact, the loss o f the religious. Depth is
religion itsel£ and religion is the substance o f culture. It is the passionate search for the
meaning o f existence and "the state o f being concerned about one's being and about
being universally" ( p. 42), the call o f faith. This depth from which we have departed can
be described, then, as the ability to answer for ourselves the crucial and pressing
question: "What is the meaning o f life?" Through this loss o f depth, not only can we not
answer the question, but we also lack the courage or consciousness, the ability to even
ask the serious questions life poses us. We neither hear nor receive, as well, the answers.
I might add that without this dimension, without this search, without this call, humanity
is without vision, without soul;1 humanity is neither free nor full humanity.
I am in agreement, too, with Harvey Cox (1984) that while secularization, the
heir o f the prophets who have preached against the injustices sanctioned in the name of
religion, has been a strong force in the history o f human freedom and a "legitimate
response to the illegitimate use o f the sacred" (p. 170), it has pushed itself to excess,
manufacturing its own "pseudosacral devices" like the "goddess o f Reason" and the

^ e word "soul" has an unclear etymology, and its definitions vary greatly with
use. However, the term is ever referential o f that which is vital, cojoined with life.
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, "soul" signifies "the principle o f life...; the
principle o f thought and action...; the spiritual p a rt...; the seat o f the emotions...; the
vital, sensitive, or rational principle; the inspirer or leader...; the active agent, prime
m over...; and the essential, fundamental, or animating part, element or feature of
something" (1989, Vol. XVI, pp. 40-41). Joel Kovel (1991) describes "soul" simply as
"the spiritual form taken by the se lf (p. 33), in relation to humanity in particular. The
loss o f soul o f which I am speaking in this case connotes, then, the deprivation of the
self s spiritual principle.
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"tomb of Lenin," and created its own illegitimate sanctions against freedom and justice.
"If freedom once required a secular critique o f religion, it can also require a religious
critique o f the secular" (p. 171). I construe this present work as a part o f such a critique,
although I prefer to consider it something o f a deconstruction o f the secular which makes
manifest its internal relationship with the sacred and elucidates the possibility o f a kinship
between a hermeneutics o f suspicion and a hermeneutics o f restoration (reason and faith,
knowledge and value, secular and sacred, the critical and the creative). This work
suggests the possibility o f legitimate transcendence—the path o f depth, o f affirmation in
the light o f negation and critique, o f a liberatory hermeneutics o f redemption.2 In the
words o f Theodor Adorno (1974/1978), "The only philosophy which can be responsibly
practiced in the face o f despair is the attempt to contemplate all things as they would
present themselves from the standpoint o f redemption. Knowledge has no light but that
shed on the world by redemption" (p. 247).
The form o f this inquiry may best be described, then, as a philosophical history, in
the words o f Hegel, which is the prerequisite for all historical writing, according to R. G.
Collingwood (MacIntyre, 1984): a narrative o f fall or decline, marked by order and
disorder, achievement and failure, and o f recovery. Richard Bernstein (1991b) speaks
similarly o f the centrality o f narratives in philosophy, and this "common rhetorical

Redemption is, o f course, usually perceived as a religious term, and well it is,
particularly here in the interest o f recalling "spirit” or "soul” in the contemporary world,
in the human realm, o f nurturing hope on the other side o f modern darkness and despair.
The origins o f the word, however, introduce a much broader meaning, found in the Latin
infinitive redimSre. meaning: to buy back, to regain, to recover, to reclaim, to restore, to
make good, to free, and to fulfill fOED. 1989, Vol. X m , pp. 410,412).
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pattern" o f "anticipations, setbacks, and trials” which "culminate with the progressive
realization o f truth and reason” (p. 31), particularly some truth not seen before yet
revealed as in a glass darkly to the philosopher telling the tale. However, he speaks also
o f the dramatic reversal o f this pattern, begun with Nietzsche in his genealogical
exposure o f the history o f reason concluding in nihilism: the narrative o f "relentless
decline, degeneration, catastrophe, and forgetfulness" (p. 32). In this work, I am clearly
seeking to reckon with and take up both o f these genres o f philosophical narrative, which
obviously necessitates the need for something along the order o f redemptive hope,
perhaps in the dialectical manner posited by Adorno and Horkheimer (1944/1972). Even
still, within Nietzsche's philosophy can be gleaned the structure and trace o f the common
rhetorical pattern, nihilism the truth seen by him through a glass darkly and restorative
speculations brought forth.
I am struggling here to make my aim and my approach to that aim explicit for
and transparent to the reader, which is not without its irony. I have begun this endeavor
with the quandary o f Abraham, for this reason, because I am faced with the problem of a
thesis and o f prefacing, in the words o f Jacques Derrida (1972/1981), the problem of
seeking to reduce thought, to constrain meaning, to tie the text down to the graspable
and known, which is also the problem o f not trusting in the power o f language—o f the
logos, the word—to speak meaningfully in manifold ways, nor in the efficacy o f the
reader's experience o f interacting with the text, o f textual encounter. Yet, at the heart of
the hermeneutical position is that understanding "happens" only in the inter-"play" of
dialogue, and I hope here for the happening o f understanding, and the experience o f the
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7
"inner infinity o f the dialogue" and also o f the "infinity o f the unsaid" (Gadamer,
1960/1992). hi many ways, such a requirement is bom from a kind o f faithless faith, in
which the ultimate concern is for control, for certainty, the possession o f the unknown;
it operates by the assumption (or should I say delusion?) that humanity can wholly
master knowledge, language, reality, the entire realm o f meaning: that humanity can gain
the whole world. I am writing about faith, about our cultural crisis o f frith, and yet I am
asked in the writing to go out, knowing quite well whither, and to send my readers on
their way, giving them as well, the knowledge o f the precise path and destination. I am
seeking to address the issue o f this loss o f depth or soul in our society: the denial o f the
mysterious, o f that beyond us and beyond all our knowing, of the "moreness" (Huebner,
1995, in press) felt but to which we can never truly arrive; or in that impulse to connect
with the sacred, to experience the transcendent, its reduction. Yet, I am asked to reduce
this address to an explanation, a thesis, and a methodology—to create in an introduction
this elaborate imitation o f control, a kind o f performance which is the mark o f modem
practice in the West, and what I see to be a harmful compulsion from which we need
deliverance.
Says Kenneth Wilber (1995):
We might have lost the Light and the Height, but more frightening, we
have lost the Mystery and the Deep, the Emptiness and the Abyss, and
lost it in a world dedicated to surfaces and shadows, exteriors and shells,
whose prophets lovingly exhort us to dive into the shallow end o f the
pool head first, (p. xi)
I am frightened of these shallow waters, and while I am here compelled to draw from the
depths in the making o f some shallow pool for its presentation, I do it under protest,
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8
calling attention to the very act and subverting it, and I would not dream o f recruiting
any divers. For this reason, I have crafted the substance o f this work in a very particular
way, written it intentionally in a different or non-conventional manner through the use
o f story, and through the non-use o f the proverbial "I." Both "techniques" work in
concert with the aim o f reconciliation, o f reviving depth, o f pointing to the universal, to
that beyond the self and beyond telling. The assertion o f the "I" risks the separation o f
the writer from the reader, and the suggestion that the author autonomously wields the
text. The stories are ours as much as mine. Stories, as well, tending to show rather than
tell, exceed explanation-theoretical postulations, thesis statements (Trousdale,
Woestehoff & Schwartz, 1994).
A story is synthetical or analogical, able to articulate similarity-in-difference
(Tracy, 1981), rather than analytical; thus, in relation to story we speak o f the notion o f
narrative unity, and coherence. Stories bring together, rather than break down. In
addition, as Thomas Berry (199S, January) has said, the parts are exalted in the whole
beyond themselves, and the whole shows forth the divine in more beauty than do the
parts. If the crisis o f our day can be described as a crisis o f faith, which is also a
breakdown o f meaning and o f intelligibility productive of alienation, then it can also be
characterized as a crisis o f story and o f understanding and o f the imagination and o f
language. Understanding is primarily narrative. It is not only a historical legacy to
conceive o f the self o f life, in some narrative form, but it is also the natural mode o f self
perception (MacIntyre, 1984). In this way, I agree with Fredric Jameson that narrative is
an essential epistemological category: "Reality presents itself to the human mind ... in
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the form o f stories" (Selden, 1989, p. 47), which are aesthetic creations o f the human
imagination (Chase, 1960).
Clearly, story and imagination are integrally related. Story is, perhaps,
imagination's performance. Whatever the case, it seems clear that without story, no
imagination is manifested, and without imagination, no stories could exist.
Without imagination, nothing in the world could be meaningful. Without
imagination, we could never reason toward knowledge o f reality....
Imagination is our capacity to organize mental representations... into
meaningful coherent unities,... our capacity to mold experience, to bring
something new out o f the old, or to sympathetically project [ourselves]
into the position o f another. (Johnson, 1987, pp. ix, 140,141, emphasis
mine)
A crisis o f meaning, o f coherence, then, is a crisis o f the imagination, o f understanding,
and o f story. Such, as I have said, is also a crisis o f language. In the prosaic
contemporary West, lost somehow is the poetic, story's language and source and style
(Pellowslti, 1977), the language o f the imagination, o f vision, of faith. Thus, I have
attempted in this work to revive the poetic, to include story, because we are poetic by
nature and because we are our stories.
Narratives comprise, then, the basic structure o f existence, or at least that
structure by which existence is interpreted, understood, given value. Each o f us, in the
course o f living, participate in narratives o f one sort or another, and comprehend our
existence in terms o f the narratives we have lived out. Self and world coherence depends
on a sight o f these larger contexts within which we all dwell, the narratives which have
made us, the histories into which we have been born. We come to understand the lives
o f others, as well, both past and present actions, and their aspirations for the future, in
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terms o f a narrative context and o f narrative histories. Our own utterances and actions
are only meaningful as they find their place within some narrative. We are held
accountable for them, as well, and for the narratives o f which we are authors, or
subjects, and those within which we participate; we must answer for them in some
intelligible and responsible manner. O f course, we are never the sole authors o f these
stories, perhaps not even lead ones; thus, there is this element o f unpredictability or
mystery within a partially teleological structure. There are constraints, then, to their
intelligible continuance; our narratives can lapse into unintelligibility, which seems to be
a part o f the crisis. Before we know what we should do, we must have a sense o f what
story or stories in which we find ourselves. Alasdair MacIntyre (1984) goes on to say
further and as well that "there is no way to give us an understanding o f any society,
including our own, except through the stock o f stories which constitute its initial
dramatic resources. Mythology, in its original sense, is at the heart of things" (p. 216).
I, therefore, draw explicitly on certain myths I feel to be influential in W estern
thought or particularly helpful in giving us insight into the development o f thought in the
West. I am asserting, then, as well, the indelible connection and virtual inseparability of
story, myth and imagination. Myth literally means "story." Ortega y Gasset (1957/1961)
has described myth as the "leaven o f history" and traces the distinction we make between
myth and story as involving a development in human thought, akin to Weber’s notion o f
disenchantment and Kovel's idea o f despiritualization, in which we could no longer
believe in the historical and cosmogonic reality o f our own narratives. However, he
maintains that "even deprived o f all religious significance, the epic themes, the mythical

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.

II
seeds not only endure as splendid irreplaceable phantoms, but they gain in liveliness;...
hoarded in literary memory, they constitute a poetic leaven o f incalculable energy" (p.
128). I might add, as well, that this energy is not without religious significance, though
its influence may be denied, unexamined, wholly unthought.
Richard Chase (I960), in fact, situating the power o f myth as in its function o f
mediating dualisms, claims that humanity lives in two worlds, essentially, the mundane
world o f the everyday and the "magico-religious" world. In accordance with his theory,
we, as humans, employ both psychic and social means to keep these two worlds
separate. It could be said that we know two principles o f causation; the natural and the
supernatural. Chase prefers to use the word preternatural rather than supernatural,
which implies a distinction between the objective world and "supersensuous" experience
which ought not to be made. The preternatural is the extraordinary, the uncanny, the
mysterious, the powerful or numinous, that which has "mana." While the preternatural is
set off from the world as ordinarily experienced, it is not because the preternatural is less
than real as commonly known, but because it is more than ordinarily real. The mythic
within any narrative—and I would add, constitutive o f narrative, or story—is that which
unites the real and ideal (the imagination). Chase speaks o f it as that which "suffuses the
natural with preternatural efficacy (mana)" (p. 135).
The mythic power o f story lies, then, in its "resurrection o f a primeval reality,
told in satisfaction o f deep religious wants, moral cravings, social submissions and even
practical requirements" (Malinowski, cited in Chase, 1960, p. 135). I concur with Chase
that story, as a Promethean force, somehow acts as a mediator between God and
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humankind, and as such, is crowned with life-giving potential. Chase describes its action
well:
Story dramatizes in poetic form the disharmonies, the deep neurotic
disturbances which may be occasioned by this clash o f inward and
outward forces, and that by reconciling the opposing forces, by making
them interact... toward a common e n d ,... [it] performs a profoundly
beneficial life-giving act. (I960, p. 143)
Thus, story seems, to me, to be the perfect medium through which to revive the
question o f faith, a main interest in this work. Faith, too, is a mediator between the
human and the divine, between the eternal and the temporal, between the preternatural
and the mundane, between the ideal and the actual. In acts o f reconciliation, faith, too,
"makes the discords o f the present the harmonies o f the future" (Coliyer, cited in Mead,
1989). Faith is often also expressed in terms o f its object, most often in the West
expressed in the idea o f God, an idea which obviously ever needs unpacking
symbolically, one which has even been declared "dead" in the world of Western
modernity. John Dewey (1934), wrestling with this symbology o f God in human
consciousness, defines the concept in this way. "It is this active relation between ideal
and actual to which I would give the name 'God'" (p. 51, emphasis in original). In like
manner, Alfred North Whitehead (1978), discusses the primordial conceptual nature o f
God and the consequent derivative nature o f God, the tension between permanence and
flux. He identifies God as "the unlimited conceptual realization o f the absolute wealth o f
potentiality," and "the eternal urge o f desire," "the initial object o f desire," establishing
the beginning o f every subjective aim (p. 343). The crux o f the matter, he suggests, is
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"everlastingness," "the content o f that vision upon which the finer religions are built—the
'many1absorbed everlastingly in the final unity" (p. 347). Whitehead concludes:
The concept o f God is the way in which we understand this incredible fact
[that which is beyond understanding]—that which cannot be, yet is.... In
this way, the insistent craving is justified—the insistent craving that zest
for existence be refreshed by the ever-present unfading importance, o f our
immediate actions, which perish and yet live forevermore. (pp. 3S0,351)
My interest in this sort o f inquiry has been a consequence, in part, o f my own
personal crisis o f faith, and o f the "death o f God” in my own consciousness, and,
therefore, o f my need to interrogate my own education: that which I had been taught
and the way in which I had been taught it, that which I had learned and how I had
learned it—the development o f my mind, the movements o f my soul, which had brought
me to this state o f crisis, and to this "deadly" culmination. Such would mean a
reflection, as well, upon the nature o f education itself—what it is, what it purports itself
to be, what it claims to effect, its aims and ends. My purpose, then, is not to address
faith and God solely o r explicitly, but rather to consider them in the context o f and as
they are brought to bear on (as they operate within) the West's great and enduring
project o f faith, the project o f education, reason's guardian, the frith o f reason. O f
course, such is a project and a frith in crisis also in our day—"the sweet dreams o f reason
dying," as has been said.
Clearly, my notion o f education encompasses a great deal more than the content
of schooling as it presently stands, although schools, in some senses, have taken the
place formerly occupied by church and family in the education o f the young. What I
mean is that it seems great expectations are being placed increasingly on schools by
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parents and educators, by society, in terms o f our ultimate concerns involving not only
economic and material security and global competitiveness, but also cultural preservation
and transformation, individual actualization and fulfillment, the plight o f the oppressed,
and the promotion o f values and recovery o f some normative ethics. A part o f the crisis
o f contemporary experience, in fact, rests within this frame. Ever becoming more
apparent is that the "good life” cannot be reduced to the mere acquisition o f material
goods, o f economic success, o f material well-being, nor the comfortable life o f leisure
these possessions afford. The politically powerful, the wealthy, and the famous—
generally via the possession o f knowledge or money or skill, seen as the fruits o f reason—
are not necessarily the free or blessed.
The education o f which I am speaking, then, is something more and other than
the accumulation o f knowledge or transmission and acquisition o f competencies and
skills, though these are important and not unrelated to its spiritual and religious function
or grounding, which is where my interest lies because it is a grounding which, with this
loss o f depth o f which I have been speaking, has also been lost. Dewey has said that
education is concerned with what does not yet exist (Noddings, 1993); as such, it is
humanity's attempt to negotiate paths between the actual and the ideal—in this sense,
related to and not at all unconcerned with the idea o f God, at least as Dewey and
Whitehead have characterized this idea, symbolically. Education is a project o f faith, in
this way, referential o f the spiritual journey o f humanity—o f society, o f culture, o f
civilization, o f self. Such is also education in its classical sense, the upward journey of
the soul, in the words o f Plato, concerning freedom and transcendence. This journey is
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built on the assertion o f Socrates that the unexamined life is not worth living, which
implies a faith that the examination o f life might assist us in living lives o f worth and
meaning, in creating such lives, which implies a passion for the possible beyond what is.
The primary impulse behind the project o f education is, as it were, related to that impulse
behind religion which Tillich has described as the search for depth, the question o f life's
meaning. It is an existential enterprise which concerns the art o f living, involving an
inquiry into being in the world and an examination o f the life-world, in relation to the
question o f human existence and agency, to the possibility o f living in a worthwhile way.
In Chapter One, "Dying Idols, Difficult Commandments and the Call o f Faith," I
tell the story in Western Civilization o f humanity's relationship to the sacred. Such
involves an inquiry into our changing perspectives on the divine, on that which claims
ultimacy in human consciousness. Inclusive therein are also changes with respect to our
view o f ourselves, each other, the life-world, and even the stories we tell about human
existence through time. I draw primarily upon such stories as they are told by three
European scholars: Frederick Nietzsche (1883/1982a), Paul Ricoeur (1969/1974) and
Jacques Derrida (1992/1995). These men address our culture's most fundamental
problems with boldness, insight, critique and vision. At their core, the crises o f our times
are crises concerning our own consciousness o f ourselves, the cosmos and our place in
it, and of what constitutes the good in human life. My aim is to provide a background
for grasping more frilly the troublesome and enigmatic nature o f the present, to set up a
broad framework for inquiry into its historical origins, for understanding better the
changes through which Western culture has passed, culminating in the current historical
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moment. Implicit is the assertion that the problems we face must be seen in terms o f
their historical genealogies and investigated in such a way that they are not addressed
superficially in terms o f present symptomology, but rather probed into regarding their
origins and roots, by digging up, raising and attending to the foundational questions at
their very core.
The chapter opens with and is framed by Nietzsche's (1883/I982a) narrative, "On
The Three Metamorphoses," which presents us with three transformations o f the spirit
and three images—a camel, a lion and a child—considered as they stand metaphorically in
relation to human life, through which I illumine humanity's history with the sacred in the
West, and trace the evolution o f spirit wrought in its people and culture. Beneath this
genealogy, and upholding it, is the affirmation o f the primacy o f spirit and transformation
in human life. Each metamorphosis can be seen as a pivotal moment in the human
history and consciousness o f Western civilization, each image a representation o f the
tenor and spirit o f the times, o f the dominant human stance taken in and toward life.
The metamorphoses parallel the movements o f humankind upon which Ricoeur
(1969/1974) looks in "Religion, Atheism, Faith." He seeks to inquire into frith, which I
liken to Nietzsche's spirit o f the child, as a movement and future hope through which we
might traverse the dialectical relationship between religion, or camel-spirit, and atheism,
the spirit as lion. In this way, faith is not seen as a linear conclusion following on the
heels of the human evolution from religion, in its primitive sense, to atheism, which for
Ricoeur is inclusive o f more than its literal sense. It is, however, forward-looking, a kind
of synthesis involving religion and atheism, and yet also a metamorphosis moving
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humanity beyond them. Clearly seen are the idols o f religion, hidden and dying, and
keenly felt, the difficulty o f the commandments once presumed to give life. The people
o f the West, for the most part, no longer revel in carrying burdens into the desert like the
camel; the burden o f "Thou Shalt” is no longer a weight wholly welcome. Rather, we
are brought to a new appreciation o f atheism through this awareness it announces.
Paradoxically, like one crying out a "sacred 'No'" in the wilderness, analogous to the
message o f repentance, the beauty o f atheism is in the roar o f the lion who awakens its
jungle inhabitants to the sound o f freedom. Yet atheism, too, is insufficient, unable to
enter the game o f creation, to begin anew, or utter a "sacred Yes'" to life. We are left,
then, with the spirit o f the child as that transformation, desirable, longed-for, but not yet
present, the yet-to-come promise o f faith.
The work o f Derrida (1992/1995) is introduced to inquire further into this
history--to illumine the continuities and disruptions extant in these human
metamorphoses, to shed light on the tensions formed between sacred and secular, as well
as to elucidate the concepts in question, and the relationships among them: religion,
atheism, faith, the sacred, the eternal, the temporal, the death o f God, the birth o f the
human subject, freedom, responsibility, and history. Derrida's history is what he calls a
"crypto- or mysta-genealogy o f responsibility," in which he claims that history (European
history, the history o f Western civilization) finds its meaning or function in this
movement o f humanity toward responsibility, and posits history itself as responsibility.
Religion here is considered in a different sense from the way in which Ricoeur considers
it (though they are related), synonymous with responsibility in Derrida's formulation,
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primarily because in looking at the West he must center his discussion of religion in
Christianity. Christianity, as a religion, carries within it the call by grace to transcend
primitive religion grounded in commandment, obedience, duty and fear. Responsibility
in Derrida is linked not only with religion, and with freedom and frith, but also with the
birth o f the human subject, which corresponds to the rise o f reason and initiates the
critique o f religion, culminating in "the death o f God," and atheism, secular history.
This genealogy, beginning before and lying beneath religion, begins with the
"daimonic" self o f humanity enmeshed in the "orgiastic sacred" and traces its
metamorphoses through the Platonic self, which has denied and yet retained the sacred
mystery, to the responsible self or the fully differentiated human subject, which has o f
course incorporated the former and is expressed via religion in terms o f the unfathomable
depth o f the human soul, compelled to respond in its singularity before the ultimate
Other, God. While Riceour traces for us a historical process involving the
demythification, demystification or demytholigization o f human consciousness in relation
to itself the cosmos, the sacred, Derrida unmasks the repressed yet incorporated and
constitutive sacred mystery at the core o f human consciousness and metamorphosis. His
is a process o f remythification, remystification, remythologization: the revelation o f
history's intra-mythology, the religious or sacred which lies at the very heart o f history.
Recognizing this, history's secret, also critical to understanding the crises o f our
times is the moment in human thought, or history, when the declaration is made that
"God is dead," and the aftermath o f such a conclusion. Ricoeur suggests that we in the
West dwell still in this aftermath, a time of confusion, mourning, even anger—violent
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reaction to this loss. Raised, then, is the primacy o f the question o f faith, for herein
human faith is sorely tried, perhaps even overthrown. Yet faith, like the sacred mystery,
ever is, however repressed, denied, forgotten or misdirected, hi this sense, though gods
may die, divinity lives on; and humankind is condemned to faith, to some ultimate care
and concern. Both Ricoeur and Derrida are thus drawn to faith's call, in response to
contemporary straits, and Nietzsche to this metamorphosis o f the spirit as child—an
image o f faith: fulfillment o f the past, blessing o f the present, hope o f the future. At the
chapter's end, I leave the reader with the promise o f faith, but the task remains to
uncover the effects o f God's death upon us and our world.
Yet, can God ever in truth be dead? We kill one god, and raise ourselves up
another, whether it be in the fashioning o f a golden calf or o f ourselves as sovereign—or
some other object o f faith. Yet die, gods do, or we kill them. It is in Chapter Two,
"Curse, Crisis and the Reign o f Death," that I invite the reader to look into the aftermath
o f this burial o f God in the West. Such an inquiry is not simply an avenue through which
I can establish the crisis o f the present day, explicating it and tracing some o f its sources,
and posit it as a crisis o f faith, the crux o f which is ultimately spiritual—ontological or
soul sickness at the heart o f humanity. The endeavor also provides a means through
which I might seek to elucidate this state o f things in our times, that we may glean
insight into it and hopefully better understand or know how to find our way in it and
through it redemptively.
Admittedly, in describing the nature o f this crisis—its extensiveness, its severity,
its all-encompassing scope, I attempt, in fact, to "prove" its existence, and begin laying a
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groundwork toward providing a rationale for looking anew at human faith, for insisting
upon its import in our constitution o f the sel£ o f society, o f the world, and all their
destinies. These dark days are presented, then, in terms o f the human crisis o f faith in
Western civilization, and as the manifestation o f a spiritual crisis—in the presence o f my
interest in exhorting the reader to a renewed concern with the spiritual matters of
existence, and in reviving a language that can speak spirit and grant it breathing room.
Through such, we might think more deeply upon the source and summit o f our present
plights and most pressing cares, and perhaps respond more wisely in and to them.
Picking up from Chapter One, I proceed with this large, overarching history of
where we are ontologically and spiritually, from whence we've come—more specifically,
where we Westerners are and where we have led and are continuing to lead the world.
From Nietzsche's "God is dead” proclamation, I am seeking to further escalate the
urgency o f things globally, and suggest, that where God is dead—as the author and
source and breath o f life—so begins the languishing o f all things: for banished, as well, is
life, and spirit, the animating principle o f life. The death of God, in this sense, intimates
the Reign o f Death in human consciousness. God is not only dead, then, and we have
not only killed him ourselves, but with our posture, we are also effecting the death o f the
world, o f humankind itsel£ of ourselves, as well. Tracing this fatal process, my aim is
basically to discuss and cite the "death" o f the world and of humanity through modem
thought, the seeds o f which are found much earlier in Western history and thought, to
explicate what I call this "Logic of Death" and illustrate its historical operation.
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The discussion is framed by the Judeo-Christian story o f Creation and o f the "Fall
o f Man" (The Holy Bible. 1985, Genesis 1-3) because it is a foundational myth o f origins
concerning the creation o f the world and humankind and human knowledge, regarding
humanity's relationship to the world, the divine, itself and this thing we call death.
Moreover, it is not merely a story but one o f mythic proportions within a tradition which
has a profound influence on W estern consciousness. Herein, again, is affirmed the
primacy o f the imagination in human thought and action, the images we set before us
defining the world, human existence in the world, and what is sacred to such existence.
This story is really about the death o f "man," however, not the death o f God. The
proclamation o f the sentence o f death is made against humanity. In this light, Nietzsche's
declaration that God is dead might be seen as another one o f those great reversals for
which he is so famous. Yet, the two pronouncements are related, a connection I strive
to show.
I rely upon a number o f thinkers to document this domination and development
o f death-each Weberian, or "very dark," in their presentation o f the progress of
humankind and human reason in the West, and in their critique o f its primary worldview.
These scholars, four in number, are: 1) Morris Berman (1981), with his discussion from
Max Weber on the modem "disenchantment o f the world"; 2) Joel Kovel (1991), with
his explication o f the "despiritualization o f the world" and its relationship to advanced
capitalism; 3) Douglas Sloan (1983), with his critique o f Western ways o f knowing via
science and its quantitative emphasis; and 4) Martin Heidegger (1950/1971a,
1952/I977a, 1952/I977b, 1954/I977c, and 1962/1977d), with his examination of the
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impact o f our stance toward and in the world, our present way o f being in it, in the
technological age—world violence, dehumanization, and the antithesis o f freedom.
What is at issue, then, I am suggesting, is how we are in the world, how we
know the world, ourselves and the divine—and how we relate to these and to all things.
Death is separation, and the history o f the West, in this sense, has been the separation o f
all things: subject, object, God, "man," mind, body—and spirit has been
excommunicated. Heidegger calls our position in the world one o f "enframing" in which
we challenge nature, and all the world, to reveal its treasures; and grab them up, store
them and use them up at our own will. In this way, we have not only killed God, but
have initiated as well the systematic killing o f the world which we have objectified.
Humanity, the human subject, the homeless, languishes too while slaying the earth, its
home. Heidegger describes how we ourselves are sucked up into this clutching grasp,
and objectified, freedom become an illusion. Distorted images o f the divine, o f humanity
and o f the world reign. From the "Ye shall be as gods" promise in our Genesis story, I
identify "enframing" with the quest for godhood, the will-to-power gone awry in an
incessant plucking and consumption of forbidden fruit. We are left with the bleak picture
these statistics paint: Cain slays Abel, and Holocaust and Hiroshima ensue. God has
perished, and we shall not only surely die, but also be the instruments o f death.
Chapters Three and Four may be read together, as they are parts one and two
respectively o f the same general theme: "Education, The Upward Journey and the Faith
of Reason." Certainly, by Chapter Two, I have left the reader with a very dark picture o f
our present plight, and o f the journey and destiny o f Western civilization. Yet, as ancient
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wisdom is fond o f reporting, where there is great darkness, great light also shall be.
Thus, I frame these chapters with a story o f light, one prophetic o f progress, goodness,
truth, and beauty—as opposed to curse, crisis and the reign o f death, hi truth, however,
in the biblical story o f the creation o f the world and the fall o f humanity, lies also the
seed o f redemption, the foreshadowing o f the great light o f salvation. Yet, with the
mythology o f Judeo-Christianity is another equally powerful influence in Western
thought and development: the Socratic tradition, Greek philosophy, Greco-Roman
thought, the vision o f Plato. Plato's "Allegory o f the Cave" (c.a. 380 b.c./1992) not only
construes human existence and the evolution o f humanity in terms of light, but also as
constitutive o f an upward journey of light and to light. The human soul is liberated from
the dark confines o f the cave to make its way upward to the brilliant light o f the sun and
the wide world warmed and lit up by such light.
The question is, again, one of reconciliation: How might we reconcile this story
o f the human attempt to make the godward ascent via the consumption o f the fruit o f
knowledge, resulting in destruction, and this similar one o f ascension, resulting in
blessedness and the sight o f the good? More to the point, how has this sojourn o f light,
explicated by Plato in such glowing colors, turned so easily to darkness in the West,
especially since the presence o f any light at all is known to dispel darkness? In these
chapters, I explore these questions, explicating Plato's image here of the education o f the
human soul and establishing its significance in the Western imagination, in the course of
human progress. The inquiry, pursued in the light o f the crises in which we now find
ourselves, ultimately aims at opening up our understanding, uncovering not only the
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dregs o f the past but also its forgotten treasures, toward some redemptive path and
avenue o f hope; yet, it is undertaken, Plato's (subsequently, the West's) journey o f light
is considered, in regard to its relationship to the journey o f darkness traced in Chapter
Two involving the dis-integration and de-spiritualization o f the world, supplementing and
continuing this history.
For, following the death o f God, the world, etc., comes this reign o f death: the
impending "death" o f the subject, and the "death" o f reason-biting questions regarding
human agency and efficacy in knowing and promoting the good, the true and the
beautiful in the life-world. Reason, subjectivity, the self and the notion o f life even
construed as a journey o f some narrative unity are under scrutiny. As Viktor Shklovsky
(1929/1990) has put it, "the prosaic universe [the modem world] is just one damn thing
after another” ( p. ix). Traumas o f meaning, value, significance, faith, in the presence o f
great darkness and in the absence o f the light o f the good. Fundamental, then, to what is
currently at issue in our culture is this crisis o f reason, doubts regarding its import,
function, place and centrality. Richard Bernstein (1991b), in his analysis o f the situation,
calls it the "rage against reason." Once our most prominent and revered possession,
reason has now been found seriously wanting, and in many cases is indicted as the cause
o f all the world's present woes.
Yet the kernel o f Western civilization can be most accurately depicted, in fact, as
the relentless pursuit o f reason and an unwavering faith in it as humanity’s hope for
achieving the knowledge o f the good, and the good itself. Plato is, as well, the man we
regard as the father o f reason in the great Western tradition, or at least the representative
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o f its father Socrates; and his "Allegory o f the Cave” is the expression o f not only the
"glory” o f reason, but the faith o f reason wherein education is set forth as the avenue
through which this faith is manifested and practiced—through which reason is aspired to,
discovered, acted upon and actualized-toward the realization o f human good. Because
o f the pervasive logic o f death and o f severing—the de-spiritualized world, according to
Kovel—in which we live and move, it is at first difficult for us to ascertain the
relationships between some o f these concerns, particularly here for us to hold together
the notions o f faith and reason, usually construed as unrelated and more often as
antagonists. Thus, in discussing Plato's image o f education as the transcendent journey
o f the soul to spirit, and the guardian, midwife and path o f reason, conceived by him as
divine, I do so with an eye toward elucidating this idea o f reason's faith, o f reason's
grounding in faith, the ultimate concerns o f humanity, and toward investigating the
historical dissociation o f faith and reason in Western consciousness. Highlighting this
"original'' unity (between faith and reason, knowledge and value, etc.) also sheds light
once again on the communion o f the secular and sacred, the sacred at the heart o f the
secular, the "religious meaning," in the words o f Ricoeur, or underpinnings, to history,
human subjectivity, reason, etc.—the omnipresence and omnipotence of mystery, despite
Western attempts at certainty, mastery, control, comprehensive knowledge and power.
Plato's portrait o f education is viewed, then, as a metaphor for the journey o f
humanity in the Western world, involving ascending climbs from the cave to the light o f
the sun, the intelligible realm, and descending returns to its dark confines, the visible
realm o f the senses. Just as Derrida identifies the Platonic self with the beginnings o f the
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birth o f the human subject, a "heightened" consciousness which has differentiated itself
from the "cave" o f the earth in some measure, Kenneth Wilber (1995) presents an
evolutionary history o f the Kosmos. a history o f spirit and humanity and human
consciousness in relation to the world and to spirit, that is consistent with Plato's
allegorical journey o f the soul. I draw upon his work to consider through time the
progressive reduction o f the Kosmos—in the Greek sense o f the full-bodied whole, the
"All" (physiosphere, biosphere, noosphere and theosphere) and that which can only be
symbolized yet never fully come to, or apprehended—to the cosmos, the totality o f which
we speak today which primarily rests upon the physical aspects o f the universe alone.
From this perspective, the death o f the world through the logic of severing is achieved
and viewed as evolutionary differentiation gone too far, into dissociation, subsequent
integration in a higher embrace involving the negation and preservation o f the former
denied—pathology. In the language o f Plato, the transcendent journey upward to the
intelligible realm o f the one (noospheric awareness, depth, inferiority, universality) is cut
off from the descending journey o f return to the sensible realm o f the world's eminent
manyness (physiospheric and biospheric embodiment, exteriority, particularity)—
pathology, and mis-education.
The sundering o f faith from reason, the movement o f reason from that treasured
in the West to that deconstructed, doubted and despised, and the renunciation and denial
of the faith which is its ground and guide, are traced in the context of the wars fought
between these two journeys (faiths, gods, teleologies) espoused in the West—o f ascent
and descent, having been separated, each truncated and having repressed the other. In
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Part 2, or Chapter 4 ,1 look specifically into the history o f education in regard to these
issues, as an institution, and as institutionalized, explicitly concerned with the education
o f the human "soul," and implicitly, with the advancement o f reason in humanity as a
whole. I draw predominantly on three different works in curriculum through which to
tell this story o f education: Curriculum History by David Hamilton (1990), which begins
with the "birth" o f education tracing it through to its mutation into "curriculum" with an
added emphasis on the tensions therein between absolutist/methodistic and enlightenment
thought; Understanding Curriculum by William Pinar, William Reynolds, Patrick
Slattery and Peter Taubman (1995), a historical piece investigating curriculum in terms
of these tensions as well with a focus on the movement in the field from an interest in
development and procedure to an attempt at understanding; and The Moral and
Spiritual Crisis in Education: A Curriculum for Justice and Compassion in Education bv
David Purpel (1989), which posits and explicates the state o f education as one o f moral
and spiritual crisis, seeking to address such by looking again at the traditions which have
formed Western education, particularly that o f prophetic Judeo-Christianity, in addition
to Socratic rationalism. A discussion o f education as a project o f faith, o f frith in reason
as the avenue through which humanity might address its deepest care and attain its
highest good, is inclusive herein. In tracing broadly this history—exemplary o f the splits,
wars, pathologies, documented in Chapter 3 (Part 1), the narrowing and trivialization of
the very notion o f education itself is clearly evidenced and seen. We are brought indeed
to the "death" o f reason, at least in the "original" or Platonic sense, inclusive o f the
notions of attunement with the Kosmos, blessedness, and friendship with all that is
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human and divine. Begun with Plato as the spiritual pilgrimage o f the soul upward, the
faith o f reason to actualize goodness, truth and beauty, and a foundational unifying
construct through which to consider humanity's ultimate happiness and concern,
education becomes and is reduced to little more than the business o f schooling, an
academic area o f research, an economic insurance policy, a material possession for
soul-less human societies and selves.
This work I present in an effort toward redemption. For, the thesis turns on the
primacy o f education, its historical import in the aspirations o f humanity in Western
civilization and in our constitution o f life and knowledge and human existence in the lifeworld—that deemed sacred or o f ultimate concern; and the present need to address its
abnegation and trivialization, its "death" via dissociation, repression, reduction—faithless
reason or reasonless faith, the loss o f a prior and primary grasp o f the Kosmic whole
(Sloan, 1983), a ground o f value and meaning. I am advocating a redemption o f sorts, a
revival or restoration o f that foundational insight o f the fathers o f education (of Socrates,
to be exact), seemingly forgotten or lost: the unexamined life is not worth living: o f
education, the faith o f reason, as the faithful examination o f the life-world, involving our
posture before and participation in the essential ambiguity o f life and mystery o f spirit,
toward this end of living that is worthy, toward apprehending and actualizing the good,
the true and the beautiful in human life.
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CHAPTER 1
DYING IDOLS, DIFFICULT COMMANDMENTS AND THE CALL OF FAITH

I tell you o f three metamorphoses o f the spirit: how the spirit
becomes a camel; and how the camel becomes a lion; and how the lion,
finally, becomes a child.
I tell you o f the spirit first that would bear much, whose way is
hard, for this spirit is strong and reverent, and its strength requires the
difficult and the most difficult. "O heroes, what is difficult, and most
difficult?” the spirit that would take all upon itself asks, kneeling to the
ground like a camel ready to be fully loaded. "I shall take such upon
myself that I may exult in my strength," it declares.
"Is it 'feeding on the acorns and grass o f knowledge and, for the
sake o f truth, suffering hunger in one's soul?*" (Nietzsche, 1883/1982a, p.
138).
"Or is it dwelling in rancid waters if they be the waters o f truth,
and not flinching in the face o f seething snakes o r icy toads?"
Like a camel well burdened, the spirit that would bear much and
the most difficult things speeds into its desert.
In the desert most lonely occurs the second metamorphosis: a
lion, who would master his own freedom and overcome his own desert,
the spirit becomes. Here he searches out his last lord and god with whom
he wishes to fight to the death. The ultimate triumph for which he longs
is in the battle with the great dragon.
This dragon, no longer to be known as master and king, who is
he? '"Thou shalt' is the name o f the great dragon" (p. 138). But "I will"
is the spirit o f the lion. "Thou shalt" stands before him as an immoveable
obstacle; it is a beast o f gold, with scales all over its body. Values they
are which shine from these scales: upon each scale shines a "golden
Thou shalt'” (p. 140).
The lion, though he cannot himself create, with the "I will" o f his
spirit prepares the way for invention, for new values. For without for
oneself the creation o f freedom, new creation is not possible. Thus, the
lion is the spirit o f a sacred "No," that realizes illusion and caprice in
"Thou shalt."
The spirit moves once again, and the preying lion becomes finally
a child. With the child comes the game o f creation. The child, a new
beginning, innocence and forgetting, utters now a sacred "Yes." The
spirit wills its own will, and having been lost to the world, now triumphs
over its own world.

29
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I have told you o f three metamorphoses o f the spirit: how the
spirit became a camel, and how the camel became a lion, and the lion at
last a child.
A retelling o f Nietzsche's "On The Three Metamorphoses," from
Zarathustra's Speeches in Thus Spoke Zarathustra (1883/1982a)
We do not readily speak o f Frederick Nietzsche (1883/I982a) as a man o f frith.
Yet, here is Zarathustra, his wise prophet, speaking o f spirit and transformation. Here is
the crowning metamorphosis o f spirit as child.1 What is the child but an image o f frith?

'Nietzsche does not expound on the signification o f this image o f the child, nor
does he develop any mythology o f the child as such; we are merely left with the image,
and the few words recounted in the story. However, the symbol o f the child figures
prominently in W estern and non-Westem cultures from ancient times, powerfully central
in mythology, religion and folklore. The child is often divine and typically endangered,
orphaned, hidden in obscurity and enduring trials o f all sorts, later to rise up as a great
leader or savior. In Greek mythology, the great god Zeus as a child lives under the
devouring threat o f his father Chronos, and his son Dionysus, a messianic figure, is in
danger o f being ripped to pieces by the Titans in his absence. The Roman twins
Romulus and Remus are abandoned as infonts, set adrift on the river Tiber. The mighty
deliverer o f the Jewish people, and chosen o f Yahweh, Moses is hidden as an infant in a
basket on the river among the bulrushes for fear o f death at the hands o f Pharaoh. The
Christian child divine, Jesus, enters the world with a similar plight, and "wise men" come
to worship him. Krishna's birth, as well, is threatened by another ruler, King Kansa, who
decrees the slaying o f all newborns (Capacchione, 1991). Folklore is full o f child heroes
who overcome, for example: Hansel and Gretel, Little Red Ridinghood, Rapunzel,
Cinderella, and Jack and the Beanstalk, in the fairytales o f Europe.
Some scholars, particularly Carl Jung and Joseph Campbell, have suggested that
myths and the symbols with which they are imbued live on because they speak to
universal human experience that transcends culture and history. The image o f the child
throughout history has been associated with the prophetic message o f hope, liberty, and
empowerment. In the Old Testament scriptures a vision is told o f the lion dwelling
peaceably beside the lamb, and of a child which leads them (The Holy Bible. 1985, Isaiah
11.6). In the New Testament scriptures, Jesus is credited on several occasions with
saying that one must become as a little child to inherit the Kingdom o f God (Matthew
11:25,18:3; Luke 18:16-17)—the child as a way to serenity, joy, peace, salvation,
divinity. The child is said to represent the core o f human being, full humanness,
aliveness, openness, wonder, play, enthusiasm—which means literally "in God."
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The child is the hope o f the future, the fulfillment o f the past, and the blessing o f the
present. The child, as innocence and forgetting and a new beginning, adopts in the
movement o f creation a "sacred 'Yes.'" The child responds to the world, to being-in-theworld,2 with a grand "Amen." The child is the pure affirmation o f existence, the
utterance o f a "sacred Yes'" to life, which is the substance o f faith.
Paul Ricoeur (1969/1974), in an essay entitled "Religion, Atheism, and Faith,"
presents something o f an ontological history of humanity's relation to the sacred, or at
least a sketch o f a history o f faith, as it were, in Western civilization. Ricoeufs scheme,
interestingly enough, is well-suited to the images o f Zarathustra's transformations o f
spirit. A response to the Nietzschean critique of religion and the hermeneutics o f

Contemporary psychology has picked up on this image to help hurting individuals
toward healing and wholeness through "Inner Child" work (Capacchione, 1991;
Whitfield, 1987; Whitfield, in Capacchione, 1991). Alice Miller (1983,1984) claims
that humanity manifests authenticity and creativity only through listening to and making a
dwelling for this voice o f the Child within, through the social and personal respect for the
preciousness o f the child.
Jung (1949/1989) identifies the image o f the child as an archetype, a symbol in
the collective unconscious o f the human race. The child announces a path for feture
change; it signifies transformation, and synthesis, particularly o f unconscious and
conscious elements held before at odds. It is the archetype bearing the power of
regeneration, a symbol o f wholeness and o f being in its totality. The child reveals to us
our journey as a whole, where we have strayed and the treasured aspirations we have
lost or forgotten along the way (Fontana, 1994). Jung (1949/1989) says o f the child: "It
is ... a symbol which unites the opposites; a mediator, bringer o f healing, that is, one
who makes whole" (p. 83).
T he notion o f "being-in-the-world" is drawn from Heidegger (1927/1962) in
Being and Time, referential to an understanding of subjectivity which is inseparable from
objectivity, to his identification o f human being as "Dasein," or being-there, the world
always and ever constitutive o f the being that is human.
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suspicion, Ricoeur boldly advocates a path, or eschatological metamorphosis, from
religion through atheism on the way to what he calls "faith." Clearly, aware o f the
dangers o f such a formulation, Ricoeur is careful to posit a frith distinct from religion;
his endeavor—though a personal radical challenge to accept the critique o f religion and
still remain a Christian—is not a deceptive and hypocritical method aimed at preserving
the "frith o f our fathers," snatching back with one hand what the insights of atheism have
compelled him to yield with the other. Ricoeur claims, "Atheism is not limited to the
mere negation and destruction of religion b u t... rather, it opens up the horizon for
something else, for a type o f frith that might be called... a postreligious frith o r a frith
for a postreligious age" (p. 440). Ricoeur looks forward to, grasps after, the spirit o f the
child.
Ricoeur begins with the spirit o f religion—the spirit as camel in Zarathustra's
parable. The camel, a beast o f burden, goes about bearing happily the loads placed upon
it in the fulfillment o f duty. The camel, reverent and submissive, exults in such exhibition
of virtue as it serves to assuage guilt and deliver comfort. Religion, in this sense, is a
primitive form o f life rooted in the fear o f punishment and the desire for protection.
These two drives correspond to the two main facets o f religion, taboo and refuge, as
well as to the two central countenances o f religious feeling, accusation and consolation.
This primordial structure, says Ricoeur, is one that must always be overcome by faith.
However, he is quick to admit that, perhaps, it is the case that these features represent
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the corrupt parts o f religion, in the same way that Marx viewed theology as the corrupt
part o f philosophy.
Nevertheless, the God o f religion is here one who both threatens and protects.
He3 is the ultimate danger and the ultimate protection. He is the God o f morality

3A word should be said about the gender o f God here. From Ricoeur, I am using
the pronoun "he" to refer to God, which Ricoeur has taken undoubtedly from Nietzsche
and Freud. In Nietzsche's famous pronouncement that God is dead, accounting this God
male, Nietzsche (1882/1974) goes on to say that we—you and I—have killed him. The
murder o f God, as well, in Freud's line o f thought, is akin psychologically to the murder
o f the Father figure, obviously masculine. This is neither to establish "the reality we call
'God' [which] exceeds all human expression” (Armstrong, 1994, p. xxi), an indescribable
reality we can only humanly symbolize, as male, nor to accuse Freud or Nietzsche or
Ricoeur o f sexist conceptions o f God, though they may, in fact, hold them. It is to posit,
rather, that "the human idea o f God has a history" (p. xx), and that in tracing the history
o f this idea in the West, the development o f the sacred in Western thought, we are
primarily inquiring into a masculine idea, emerging from a patriarchal worldview. Says
Karen Armstrong (19941 in A History o f God: "Because this God [the Judeo-Christian
God, and the Muslim God, as well] began as a specifically male deity, monotheists have
usually referred to it as lie'" (p. xxii). Since I am here investigating the history o f the
human stance toward this God, in the West, and presenting the ideas o f thinkers who
refer to God as "he," in the Western tradition, I am maintaining the "conventional
masculine terminology," the use o f "he" in reference to this God—too, for the sake o f
historical accuracy. The God who has died, in the West, is a male God.
Clearly, in contemporary times, with good reason, feminist scholars have called
into question this gendered, masculine conception o f God. Some feminist theologians
have even adopted what has been called a "hermeneutics o f rejection," dismissing the Old
Testament even, as an embodied testament o f a patriarchal society. Feminist thinkers
have also keenly brought to light how the subjugation o f women is inscribed in our
language, in our very definitions and "conceptualizations o f God, whose omniscience and
omnipotence are thought to be the religious pattern o f human rationality and freedom"
fCompanion Encyclopedia o f Theology. 1995, p. 491). Other theologians have drawn
attention to the actual double-gendered nature o f the Judeo-Christian God of the Old
Testament and to "his" problematic representation in the West, particularly as construed
in English translations. In the Hebrew and in Arabic, certain references to God are
grammatically feminine (Armstrong, 1994). In the Book o f Psalms (Psalms 22:9), God
is likened to a midwife, having brought David forth from the womb, a female image
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operating by the law o f retribution. Religion is set up as the foundation o f morality, and
through this rational scheme o f the law, also a moral vision o f the world: the God o f
Providence rules the world by this law o f retribution. Human response to the sacred is in
heeding prohibitions and following commandments—the edicts o f "Thou Shalt,"
commandments eventually found too difficult to bear.
Ricoeur’s aim is not formally a history or genealogy or evolutionary trace.
Rather, he seeks to examine atheism as a spiritual passageway from religion to faith.
Atheism is seen as a link between religion and frith which looks back at what it denies
and forward toward what it makes possible. For this reason, Ricoeur does not discuss
religion in great length, as such, but religion as it has been laid bare and exposed by the
work o f atheism. The spirit o f atheism comes on the scene, like the image o f the lion,
roaring a "sacred ’No.'" If the camel is subjection, the lion is rebellion. The lion is the
spirit o f "I will" who slays the great dragon "Thou Shalt," having discovered illusion
therein. Atheism—ferocious, majestic, free, in the spirit o f critique, dismantles and rips
away at the foundations o f religion.

ascribed to the divine deity (Companion Encyclopedia o f Theology. 199S). Even in the
English translations o f the Old Testament, the womb and breasts o f God are mentioned
on several occasions (The Holy Bible. 1985, Genesis 50:8, Job 21:24, and 38:39, for
example). Certainly, the conception o f God in the West, however, has been principally a
male conception. This fret, as well, seems to support the feminist claim "that all human
knowledge is shaped by the perspective of the knower, and that as knowledge has been
constructed in the Western world, those knowers have largely been the dominant males"
(Companion Encyclopedia o f Theology. 1995, p. 492).
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The focus in Ricoeur is on the atheism o f Nietzsche (1883/I982a, 1886/1966,
1887/1967a and I898/1967b)~and Freud (1925/1958), as well—because it represents a
different kind o f criticism unlike that o f empiricism or positivism Rather than fussing
over the proof o f the existence o f God o r the meaning or meaninglessness o f the concept
of God, this atheism uncovers the disguised symptoms o f fear and desire at the heart of
religion. In an assessment o f religion as refuge, the critique of the God o f morality is
fully accomplished. Atheism, then, lays bare a bidden meaning to religion that is
concealed from the believer through an "act o f dissimulation" which blocks any
investigation o f consciousness into its true origins. Religion is seen as a part o f the
cultural dimension o f experience, and the cultural function o f illusion is manifested. This
illusion is not along the order o f error or the ethics o f the lie, but rather o f a hidden
meaning that requires the stripping away o f masks, the deconstruction o f the camel's
burden. Ricoeur (1969/1974) situates atheism within this enlightenment: "The public
meanings o f our consciousness conceal true meanings, which can be brought to light
only by adopting the attitude o f suspicion and cautious critical scrutiny" (p. 442).
Atheism is justified.
In the Nietzschean critique, the ideal realm o f being o f the absolute good and the
intelligible—o f metaphysics—is interrogated; and this invisible source o f all values is
found to be empty, in so far as it is ideal, outside and above humanity, and a projection
into the heavens o f human frailty. This realm is akin to the superego, the seat o f moral
conscience, in the language o f Freud. The God o f prohibition does not exist and yet is
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the author, or father o f all prohibitions. Obligation is shown to be grounded in this
secret process referring back to an original act o f accusation, rooted in the will.
Accusation is, then, at the center o f duty. Thus, the consolation provided by this God is,
first, founded on fear, and second, on an infantile desire for protection. The instincts o f
fear and desire are discovered behind religion.
The figure o f God becomes, in many ways, ambiguous because he is not only the
one who condemns and punishes, but also the "Father" who comforts and protects.
Such relates to Freud's insight that religion is the highest function o f culture in that it
does not primarily set up an absolute authority to guide moral consciousness, but rather
attempts to address and ease the severity o f life. Here is Freud's "nostalgia for the
father," and religion becomes a covert operation o f the "pleasure principle." For
Nietzsche, it is weakness o f will.
The nature o f this God is revealed: He is the God o f prohibition and accusation,
o f refuge, of morality, and o f metaphysics. Metaphysics here represents that tightly-knit
system o f philosophy and theology in the form o f theodicy that attempts in the face of
evil to justify and defend the absolute goodness and power o f God. The atheistic
critique exposes some o f the underlying motives behind theodicy, but also behind those
philosophies-like those o f Kant and Hegel, for instance—which claim to go beyond
theodicy and still seek to reconcile rationally natural law with human freedom. Thus
comes the proclamation that must come through critique and the spirit o f a "sacred 'No'":
"God is dead." Metaphysics, too, is fatally wounded.
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As atheism, then, announces the death o f god and draws attention to the
emptiness at the source from which ethics and values spring (Derrida 1990; Nietzsche
1886/1966,1887/1967a and 1898/I967b), nihilism is not far behind. Nihilism, as such, is
not the creation o f atheism, or Nietzsche, but only that historical process to which both
bear witness.4 It is the historical manifestation o f the nothingness at the heart o f the
illusory origin, the ideal realm. It is the soul o f metaphysics borne, and an agonizing

4Nihilism, from nihil meaning "nothing," is generally defined as a loss o f values:
ethical, political, religious, social—the death o f "God." It involves a skepticism which
rejects all that is designated as real/unreal, or being/nonbeing, etc.; it denies the value o f
all distinctions; the conclusion drawn is that there is no objective, actual foundation o f
truth, that nothing is knowable, and that all human knowledge is illusory, relative, and
meaningless. Ultimately, there is found no justification for moral values esteemed and
posited. The universe knows no aim or purpose either, no meaning (Angeles, 1981). It
is the manifestation of nothingness.
Nietzsche (1887/1967a) calls nihilism a European Buddhism, the "sinister
symptom" o f a morality gone sinister, the morality o f pity, in which the human will in fact
turns itself against life. Nihilism is this weariness, wherein humanity is sorely tired of
humanity itself lost are the hopes for the human family, the love o f it, humanity's will to
itself. The human being, diminished and levelled, gives way to the "Great Nausea," this
will to nothingness spawned from the tyrannical ideal, against the earth and life and
humanity; nihilism is the consummation o f fear and nausea, or pity: terrified o f the
vacuous, o f the void, humanity must choose to will nothingness than not will at all. It is
the process in which the will to truth has gained self-consciousness, has overcome itself,
a process Nietzsche identifies as not only the most awful and dubious o f phenomena, but
also possibly the most hopeful.
Heidegger (1952/1977b) interprets nihilism, in the Nietzschean sense, as a
movement in history, the inner logic o f the West, that which has always reigned but is
manifest and determining in modem times. The word that "God is dead," then, has
already been uttered, insinuated in the very history o f the West as decided by
metaphysics. God is the ideal realm, the suprasensory, as understood by late Greek and
Christian appropriations o f Platonic philosophy: opposed to the sensory, visible world,
and that alone which is real. Yet, Nietzsche's affirmative stand remains: nihilism and its
consequential loss o f faith calls for not only the devaluation o f man's highest values, but
also the endeavor o f revaluing.
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cultural challenge. In Freudian terms, this process involves a personal renunciation o f
the "father," which is a process o f mourning. One realizes the relative nature o f the
superego. Ricoeur suggests that these are the two ways in which the origin o f values is
restored to itself—via nihilism and mourning. The god who has perished is the god o f
morality and accusation; the murderer, not atheism but this cultural process called
nihilism, and the personal one o f mourning in relation to the father figure.
Yet is God really dead? Perhaps, we peruse the landscape, and find him still alive
and well. Some o f us might even respond with relief; should the god o f morality die, we
would resuscitate him. Others o f us may wish he would just go on and finally die
already. Yet, it seems clear that historically something dramatic, however slowly, has
taken place—a "metamorphosis” such as this. Ricoeur says that, in regard to this god, we
think we know also what is the cause o f death: metaphysics' self-destruction via nihilism.
Who, however, has made this pronouncement o f death? All is called into question, for
it is the madman (from The Gay Science. 1882/1974), or Zarathustra, o r Nietzsche
himself who we all know lost his mind as well. Or the ferocious lion who is utterly free
and wild, measuring the world by himself alone, by the strength of his will. O f this
pronouncement, Ricoeur concludes: "Nothing is capable o f proving it [the death o f this
god], unless it be the new form o f life that this message makes possible, or the
affirmation" (1969/1974, p. 460).
The affirmation must come on the heels o f critique; the "sacred 'No'" must be
followed with the "sacred 'Yes.'" The aftermath o f this critique-the impact o f the
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arrival of this spirit o f atheism and the "sacred "No”*—is the destruction o f the god o f
morality as not only the source o f accusation but also o f protection. Ricoeur asserts that
if atheism has a religious meaning, and he believes that it does, that meaning is found in
its movement toward faith o f a new and different kind. It is a faith that positions itself in
relation to classical metaphysics in the same way as the character o f Job in the Old
Testament stood in relation to his friends. Contrary to his friends, Job's God is not the
god o f morality ruling the world under the auspices o f commandment, duty and the law
1985, Job). Ricoeur admits, renouncing something o f the
linearity of this formulation, that there have always been people o f faith who rejected this
God o f retribution, though few—whom we identify as saints, prophets, master teachers,
great souls. Theirs was the tragic faith o f Job, beyond assurance and protection.
Through atheism, the cultural burial of the God o f providence, and nihilism, points to the
possibility of this new kind o f faith, for many—a democracy o f great souls.
Nietzsche himself, despite himself seems to believe in this opening to faith, as
evidenced in the story o f Zarathustra, as well as in other shimmerings o f a positive
philosophy found in his works: like the affirmation o f Dionysus, the amorfati (the love
o f fate), the eternal return o f the same, and even the yearning for the overman5—one

The Dionysus affirmed by Nietzsche changes from his earlier to later works.
While Dionysus is ever passion, in The Birth o f Tragedy f l 872/19571 he is passion
unbridled and intoxicated, and in Twilight of the Idols (1889/1982b) he is passion
mastered and creatively engaged. The figure exuberantly, however, in all cases,
positively affirms this world, and human passion (Kaufinann, 1967). The eternal return
o f the same is that doctrine to which Nietzsche (1886/1966) is brought in plumbing the
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could argue. After Nietzsche—atheism, the lion—the question is left open; nothing is as
yet decided. The way ahead is fraught with danger and uncertainty. However, the way
to faith is ahead, asserts Ricoeun "I believe we are henceforth incapable o f returning to
an order o f moral life which would take the form o f a simple submission to
commandments or to an alien or supreme will, even if this will were represented as
divine. We must accept as a positive good the critique o f ethics and religion that has
been undertaken by the school o f suspicion. From it we have learned to understand that
the commandment that gives death, not life, is a product and projection o f our own
weakness" (1969/1974, p. 447).
Yet we have also learned o f the insufficiency o f atheism, that the lion's reign, too,
is an unsatisfactory conclusion. Though Nietzsche has these sprinkles o f the "sacred
'Yes'” throughout his work, it is dominated by rebellion and critique. Ricoeur states:
"This positive Nietzschean philosophy, which alone is capable o f conferring authority on
his negative hermeneutics, remains buried under the ruins that Nietzsche has
accumulated around him.... His aggression against Christianity remains caught up in the
attitude o f resentment; the rebel is not, and cannot be, at the same level as the prophet.

depths o f pessimism through thought. He claims that doing so has freed him from the
simple-mindedness and reduction o f this century’s world-denying thought, and has
opened his eyes to a new and opposite ideal winch is aliveness itself high-spiritedness,
and world advocacy. Such is akin to the amor fati. his love o f fate, an "amen" to the
infinite occurrence o f what is. For Nietzsche's (1883/I982a) discussion o f the overman,
man's positive triumph o f himself and "the meaning o f the earth," see section 3 in the
"Prologue" o f Thus Spoke Zarathustra f!883/1982al.
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Nietzsche's work remains an accusation o f accusation and hence fells short o f a pure
affirmation o f life" (p. 446-447).
We must find our way, then, to this "sacred 'Yes'" to life, to the affirmation o f the
child, to faith. For Ricoeur, the work o f the philosopher toward this end lies in exploring
what he sees as something o f a dialectic between religion and atheism, in digging beneath
the present antinomy and reviving the question. The task is opening up a measure o f
inquiry which could conceivably accomplish a negotiation by way o f atheism toward feith
for a postreligious age. O f course, such a negotiation could not be a meager
reconciliation o f a hermeneutics o f suspicion, that seeks to slay generations o f idols, and
a restorative hermeneutics, that works to resurrect the original living symbols behind
those idols. Yet, according to Ricoeur, the philosopher can only think and question in
this interim time—this period o f mourning, nihilism, instability, before the emergence o f a
new spirit, the recognizable metamorphosis from lion to child, atheism to feith. The rest
is the job of the prophet, perhaps.
Nevertheless, the challenge is posed: "We must now go further. Our critique o f
metaphysics and its search for rational reconciliation must give way to a positive
ontology, beyond resentment and accusation. Such a positive ontology consists in an
entirely nonethical vision, or what Nietzsche described as th e innocence o f becoming'"
(p. 457). Such a vision is, as such, beyond good and evil. Moreover, it must remain
open, having overcome dogmatism, lest it fell under the accusation o f its own critique. It
is a vision without certainty, then, having given up the fear and also the protection
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through its "becoming innocence." For Ricoeur, it involves the prophetic preaching o f a
freedom free from condemnation, and also consolation—at least o f the former kind. He
says: "An heir to the tragic faith o f Job,... it would be a faith that moves forward
through the shadows, in a new 'night o f the soul'—to adopt the language o f the mystics—
before a God who would not have the attributes o f Providence,' a God who would not
protect me but would surrender me to the dangers o f a life worthy o f being called
human" (p. 460).
Jacques Derrida (1992/1995), in The Gift o f Death, has taken up in part, albeit
not explicitly, the challenge o f Ricoeur, the task o f the philosopher in response to this
interim period o f loss. In addition, he has both supplemented and complicated this
formulation o f humanity's history with the divine which we have been investigating. He
has gone on to dig deeper than Ricoeur, perhaps, before religion and further beneath it,
uncovering more that is not only hidden, but also secretly retained in subsequent stages
or changes beyond. Within this frame, he elucidates what we might call the "religious
meaning"—for lack o f a better word—at the heart o f the secular, indeed at the heart o f
history itself. O f course, this religious meaning, we may more appropriately speak o f as
the esoteric or the sacred, perhaps even demonic meaning—the mystery, the inaccessible,
the Cloud o f Unknowing (Anonymous, ca. 1300/1957). Following Jan Patocka
(1975/1981), Derrida focuses on Western religion and philosophy, specifically
Christianity and Platonism, as the birthright o f responsibility, integrally linked to
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freedom, faith, history and the human subject.6 His central interest is in the growth or
development o f the notion o f responsibility in European history out o f humanity’s
relation to the sacred, and the moral and ethical meaning o f such a notion.
In Heretical Essays on the History o f Philosophy.7 Patodka discusses the
relationship between responsibility and secrecy or the mystery o f the sacred, highlighting
what Derrida calls their heterogeneity, or connection in opposition. "He warns against
an experience o f the sacred as an enthusiasm or fervor for fusion, cautioning in particular
against a form o f demonic rapture that has as its effect, and often as its first intention, the
removal of responsibility, the loss o f a sense o f consciousness o f responsibility" (Derrida,
1992/1995, p. I). Religion represents a break with this demonic secrecy in that it
appeals to a free and responsible self. Derrida, grounding his inquiry in the work o f
Patocka, does not fault him for reference only to the Christian religion, for the omission
o f some sort o f comparative analysis. He asserts: "It seems necessary to reinforce the
coherence o f a way o f thinking that takes into account the event of Christian mystery as
an absolute singularity, a religion par excellence and an irreducible condition for a joint

‘For an in-depth look at the kinship o f Derrida's work as a whole with the
question of responsibility, see Denise Egea-Kuehne's "Deconstruction Revisited and
Derrida's Call for Academic Responsibility" (1995, Summer), in Educational Theory.
45(3), pp. 293-309. According to Egea-Kuehne, Derrida considers identity itself to be
constituted by the response, responsibility to comprise identity.
7An English translation made by Wills, D., Trans., in Derrida's (1992/1995) Gift
o f Death, from the French translation of Patocka's (1975/1981) Essais heretiques sur la
philosophic de l'histoire.
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history o f the subject, responsibility, and Europe" (p. 2). We might say this
"Eurocentric" view is justified given the uniquely European legacy that this history is,
and also given the crisis in which this history seems to culminate.
Derrida, thus, reaches before religion to the "orgiastic sacred." Religion only
arrives once this demonic secret is surpassed or outstripped. Here, we refer to the
concept o f daimon* in which the boundaries between the divine, the human, and the beast
are blurred, crossed, lost. This daimon is the mystery o f desire, prior to any form o f
responsibility, as such, it is irresponsibility, or non-responsibility. It is that place before
which any call to respond has arrived, any injunction to explain oneself before the other
has been issued. It is before the complete formation o f the subject, the "I." We do not
say that it has been destroyed in religion, but rather integrated or in some way subjected
to the domain o f responsibility. Derrida explains that religion, if it is anything at all, is
responsibility, at least in the Christian sense. Moreover, he claims that history obtains its

*The word daimon comes to us in the English as a transliteration from the
Greek, indicative o f a spirit, or spirit itself which may be benevolent or evil: in the
Greek, it is frequently a tutor-deity—in some measure in the service o f humankind; in the
Latin, it is often an evil spirit. The meaning o f daimon is not just the notion o f divinity,
or the spiritual, intangible and invisible force animating all o f life, but also is seen as the
source o f inspiration in a human being, its genius and most influential life force. Though
the term demonic is drawn as well from this root, it does not signify spiritual darkness,
although it might. The universe itself is daimonic, the daimonic being central to the
affairs o f the cosmos as well as those o f humanity. Desire, the flesh, the earth, the
heavens-all are expressions o f the daimonic. Wild forces they are that when too
powerful, might drive one to madness, a condition through the daimonic felt to be very
near genius-inspirational powers gone awry (Oxford English Dictionary. 1989, Vol. IV,
pp. 217,445).
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meaning or function from this "metamorphosis" or journey to responsibility, this
deliverance from the esoteric: a movement to the history o f responsibility and to history
as responsibility. What Nietzsche calls "the stroke o f genius called Christianity," Derrida
identifies as the history o f Europe.
"The history o f the responsible self is built upon the heritage and patrimony o f
secrecy, through a chain reaction o f ruptures and repressions that assume the very
tradition they punctuate with their interruptions" (p. 7). Derrida links the responsible self
with the birth o f religion, specifically Christianity, and with the present moment that has
endured in the history o f the sacred, however secular. He traces this heritage o f secrecy,
beginning with the demonic sacred and passing through Platonism to Christianity, and
Europe. Derrida coins this history as the "crypto- or mysta-genealogy o f responsibility"
(p. 33).
Platonism represents the initial break with the demonic mystery, the initial
experience o f the notion o f responsibility. The orgiastic sacred is retained in part, the
secret is incorporated. Complete differentiation is not accomplished. Responsibility
extends only to the political dimension o f life almost exclusively. The self o f Platonism is
the ethico-political self. Plato's anabasis, or upward journey from the cave o f darkness to
the light o f the sun, does not signify the death o f the mystery, yet perhaps its denial. It is
one mystery come to dominate or suppress or envelop another. This Platonic conversion
is one o f turning away from or forsaking the cave—what one scholar calls "earthmother," and seeking to extricate oneself from it, in order to move toward the sun with
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fixed eye upon the light o f the good and intelligible. It is the ascending path o f the soul
to eternity, and the fountain o f eternity. Thus begins the subordination o f the orgiastic
mystery to responsibility. Patocka (1975/1981) considers this a conversion toward
inferiority, the constitution o f a "new mystery o f the soul," that is the quest for the
"good," the genesis o f the internal dialogue. Hannah Arendt (1978) attributes the birth
o f the will as a faculty o f the soul, as well, to the internalization the Christian stance
achieves, bound up in the notion o f responsibility.
What Derrida (1992/1995) describes as becoming responsible or becoming
historical is intrinsically bound to the mysterium tremendum.9 or the Christian event o f

^Mysterium tremendum is a term coined by Rudolph Otto (1917/1950/1960) in
his classic study on "The Idea o f the Holy." For Otto, the expression signifies the most
profound and foundational element in true religious experience. The modern or
contemporary idea o f the holy, according to Otto, is derivative, having been reduced to a
moral signification. While such is inclusive in the concept, it signifies first and foremost,
eminently, what he calls "this unnamed Something" (p. 199), this overplus and excess o f
meaning, evading signification even. Further, all genuine religion has such as its
sanctuary, center or innermost essence. The mysterium tremendum—the tremendous
mystery, or mysterious trembling—is, for him, the only adequate expression o f this
experience o f the holy, before its schematization, "a unique original feeling-response" (p.
199). It is the experience o f the numinous, irreducible to any other experience,
penetrating the inexpressible surplus, beyond goodness. He goes on to call it "creatureconsciousness" or "creature-feeling"—the overwhelming sight o f the numinous or "The
Wholly Other." Defining elements include feelings o f awfulness, overpoweringness,
energy or urgency, and fascination.
The OED defines mysterium tremendum as "a term used to express the
overwhelming awe and sense o f unknowable mystery felt by those to whom this aspect
o f God or o f being is revealed" (1989, Vol. X, p. 173). In this sense, the mysterium
tremendum does not denote that which is hidden per se, for it involves a revelation, one,
however, which even upon and after delivery remains inexplicable, beyond expression,
mysterious, in a way which may simultaneously evoke a sense o f ecstasy or rapture and
o f fear or dread. There exists, then, in this moment something o f a confrontation with
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mystery. The moment o f becoming a person is one o f fear and trembling, o f being
paralyzed before the fixed stare o f God in one's irreplaceable uniqueness. The good and
intelligible sun becomes this ever-eyeing God and the one taking the ascending path, the
"I" in naked singularity. The advent o f the Christian mystery accomplishes the process
begun in Platonism from exteriority to inferiority, and also from the accessible to the
inaccessible.10 The mysterium tremendum o f Christianity finally, reports Derrida,
entreats and enables me to respond, stirs and awakens me to responsibility. Against the
Platonic mystery, which has itself incorporated the demonic, the Christian mystery arises;
yet, it arrives upon that mystery, in the same instance repressing it, the mystery that is in
fact its foundation.

the unity in difference, and the difference in unity—the universal power o f God in all
things, and the singular responsibility and particular agency o f every human creature. As
it is written in the Christian scriptures: "Work out your own salvation with fear and
trembling, for God worketh in y o u ..." (The Holv Bible. 1985, Philippians 2:12)-you,
you and God, God in you, the mysterium tremendum. While Derrida does not draw
from Otto, he includes in the Gift o f Death an exegesis o f Soren Kierkegaard on faith, his
Fear and Trembling (1843/1983). The term turns to be a twentieth-century coinage o f a
very old idea—rather, experience.
“There is the possibility that the question o f "access” is that which has not even
been considered before, the question itself requiring a certain measure o f interiority and
self-consciousness. In this sense, perhaps Christianity is inclusive o f a turn back toward
orgiastic mystery, at least in an acknowledgement and awareness o f inexpressible,
inexplicable mystery, a kind o f disciplined admission o f something heretofore repressed.
However, we may also distinguish between the thought o f Plato and Platonism, for Plato
admits to the inaccessible, to the mystery, involving the sight o f the good and the
"mystical" experience o f the One, o f the One in the Many.
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Thus, we have in humanity’s relation to the sacred a complicated history, full of
repressions, ruptures, envelopments, and abysses upon abysses—at least in the West. It is
not then a matter o f a clear and straight progression from the demonic to the Platonic to
the Christian, nor from religion to atheism to faith.11 Rather, Derrida calls attention to
the "logic o f the conservative rupture" o f each advance, which like his economy o f the
trace12 keeps what it gives up, retains something o f what it has surpassed, subordinated,
denied, and buried. O f course, such still involves mourning and a sense o f loss, as if
nothing were retained, as if all were relinquished. Always at play is "the burning memory

“The development seems rather to center in a kind o f tension between absolute
objectivity and absolute subjectivity as the ground o f authority or justification.
Moreover, the movement, while along a continuum, becomes strangely circular, wherein
the one absolute turns easily into the other, even though the two are progressively
differentiated, separated and polarized. The gaze o f God in one instance becomes
absolute objectivity in the moment it is felt by human subjectivity at its height, though in
the person o f God it is absolute subjectivity. The orgiastic can be construed as absolute
objectivity in the unquestioned experience and acceptance o f what is, as absolute
subjectivity in terms o f the center of value and the lack o f a felt need to respond to the
other.
‘T he concept o f the trace is central in Derrida's thought, particularly in his earlier
works. In the French, the word connotes powerfully notions o f a track or imprint. In
this sense, it attests to the absence of presence, the infinitely referential. The trace
records the mark o f a former origin or presence, the residue; it testifies to the necessity
o f an origin and to its erasure, as ever receding, evasive, illusory. Derrida says: "The
trace is not only the disappearance of origin—within the disclosure that we sustain and
according to the path that we follow it means that the origin did not even disappear, that
it was never constituted except reciprocally by a nonorigin, the trace, which thus
becomes the origin o f the origin" (1967/1974, p 61). The trace is akin to his notions of
"arche-writing," and "difference." For more on the concept, see Derrida's Q f
Grammatology (1967/1974), although the term is found and discussed in a number o f his
works.
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or crypt o f a more ancient secret" (p. 9). Derrida refers to this as an enveloping of
immortality by immortality—eternity within eternity.
The incorporation undergone in Platonism whereby responsibility begins to
overcome this orgiastic mystery is the gesture whereby the immortality o f the soul is
established. It is an immortality o f the individual in search o f the good, an endeavor
requiring discipline. Discipline is the work, the exercise, the training needed to keep the
secret o f the demonic mystery, and to keep the secret at the service o f the Platonic
sacred. This discipline is philosophy, as well, and the dialectic—secret and yet revealed.
Mortal and yet immortal, we are taught by it how to die in order to gain eternity.
Derrida here evokes the image o f philosophy given in the Phaedo (Plato, c.a. 395
b.c./1951) by Socrates: philosophy is "the attentive anticipation o f death,... the
experience o f a vigil over the possibility o f death, and over the possibility o f death as
impossibility" (Derrida, 1992/1995, pp. 12,13).
We see the mystery, the secrecy at the heart o f the individual responsible selfs
constitution. This care over death is inseparable from an authentic concern for the soul
and for life. In fact, says Derrida, "this awakening that keeps vigil over death, this
conscience that looks death in the face is another name for freedom" (p. 15). Thus, the
administration o f responsibility—including freedom and faith with it13—involves a triumph

“Paul Tillich (1957) defines faith in terms of the action o f the total personality,
at the heart o f the personal life, involving all o f its elements, the participation o f
conscious and unconscious aspects o f the personality. In fact, he asserts that the act of
faith is "the most personal of all personal acts” (p. 4) and "the most centered act of the
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over death, which is also a triumph o f life. Always too, vestiges o f struggle persist in
any triumph. We find here a genealogy consistent with and resonant o f Martin
Heidegger's (1927/1962) analysis o f Dasein,14 being-in-the-world,15being-towardsdeath,16 and the meaning o f human being as care17in one's temporality.11 There is, as

human mind" (p. 4). He goes on to equate, in this, sense, freedom and frith: 'T or frith
is a matter o f freedom. Freedom is nothing more than the possibility o f centered
personal acts. The frequent discussion in which faith and freedom are contrasted could
be helped by the insight that frith is a free, namely, centered act o f the personality. In
this respect freedom and faith are identical" (p. 5).
“Dasein, literally "There-Being," is a term coined by Heidegger to discuss the
Being that is human, principally pointing to the insufficiency o f the segregated notions o f
the subject and the object (subjectivity and objectivity). Constitutive o f human being is
its "there,” the world in which it finds itself with things and others.
“Heidegger identifies "Being-in-the-world" (Ger. fn-der-Welt-seinf as a
fundamental structure o f the Being that is human. For him, it is a unitary phenomenon
that must be seen as a whole. We, as humans, are never without a world within which
we always are and from out o f which we can never be taken for analysis. One cannot
consider human existence apart from this world. For more on Heidegger's explication o f
this concept, see: pp. 78-90 o f his Being and Time. (1962). (J. Macquarrie & E.
Robinson, Trans.). San Francisco: Harper. (Original work published 1927).
“Heidegger's term to connote the nature and end, the directedness and projective
quality, o f the being that is human. We are always "more" than we factually are, always
our "not yet." Furthermore, our very being is teleological, directed toward an end.
Death is that end, our utmost and ownmost possibility, inescapable, not to be out
stripped. The coinage denotes, as well, the singularity and irreplaceability of each human
life. No one can represent or stand for another in this case, the meaning o f such ever our
own alone. As the being whose very being is at issue, this end as well is ever at issue for
each person, whether evaded, denied, repressed or openly faced.
l7Care, for Heidegger, is a primordial totality. It is a concept referring to the
ontological structure o f Dasein. Heidegger makes clear that it does not have anything to
do with trials or the cares o f life, per se. Melancholic, happy, and carefree designations
are only ontically (factually, existentially) possible, he says, because our being is care. It
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well, a striving o f being regarding truth, authenticity, and resoluteness conjuring up the
Heraclitian image o f being as war itself.
With Christianity, the ultimate triumph o f death, there is hidden from oneself and
others more than the secret o f the orgiastic mystery but also o f one's own mortality,
which is both refused and denied in the experience o f victory. It is what Patocka
(1975/1981) calls a "new mythology" which makes the genealogy of responsibility, the
birth o f absolute freedom, ambiguous and disquieting. It is founded on a duality which
positions the authentic and responsible over against the sacred and extraordinary. It is
also a politics, a war, and the ground o f Western politics.
History does not annul that which it secretly bears. Thus, the return o f the
orgiastic mystery, even in the place of secularization, is found indefinitely. Such is
especially true in the space o f change or unrest, o f metamorphosis. Derrida, with
Patocka, sees in this insight contemporary political significance as well. He says, "Every
revolution, whether atheistic or religious, bears witness to a return of the sacred in the

is concern and solicitude in a world of and with things and others. The being that is
human is Being-in-the-world, it is Being-toward the world, toward entities in the world,
toward others. Care is our very Being, and we are emersed in it; it includes our
everyday attitude o f concern toward other things and living beings around us, and our
deepest existential longings.
"Heidegger asserts that whenever we interpret or seek to understand the being of
a thing, we must do so with time as our standpoint. Time, then, must be illumined and
conceived as "the horizon for all understanding o f Being and for any way o f interpreting
it" (1927/1962, p. 39). The closest Heidegger comes to a definition of temporality is the
following: "This phenomenon has the unity o f a future which makes present in the
process o f having been" (p. 374).
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form o f an enthusiasm or fervor, otherwise known as the presence o f the gods within us"
(1992/1995, p 21). Durkheim (1915/1968) also, he notes, emphasizes the propensity,
perhaps inevitability, o f society to fashion its own gods or even raise itself up as a god.
Patocka, referring to the fervor or god-making o f the French Revolution, says: "This is
of course an enthusiasm that, in spite o f the cult o f reason, retains its orgiastic character,
one which is undisciplined or insufficiently disciplined by the personal relation to
responsibility. The danger o f a new fall into the orgiastic is imminent” (cited in Derrida,
1992/1995, p. 22). Patocka says, "in spite o f the cult o f reason," the demonic endures,
whereas we might argue it is at least also because o f reason's reign. The esoteric is, in
fact, embedded therein.
Further complications and dangers follow the metamorphosis from Platonism to
Christianity. "Platonic rationalism, the Platonic desire to subordinate responsibility itself
to the objectivity o f knowledge, continues to secretly influence Christian conceptions"
(Patocka, cited in Derrida, p. 24). Yet herein lies the aporia o f responsibility: to
subordinate it to such objectivity would be, in fact, irresponsible, what Derrida describes
as a "technical deployment o f a cognitive apparatus, the simple mechanistic deployment
of a theorem" (p. 24). The consensus and complaint o f the two thinkers seems to be that
Christianity has failed to fully repress its covert Platonism Moreover, their feeling is
that to the extent that the politics o f the Platonic tradition continues to hold sway in
Europe and the Western world-even beyond Christian influence—the less the capacity
for responsibility, and the greater the opportunity o f totalitarianism o f one kind or
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another. Derrida informs that politics excludes the mystical, denies the mystery essential
to responsible living.
The assertion, then, is that there is much that remains unthought in Christianity,
but yet cannot truly be thought within it. For, having repressed the Platonic as well as
the demonic sacred incorporated therein, Christianity cannot reflect wholly upon itself
namely upon the Platonic thinking and demonic mystery which it retains. Such amounts
to an inadequate thematization o f responsibility, which is also an irresponsible
thematization. Herein, as well, is the irreducible complexity original to responsibility as
aporia. "The secret of responsibility would consist o f keeping secret, or incorporated,
the secret o f the demonic and thus o f preserving within itself a nucleus o f irresponsibility
or o f absolute unconsciousness ... 'orgiastic irresponsibility"' (p 20). In order to act in
the world responsibly, it is essential that one know what being responsible means, and
yet, it seems, this knowledge is not possible. The notion o f responsibility intimates
praxis; responsibility is activated in a conscious decision, a response. The decision, the
act, is always before and beyond theoretical or thematic determination; it is independent
o f knowledge. Thus, any thematization o f responsibility is always inadequate and must
be, according to the notion o f freedom itself in practice. To follow the edicts of
objective knowledge, the commandments derived from them, is to be neither free nor
responsible.
In this way, Derrida explains that because of this idea o f freedom, heresy and
heterogeneity are inherent to responsibility. Responsibility is condemned to resistance
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and dissent. In the exercise o f responsibility, there is simply no choice but paradox,
heresy, and secrecy. Without heresy—some creative break from rule, authority, tradition,
orthodoxy, there is no responsibility. Ever-present, as well, is the risk o f apostasy o r
renaissance.
Yet, Christianity is not fully inadequate, not hilly Platonic, especially in relation
to responsibility in all its complexity. The mysterium tremendum o f Christianity includes
a terror unknown in the transcendent experience o f Platonic responsibility associated
with the city. This terror involves, in the words o f Derrida, "the abyssal dissymmetry
that occurs when one is exposed to the gaze o f the other" (p. 28). It is a frightening
secret that comes before and surpasses the assuming relation between subject and object.
Awareness is given to the absolute disproportion that brings me, and mine, together
with the unseen eye o f another, secret and yet commanding. Because o f Christianity’s
grounding in the unfathomable chasm and depth o f the soul, the assertion is made that it
endures as the most compelling way to traverse the reaches o f this abyss of
responsibility.
Derrida, in fact, maintains that Christianity has not yet come to Christianity. The
new responsibility declared through the mysterium tremendum has not yet reached its
fulfillment. The future o f Europe, and modern civilization as such, is then found in the
promise. The call is, in part, to a more extreme break with Greco-Roman Platonic
politics. The promise is the location or scene o f the most consummate enigma, the gift
of what is still impenetrable, unrepresentable, secret. Christianity, retaining a certain
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Platonism, conceives o f the responsible life as a gift, along the order o f the good, and yet
it is a gift neither present nor accessible, but one to which humanity is forever bound. In
this sense, the gift is a mystery to which belongs the final word.
Derrida brings the question before us, as well as a response:
What is it that ails 'modern civilization' inasmuch as it is European?...
Why does it suffer from ignorance o f its history, from a failure to assume
its responsibility, that is the memory o f its history as responsibility?... At
the heart o f this history there is something o f an abyss, an abyss that
resists totalizing summary. Separating orgiastic mystery from Christian
mystery, this abyss also announces the origin o f responsibility, (pp. 3 ,4 )
Historicity itself, then, is a secret that keeps. Perhaps, Patocka (1975/1981) suggests, it
is not a question so much o f the decline o f civilization in our day but whether or not
historical humans can acknowledge history—the abyss that undermines what we think we
know. The danger is an excess o f knowledge along the order o f detail that assists us in
forgetting not only the fundamental questions but also the grounds that have given rise to
such questions and problems. This saturated objective knowledge does not ensure or
even advance necessarily responsible thought and action.
"History can be neither a decidable object nor a totality capable o f being
mastered, precisely because it is tied to responsibility, to faith and to the gift" (Derrida,
1992/1995, p. 5). Derrida describes responsibility as that which is made outside
knowledge, lest it be mere calculation or the technical application of reason to a
particular situation. As such, responsibility involves, in the moment o f absolute decision,
going through "the ordeal o f the undecidable" (1990, 1992/1995). Faith precedes
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responsibility or is borne with it, by this venture into absolute risk which is involvement
with the other, beyond knowledge and certainty. This engagement with the other, this
care for the other, summons a response. The gift Derrida speaks o f is more specifically
the gift o f death, an ambiguous concept he describes as a marriage o f responsibility and
faith, and the excessive beginning o f history. By the gift, one is confronted with the
transcendence and infinite alterity o f the other, with one's relation to this other, God and
selfless goodness. Such amounts to a new experience of death. Thus, says Derrida:
"Responsibility and faith go together however paradoxical that might seem to some, and
both should, in the same movement, exceed mastery and knowledge” (1992/1995, p. 6).
In his exploration o f the history o f responsibility, in his tracing o f humanity's
relationship with the sacred, Derrida too comes to faith. Derrida attends to the cry o f a
waning historical moment, a time o f distress and decline, and to the call o f responsibility,
the plea to respond in such a time. Questioning responsibility, he finds aporia, paradox,
an abyss at the heart. Yet, he also finds faith, responsibility's other half. Perhaps it is
that faith itself acts as a mediator o f sorts which, acknowledging the abyss at the core of
responsibility, returns responsibility to its origins in the sacred, in demonic desire, in
mystery. Perhaps, faith is the mystery, the paradox, the abyss. Certainly, faith is a
difficult concept, burdened down with connotations o f every variety, yet powerful,
enduring, expressing a reality we cannot continue to ignore.
Faith, either explicitly or implicitly, bears this relationship to the mystery o f
historicity. It is a being-towards-death; it involves care and concern, this vigil over

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

57
death. The theologian Paul Tillich (1957) defines faith as "the state o f being ultimately
concerned" (p. 1). As concern with the ultimate, faith reaches beyond historicity in
passion for the infinite, embraces infinite passion. Faith admits humanity's yearning for
eternity and immortality; it suggests the need o f the historical for the eternal, and o f the
eternal for the historical. Faith, in this way, also mediates in the space o f an abyss
separating impossibility from possibility, mortality from immortality. The finite and
infinite, the historical and the eternal, find each other in faith. Faith too, owning human
finitude and longing, confesses the repressed marrow o f responsibility. We do not mean
here to explicate the nature, essence or substance of faith—though such is important,
necessary and even perhaps pressing, only to acknowledge its importance and its
aporetic complexity. Heidegger has explicated the very meaning o f human being to be
its temporality, made visible or evidenced as care. This care is unique to humanity for
whom at issue is our own being. In this way, we might postulate that frith, as a
condition o f care toward the ultimate, is, in fact, central to the meaning o f human being
in Heidegger's sense, and constitutive o f it, at least in the moment o f becoming a person,
a subject—as Derrida puts it, in becoming historical, responsible. Faith is then integral,
perhaps foundational, to existential and ontological meaning and value. Here is
Ricoeur's "life worthy o f being called human."
Derrida's contemplation upon these sacral metamorphoses in human history, in
Western human history, has not only served to compliment but also to complicate
Ricoeur's formulation, and the images o f Zarathustra. Ricoeur, we might say, proceeds
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to unfold a historical process o f demythification, demythologization, the death o f the
gods as it were, and posits a movement toward faith. Derrida, however, uncovers the
repressed mythology operating at the heart o f this disenchantment; his accomplishment
is, in this sense, the re-mythification and mystification o f history, or the manifestation o f
history’s "intra-mythology"~the mystery, the enchantment internal, original to history,
and yet hidden therein. Faith is already and ever present. Such a discovery works to
confirm Ricoeur’s belief in a religious meaning to atheism, and the need for a new kind o f
feith. Nietzsche, along with many a scholar, has postulated, in feet, atheism as
Christianity's logical end, or at least consequential o f its internal logic. If, as Derrida
asserts, religion is responsibility, atheism identifies the operation o f the repressed
irresponsible at religion's core. The camel in feet abdicates responsibility in dutifully
carrying out injunctions given; in the guise o f responsibility, the spirit denies its fear and
need for protection—its own desires.
The limits o f the rational and the responsible are clearly outlined as well. Even
within atheism, and not simply beyond it, endures the sacred. "To destroy idols causes
one to enter into the sacred" (Serres, 1986/1989, p. 78). Moreover, the rational, the
critical, cannot reach the aporia, the paradox, the mystery that life is. Both Ricoeur
(1969/1974) and Derrida (1992/1995) respond to these limits and return to a look at the
sacred. Although presenting different formulations and different insights, both arrive at
this enigma o f human historicity, this abyss, this emptiness at the heart. Both put forth
this promise, as well, the hope o f a feith beyond what we have known or know; both
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realize a certain historical moment in need o f metamorphosis, a moment on the verge o f
dying or being bom anew.
It is not, then, a matter o f gaining faith in our time or regaining it, but o f coming
to a new land o f faith, perhaps. As Tillich (1957) asserts, faith always is; the issue is the
ultimacy o f the concern, that within which faith is placed, or misplaced as atheism has
found the case to be. "The danger o f faith," says Tillich, "is idolatry and the ambiguity o f
the holy its demonic possibility. Our ultimate concern can destroy us as it can heal us.
But we can never be without it" (p. 16). This new kind o f faith, Ricoeur’s postreligious
faith, is conceivably a knowing and yet unknowing faith that exceeds knowledge and
stands beyond reflection and critique, coming after it, on its heels, in response to it. It is
a faith that speaks a sacred "Yes," a grand "Amen;" a faith that consists in a pure
affirmation o f life, despite and in the midst o f sacred "No's," dying idols and difficult
commandments. "A god disappears, divinity remains" (p. 18).
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CHAPTER 2
CURSE, CRISIS AND THE REIGN OF DEATH

In the beginning, God made the world, man and woman, and all
that is therein. Heaven and earth, sun and moon and stars, light and
darkness, sea and firmament, grass and herb, seed and fruit and tree,
winged fowl and great whales, cattle and creeping things—all o f these did
the Lord God speak into being. Lights there were summoned for signs
and seasons, for days and years—greater lights and lesser lights to rule
over day and night. Moving creatures o f every kind did the Lord God
also shape: beasts o f the earth, fish o f the sea, and fowl o f the air. God
commanded the man and the woman, whom he had fashioned in his own
image, that they be fruitful and multiply, that they replenish and govern
the earth over which they were granted authority.
The Lord God planted a garden eastward in Eden in which from
the fertile soil, he made trees to grow. One was called the tree o f life, and
the other, the tree o f the knowledge o f good and evil. He made also a
river running out o f Eden to water his garden. From the dust o f the earth,
the Lord God fashioned man, and quickened him by his very breath. He
placed the man in the garden to dress and keep it. The man named the
creatures o f the earth; among them, however, no companion was found.
Then did the Lord God put the man into a deep sleep and took from him
a rib out o f which he fashioned a woman. Both the man and the woman
lived peacefully with God in the garden, naked and unashamed. Now, the
Lord God also commanded the man, saying: "Of every tree o f the garden
thou mayest eat freely, but o f the tree o f the knowledge of good and evil,
o f it thou shalt not eat: For in the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt
surely die."
In the midst o f the garden dwelt the most subtle and cunning o f all
the beasts o f the field, the serpent, who one day spoke to the woman,
saying: "Yea, hath God said that ye shall not eat o f every tree o f the
garden?"
The woman answered: "The fruit o f the trees o f the garden we
may eat, but of the fruit o f the tree which is in the midst of the garden,
God has said to us, 'O f it ye shall not eat, neither shall ye touch it, lest ye
die."'
But the serpent answered back to h er "Surely ye shall not die:
For God knows that in the day ye eat thereof then your eyes will be
opened, and ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil.”
The woman saw that the tree was good for food, and that to the
eyes it was most pleasant. A tree desired to make one wise, she took o f
60
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its fruit and did eat, and gave also to her husband with her, and he did eat.
Then they knew that they were naked, for their eyes were opened, and
they made aprons for themselves out o f fig leaves.
In the cool o f the evening, they heard the voice o f the Lord God
walking through the garden. Among the trees, they hid from his
presence. Still the Lord called to them. When he found them, the man
said: "We heard Thy call and were afraid because o f our nakedness."
Then did the Lord God know that they had eaten from the fruit forbidden
to them. "The woman you gave me, she brought to me the fruit and I did
eat," replied the man. The woman likewise reported o f the serpent's
cunning.
Then did the Lord God curse the serpent to crawl upon his belly
and to eat o f the dust o f the earth. He did also put enmity between the
serpent and the woman, between his seed and hers, declaring: "Though
ye shall bruise his heel, he shall bruise thy head." And to the woman the
Lord God delivered sorrow in childbirth, sealing also her desire for her
husband and his rule over her. And he cursed the ground for man's sake,
that in grief he should eat o f it. He made it to bring forth thorns and
thistles, that by toil and sweat only should the earth yield her fruit.
"From dust were ye made and to it shall ye return," said the Lord
God at last to the creatures he had made in his own image. Then he made
coats o f skin to clothe them. He likewise drove them out o f the garden,
away from his presence, and set cherubim and a flaming sword at the
garden's entrance to prevent their return and to guard the tree o f life.
A retelling o f the Judeo-Christian "Story o f Creation" and o f the "Fall o f
Man," from the Old Testament scriptures, ("The Holy Bible. 1985, Genesis 1-3)
In the beginning: God, creation and the breath that is life. Shortly thereafter,
however, follows the "fall” into death—humanity excommunicated, the earth cursed. In
contrast to the Nietzschean prerogative that "God is dead” and long before it, we have
here God pronouncing the sentence o f death upon humanity. Yet, can we establish some
coherent relationship between these two epitaphs? Some pathway from this ancient tale
o f curse and condemnation to the perpetuated crisis o f the modern age, with Nietzsche's
confirmation o f the death o f the divine? To attempt such a journey may not be
necessary, and we may in part have already accomplished it with Ricoeur in looking at
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humanity’s movement from religion to atheism and with Derrida in tracing the birth o f
the human subject.
Again, too, the contrast might not be as great as it seems; perhaps it is primarily
a m atter o f perspective. In the beginning, God is the author o f death. In the beginning,
God declares his1 human creatures guilty and banishes them from his garden paradise.
From that point on, however, they, and we, are in the middle o f things—in medias res, in
some measure separated from the divine, expunged from his presence. God might as
well be dead. It is now left to humanity alone to read and to understand these things.
Possibly, by asserting the death o f God in our imagination, we cunningly permit the
denial o f our own death, pronounced and eminent.2 Perhaps, we have been so long out

‘In order to be true to the Biblical account o f the story, or at least consistent with
it, God is referred to throughout my exposition as a male deity, with the use o f the
pronoun "he." Genesis 1:27 reads: "God created man in His own image; in the image
o f God He created him; male and female He created them" (The Holv Bible. 1985,
emphasis mine). The dominant view o f God in the history o f the West, as well, has been
a male-oriented one. For more on this topic, and for a brief discussion concerning the
question o f God's gender, the gender issues around the concept o f God, see Chapter 1,
Footnote 3. The serpent, in addition, having been identified with Satan, the Devil, in
other parts o f the scriptures, is identified therein as male (The Holy Bible. 1985,
Revelation 12:9, for example), thus the use o f "he” in reference to this figure also
throughout the chapter.
T he anthropologist Ernest Becker, in his Pulitzer-prize-winning book The Denial
o f Death (1973), claims that all humans are born with a fear, innate and borne
throughout life: this ever-present haunting terror o f death. His contention is that in
order to live, humanity deludes itself—we deceive ourselves—with a "vital lie" in which
repressed is the knowledge o f human mortality—more specifically, o f our own mortality,
i.e., the denial o f death. This repression, he argues, is evidenced in human thought, the
way we think about and know the world and ourselves, as well as human behavior, the
way we act and the way we are in the world; it also lies at the core of anxiety and
mental illness. In like manner, Martin Heidegger (1927/1962), in Being and Time.
describes "being-towards-death" as constitutive o f our very being as humans. He posits
that this, our ownmost possibility which is death—inescapable, unable to be undertaken
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o f Eden that we have altogether forgotten the experience o f the divine and our own
eviction, and assume rather that it is God who has taken the last breath. Yet, we might
be concerned by the haunting question that follows: Can God, the breath or spirit—the
author o f life, be dead and his creatures, his creation, endure, live on, and sustain life?
Surely, the story holds much for us to ponder. For it is not merely a story, but
one o f mythic proportions, within a tradition (though borrowed from the East) which
bears a profound impact upon Western consciousness. This story o f beginnings, this
foundational Western myth o f origins, concerning the creation o f the world and
humankind and human knowledge, though ancient, abides with us; we might even
suggest that it still very much resonates within us, shaping particularly our present
conceptions o f knowledge and o f human knowing—what we think we know o f ourselves
and o f the world and o f the divine, and how we think we know these things.3 Here, the
myth will serve to illumine for us the state o f things as we have been considering them, in
a sense as a prophetic point o f departure, from which we may finally address and attend
to the call o f faith in our own times—and understand and feel more fully the urgency and
import o f such a call. For, from our perspective, God is dead, as Nietzsche first

by another in our stead, is known, and yet fled from. This constitutive human state o f
"falling" is the abnegation o f our own mortality, a fleeing in the face o f death and o f
ourselves and our own non-relational possibility, the possibility o f non-being.
’Martin Heidegger (1954/1977c) claims that "the distinctive character o f modem
knowing... consists in the decisive working out o f a tendency that still remains
concealed in the essence o f knowing as the Greeks experienced it" (p. 157), tracing our
own thought back to classical thought. In like manner, it is here suggested that the
character of modem knowing might be traced back even further to pre-classical times,
seeds o f it found in myths regarding human knowledge such as those o f "The Creation"
and "The Fall."
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observed, but there is more, it would seem. Humanity, as well, is in the grip o f death's
messenger. Moreover, the world too, with humanity, is hurtling toward its grave.
Everywhere and in all places death appears to reign. And our Genesis story has
foreshadowed and prophesied this destiny which we know to be our own.
The progress o f history, particularly the birth o f the responsible subject, it seems,
is essentially characterized by death. As God dies or the gods die, so too begins the
languishing o f humanity and the natural world from which the divine has fled. Death is a
symbol o f alienation (New Bible Dictionary. 1982), the cessation o f wholeness, the
departure o f the life or spirit. To die means to separate or to be separated (Vine's
Expository Dictionary. n.d.). In the story o f "The Fall o f Man," upon taking o f the
forbidden fruit, the man and woman do not then physically die—though o f course later
they do. Theirs is, in a sense, a slow and painful death, or deaths upon deaths. They are
tom asunder, separated from their God and maker and friend, and from their garden
home. Humanity, fashioned by the hand o f the divine, no longer lives with God in
harmony and communion in the living paradise o f his earthly garden. Rather,
excommunication, curse, condemnation. And humanity exists not only at enmity with
God and the spiritual world (including the serpent), but also at enmity with the earth: the
earth no longer gives o f itself freely; a rift4 is bora between human creatures and other

4Martin Heidegger (1959/197lb) gives an interesting explication o f the "rift" in
his essay on "Language" in Poetry. Language Thought Hopefiil in a way, the rift is
pain which tears asunder, but not wholly apart; thus, not only in the rift is there a
separating that divides but also a separating that gathers, like the horizon where what is
held apart in separation is also drawn and brought together. This site o f pain may be that
place where that which is sundered is healed and made whole.
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created things—the world, and all o f creation. Moreover, bloodshed shortly follows.
Man against man, brother against brother, Cain slays Abel in the next generation.
Humanity surely now possesses the knowledge o f evil. The separation that is death
prevails, long before Adam and Eve find bodily burial in earthly graves. It has been
postulated that for the ancients death signified primarily the separation o f the spirit from
the corporeal body. Later in the development o f this philosophy o f death, and also
theologically, there emerge further differentiations involved in this splitting which is
death: both mind and spirit, o r heart and soul, are severed from the body, or the flesh.
We know that to dissect something—to cut or separate the whole o f it into parts—is to
kill it, if it is living.
"Not only have the gods and the god fled, but the divine radiance has been
extinguished in the world's history," says Martin Heidegger (1950/1971a, p. 91), in a
commentary on modem times. In the words o f Max Weber, in the aftermath o f divine
departure, "the disenchantment o f the world" begins. Joel Kovel (1991), in History and
Spirit, calls it the "despiritualization” o f the world, man, and human existence.
Spirit,5 as the animating principle and the force o f life, once exiled, gives way to death.

5Spirit comes from the Latin spiritus. meaning breathing or breath, as in the
breath o f God, that which in our creation story gave Adam, the image o f humanity, life—
the breath o f life. The Oxford English Dictionary (1989) records the numerous and
expansive meanings o f spirit in five frill three-column pages o f fine prim. Spirit is "the
animating or vital principle in man; that which gives life;... immaterial being...,
intelligence; the soul o f a person;... the active essence or essential power o f the Deity,
conceived as a creative, animating or inspiring influence; the Holy S pirit;... the essential
character, nature, or qualities o f something; that which constitutes the pervading or
tempering principle o f anything;... the immaterial intelligent or sentient element or part
o f a person;... ardour, courage;... a subtle or intangible element or principle in material
things" (Vol. XVI, pp. 251-253); and the "breath" o f its meanings go on.
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This despirituaiizing process also initiates the pulling asunder o f all things. What has
begun, in Derrida's composite (see Chapter I), with Plato as the upward journey from
the cave, the ascending path o f the soul to eternity, culminates in the complete separation
o f the soul from the cave, the earth, the world and its inhabitants—or the birth o f the
subject. Kenneth Wilber (1995), using a developmental approach, traces the direction
o f the "spirit o f evolution" as a movement toward differentiation and then integration.
What has gone awry, in his estimation, is this differentiation. What naturally ought to
strive toward integration has degenerated into dissociation. The result is a broken world
and broken spirit, fragmented thinking, and a fractured worldview (Wilber, 1995; Sloan,
1983)—the reign o f death.
God has been dead a long time, though. It is that genius Nietzsche who, as early
as 1882 in The Gav Science, pronounced his death. Even earlier, Hegel, in Faith and
Knowledge (1802/1977), noticed a certain unacknowledged or unrecognized feeling
among the religious o f his day that God himself was dead. Perhaps, however, "genius is
prophetic; it does not so much re-present as pre-figure" (Kovel, 1991, p. 12). Ours has
been described as the "God-forsaken and Goddess-forsaken world o f modernity” in

In his book History and Spirit (1991), Joel Kovel discusses spirit and its
immensity—its vast, excessive significations—through the use o f six separate chapters,
covering: "Spirit as Vital Force," "Spirit as Occult Being," "Authentic Spirit," "Spirit
and Desire,” "Divine Spirit," and spirit as related to the "Paths o f Soul.” In addition, he
devotes the entire prelude to the definition o f spirit. While Kovel spins out the "varieties
o f spirit" and its various definitions, he summarizes succinctly a central core o f its
meaning: "From the breath o f a god, to an animating principle, to the real significance o f
something, to an unseen other, to what is immaterial and opposed to flesh, to the divine
itself—the term spirit seems at first to have as its only coherent meaning, that which is
vitally important, endowed with power, yet beyond immediate sense perception. It is not
present—yet powerfully present. It belongs to what is 'other1to us" (p. 18).
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which in our attempts to better our condition, we are destroying the earth-bent on
saving ourselves through suicide (Wilber, 1995, p. x ). O ur Genesis story, too,
foreshadows the death o f God in human consciousness, along with the decline o f
humanity and the life o f the cosmos. Ricoeur (1969/1974) calls ours an age o f
confusion: the impact o f the death o f religion has not yet been revealed. As such, ours
is a parched time; as if waiting in a desert, we remain thirsty, in search o f cool waters; it
is an agonizing slow period o f struggle, and o f preparation. "The period of mourning for
the gods who have died is not yet over" (p. 448).
O f course, according to Nietzsche, God has not merely died—we have killed him.
If Nietzsche has prophesied, we might add, it has been in seeing the inevitable
consequence o f a logic begun centuries ago in the history o f human thought (Berman,
1981), what we might call the "Logic o f Death," o f separation and o f severing. In the
aftermath o f divine death begins the systematic killing o f the world, humanity’s home.
Set in place in the seventeenth century with the rise and advancement o f science and the
birth o f modem philosophy, this logic has been identified generally as the logic o f
modernity or the modem paradigm—though one finds clearly the seeds of it much earlier,
even—as we can see—in this creation myth o f antiquity. It is characterized by this
process o f extreme differentiation and dichotomization; i.e., despiritualization,
disenchantment, death: the separation o f the human and the divine, o f the mind and the
body, o f the subject and the object. Following the excommunication o f God—o f Spirit,
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the Enlightenment, modernity's usher,6 seeks to address a plethora o f crises, and yet also
further propels them: o f tradition, o f religion, o f metaphysical reason, o f faith. A loss o f
authority accompanies these attempts to free humanity through reason and knowledge
(of the subject) from the constraints o f tradition (Metz, 1977/1980) rooted in the
precepts o f a divine sovereign. Poignantly expressed in An Anatomie o f the World by
John Donne (1621/1927, pp. 20-21) is this sense o f crisis (central to the work o f the
Enlightenment):
And the new Philosophy cals all in doubt,
The Element o f fire is quite put out;
The Sun is lost, and th' earth and no man's wit
Can well direct him, where to look for it.
...'Tis all in peeces, all cohaerance gone, (lines 205-213)
Therefore, to recover a sense o f control and stability becomes a central aim o f the
modem project (Habermas, 1989), including the quest for certainty (Dewey, 1929) and
the establishment o f new authority. The historical making o f the human subject,7
Heidegger (1952/1977a) suggests, places humanity at the center, as the rational core, as
that form of life upon which all that is, concerning its nature and its truth, is grounded.

‘O f course, we are only sketching the historical manifestations o f this logic in
Western civilization and its impact, jumping around and skipping vast periods o f human
history-not even calling into question the traditional "periods" as they have been laid out
and perpetuated by Western scholars, the legitimacy and unity o f such constructions, as
well we might. Thus, ours is not a formal o r chronological tracing o f this history; and if
the Enlightenment is modernity's usher, escorting this "Logic o f Death” to its impending
consummation, then we might likewise liken the Scientific Revolution to its host, the
Reformation to its doorman, the Renaissance to its coach, ad infinitum.
7Again, the origins o f the historical making o f the human subject are slippery,
identified by Derrida (1992/1995) with Plato's anabasis and the Christian notion o f the
soul, and as central in the workings o f Renaissance, Reformation and Enlightenment
thought, as well as in the logic o f Modernity.
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It is as if Durkheim is right: we have no more gods, thus eventually, we ourselves
become as gods and attempt our own salvation. The echo o f the serpent sounds
through the corridors o f history: "Ye shall be as gods.” O f course, such an ascent means
that humanity, that we, must pluck the forbidden fruit o f knowledge-found in nature,
separate from and outside o f us, yet within our grasp. We might say, in addition, that
this grasping or taking o f the fruit signifies a particular stance toward the world—the
human quest for godhood.
To attain the similitude o f gods, it is required o f humanity to fully separate from
the world as nature, to see ourselves no more as creatures but as world creators
(Romanyshyn, 1989). With the stolen good o f knowledge, we are indeed creators—
subjects, but forget, though, that we are creatures too. The new certainty obtains in the
subject making truth sure as "the known o f his own knowing" (Heidegger, 1952/1977a,
p. 148), and humanity establishes and strengthens the self as the measure and ground o f
authority—i.e., god. The freedom bought, Heidegger adds, is freedom o f the subjectum.
The coming of this subject position, distant and distancing itself from the world
as object, marks also the coming o f science, the dominant way o f knowing o f modernity.
Heidegger has called modernity the age o f the world picture: the world via science
becomes humanity's representation. Science requires o f us that what is must be at the
disposal o f representation, a representation that explains. Truth*—originally signifying

'Heidegger (1927/1962), in Being and Time, as well as in many subsequent
works, returns to the Greek origins o f the word "truth," aletheia. which means not to
escape notice, not to be concealed. "The truth may thus be looked upon as that which is
un-concealed, that which gets discovered or uncovered" (p. 57). Truth is "Beinguncovering” or uncoveredness, unconcealment. Truth happens in the unveiling, the
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unconcealment, the revealing and manifestation and coming-to-presence o f what is—has
become the certainty o f representation. "Certainty is the modem form o f truth"
(1952/1977b, p. 83), and the ambition o f W estern civilization.
The quest for certainty necessitates control through objectification, reification,
representation, manipulation. To know something certainly, one must kill it. A small
thing like breathing, like the butterfly effect, changes everything. Representation itself
becomes assault and murder. Having set ourselves apart from the world, from nature, in
order to know it, we "pluck" it and take it in hand. Then, we set out to rule. The quest
for godhood, o f course, bringing with it the need for certainty, calls for order and
hierarchy. To conquer, we must divide, classify, authoritatively represent. Moreover, if
we represent nature simply, we will easily master it. Descartes refutes Bacon's
assumption that to command nature, we must first obey it (Serres, 1977/1982);
Cartesian knowledge, scientific knowledge, the knowledge o f modernity gives us a wellpolished, fixed model o f the world with which to work—self-enclosed, self-sufficient,
complete with identifiable numerical parts (Doll, 1993, Markley, 1991)—not breathing,
not living, i.e., dead. To know is to know without a doubt. And there is certainty only
in death, if then.
This human stance in and toward the world is not then a living stance, not one o f
wonder or engagement or participation. Rather, it is one o f alienation. Scientific
consciousness is alienated consciousness (Berman, 1981). Devoid o f mystery and o f
spirit, the breath o f life, the organic unity that is life is banished; the separation,

showing forth, the manifestation o f what is, its coming-to-presence.
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alienation and isolation that is death reigns. As an object o f knowledge, the cosmos is no
longer a place o f belonging, and eventually loses meaning altogether. It is as if all the
world were Eden from which humanity has been evicted. Incidentally, banishing the
world o r being banished from it, it is not long before we become even banished from
ourselves, as we shall see. O f course, Descartes, it might be said, has already
accomplished the severing o f our minds from our bodies. No longer is it, "I breathe—in
the sense o f spirit, filled with the breath o f God; therefore I am"; but rather. "I think;
therefore I am"; and the earthly body does not enter into the equation, or only
peripherally.
Through the progressive disenchantment o f the world via science—what Berman
(1981) calls an alienating and severing consciousness, psychic wholeness too is cut up,
and lost is a "participatory consciousness" that is generative o f life and meaning. The
extremes o f human subjectivity create the absolute reification o f all things through
objectification; all that is, even the human subject, is object, a thing among other things
without value, deprived of life and rendered meaningless. The connectedness and
interdependence o f all things in the cosmos go unrecognized. Wholeness becomes
perverted in the modern mindset into either a collection o f separate entities or a singular
uniformity in which all exists to merely serve the whole. A living, creating, integrated
unity which sustains diversity cannot be thought. For, such an image o f life, reality, the
world, "calls for a thinking, a way o f knowing, that is itself alive, creative, and
integrating—a living thinking" (Sloan, 1983, p. 38). Yet the thinking that dominates
resists the living; denying the complexity and ambiguity inherent to life and the cosmos,
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humanity opts for death—separation, simplicity, certainty, control. And wholeness
cannot endure within this logic o f severing, the Logic o f Death.
Heidegger (1962/I977d, e) describes this severing through which we not only
distance ourselves from the world as nature, but set upon nature, challenge nature, to
reveal its truth. Adam and Eve no longer enjoy divine life in a garden paradise; rather,
they, humanity, we are after something; for the knowledge o f good and evil, we set
upon nature, pluck its fruit and consume it. Commanding nature, as gods, we seek to
master it, rule over it, control it. Even Bacon himself declares that the aim o f science is
to place nature on the rack, to torture her secrets from her (Sloan, 1983).
The knowledge o f innocence, perhaps a human reality before the fall, is a
knowledge o f which we know nothing. Rather, death has come, the knowledge o f evil
and the technology o f shame. Adam and Eve make aprons to cover themselves. The
woman labors in birth with a husband who rules over her. The ground is cursed,
bringing forth thorns and thistles unto the man. Nature conceals, she hides her treasures
from human eyes. Yet, the promise o f the forbidden fruit seems always greater than the
sentence o f death. It is ours simply to reach out and grab it; thus, we wrest nature's
treasures from her. Torture, the rack, violence. "To know is to kill, to rely on death"
(Serres, 1977/1982, p. 28). Michel Serres (1977/1982,1986/1989) devotes much o f his
writing to this issue o f violence, the tragic reality that knowing in the West, that our
knowledge, is violent. Our knowledge, he claims, presupposes a "king"—a sovereign, a
god, as we have said, one in command o f it. The king is clearly the man who killed the
former king, yet also the person who is awaiting death at the hands o f his heir. While we
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may say we "fight" for knowledge and truth, Serres asserts that we really fight to fight,
that for us, life's secret wisdom is war. Presented is the image o f a "ravenous owl," the
"priest o f knowledge." The owl hovers about the "tree o f science." It is his tree, since
he has killed his predecessor, "who supported another theory" (1986/1989, p. 47). We
kill over theories. We know too well the knowledge o f evil, but somehow the
knowledge o f good evades us, and the tree of life is dying. We ravenously devour it.
This violence is the essence o f modern technology, in the service o f science. It is
what Heidegger (1962/I977d) calls a "challenging revealing," whose chief features are
regulating and securing: "The challenging happens in that the energy concealed in
nature is unlocked, what is unlocked is transformed, what is transformed is stored up,
what is stored up is, in turn, distributed and what is distributed is switched about ever
anew" (p. 16)—regulation is secured. Put forth, in the name o f reason, is the
unreasonable demand that nature supply for us what can be extracted and stored; we
challenge nature to reveal and then gather her up as fuel. Nature, devoid o f spirit,
reduced and deadened, becomes not only an object for human consumption, but also
humanity's storehouse, in Heidegger's words—our "standing reserve."
This standing reserve consists not simply o f stock or o f a store or supply that
endures, but encompasses the way in which all things are known through this stance o f
challenging toward all that is; what is stressed is the substitutability and orderability o f
all things, to ensure the unthreatened reign o f humanity. "Everywhere everything is
ordered to stand by" (p. 17), to stand on call for future ordering. Ours is the task of
setting in order, which can no longer mean to take care o f or maintain as it may have in
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Eden before "the fall," but rather this challenging, this grasping. In this sense, even
objects actually lose their character as objects; their objectness is obscured, as
everything is converted at the hands o f humanity into and organized as nothing but
standing reserve. The fruit is no longer fruit, nor the tree a tree, but that which is
"desired to make one wise" (The Holy Bible. 1985, Genesis 3:6). Humanity does not
reign over, cannot control knowledge, unconcealment, or truth (i.e., nature revealing
itself the manifestation or coming to presence o f nature's living energies), but attempts
to in this subject-position god-striving: truth, again, is certainty through ordering. This
is the history o f science, o f Western civilization, and the reign o f death. Knowledge is
power, to know is to dominate; to know is, again, to kill (Serres, 1977/1982). The
world, in order to be known, falls beneath the dissecting knife o f humanity, denied o f its
life-breathing power.
Alfred North Whitehead (1925) has described poignantly the impact of this Logic
o f Death upon the world: "Nature is a dull affair, soundless, scentless, colourless;
merely the hurrying o f material, endlessly, meaninglessly" (p. 80). Life itself has been
extricated from the world, from our world—and with it, value, worth, quality and
purpose. As such, it is what Wilber (1995) calls a "cardboard cosmos," one "gone
slightly mad" (p. 523); the cosmos—having been reduced, disenchanted, disqualified—is
only a shadow o f what it once was in "the nightmare known as modernity" (p. 415).
Thus, the world is not simply dying but is dying at the hands o f humanity. Yet,
we must also note, the person with the knife is caught too in the web o f death, perhaps
more profoundly even than his or her victim-world. Humanity, as god o f the cosmos and
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lord o f knowledge, is the orderer o f this standing-reserve; therefore, the human subject—
says Heidegger (1962/1977d)—stands even more originally within the standing reserve;
the human subject is, in fact, challenged and ordered to exploit the energies o f the world.
In this way, the subject itself is on the brink o f the place where the self too is standing
reserve. The greater this threat, the greater the need for certainty, for lordship o f the
human subject over the object-ive "other” world. This drive, further driven, endangers
the subject in relation to itself and to all that is. All truth, all knowing in and o f the
world, is banished to ordering, this form o f knowing which is the knowledge o f death—
separation, grasping, challenging, severing, consuming, etc. Soon all that is is standing
reserve, and any other possibility is effectively blocked: to know the world is to know it
this way; truth, revelation, knowledge, is the domain o f science alone, via technology—
at least truth that is certain, and real.
Without question, human reality, in the West at least, is now in profound ways
determined by Western European Science, and increasingly so through its vehicle o f
technological advance. The knowing o f science impacts humanity and the world perhaps
primarily through the vehicle o f modem technology. Humanity itself is consumed in and
by this way o f being in and toward the w orld-this grasping, plucking, devouring, striving
quest incessantly engaged; this "entrapping securing procedure" in which humanity itself
is entrapped is a key element in the maintenance and employment o f the Logic o f Death.
The realm within which we live and move and sustain ourselves is fundamentally directed
by this logic, by science, as a theory o f the world, as a primary avenue through which
what is presents itself to us. As such a theory, science is also an epistemology o f the
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real, which has become the certain, economized into cause and effect, consequence,
that which is ordered linearly and can be grasped and determined in advance.
According to Heidegger, only since the seventeenth century, the birth o f the
modem epoch, has the real come to mean that which is certain. Being obtained and
secured by the human subject in objectness, precedence is then given to method, i.e.,
dissection. What is real can be measured, that is real which can be measured. Life is
uncertain and changing, that which is living is uncertain and changing, thus, the world,
to be known, is objectified, entrapped in objectness, and calculated in advance; nature is
muted and diminished to the inanimate, that humanity might achieve its desperately
sought-after certainty. Yet, humanity—we—cannot escape the effects o f this Iife-grip,
this calculation o f all that is. If we hope to be "real," we, too, must eventually fall
beneath this measuring imperative.
Douglas Sloan (1983) describes the development as one in which science has
become the only valid way o f knowing anything, the only legitimate source o f
knowledge. Moreover, it is not science, essentially, that is the problem, but rather the
distortion o f science—what we may call a misplaced faith, and scientism (Doll, 1993),
through the Logic o f Death. This distortion involves grandiose claims about science as a
method and as a worldview, including its intrusion into domains in which it does not
belong. "The heart o f the problem, as Michael Polanyi has striven repeatedly to
demonstrate, lies not in science and technology but in the distorted images o f the world
that have come to supply the context within which they are pursued and employed"
(Sloan, 1983, p. 25). All problems are not answerable, scientifically or technologically.
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To believe they are, to live and proceed as though they are, is "technolatry," in the words
of Frederick Ferre (1976). Pre-eminence is given to methodology, technique and means.
O f course, the West maintains, perhaps beside itself, this almost religious attitude toward
technology equivalent to dogmatism. It is the instrument o f our ascension to the throne
o f the gods.
Such is the Western mindset o f modernity, says Sloan (1983), constitutive o f a
number o f scientistic notions that have gone unquestioned, productive o f a tunnel vision
that fixates upon one aspect o f reality which is taken to be all o f reality—the quantitative
one highlighted by the methodology o f modem science. The resulting worldview—which
if not omitting, certainly inadequately addressing questions fundamental to human
experience9—essentially makes no room for human existence, for what it means to be
human.
The view o f reality that dominates is materialist, reductionist, quantitative. As
such, it is indeed a reality that humans can easily control. Yet, the qualitative nature of
the cosmos, o f existence, is eliminated or excessively undermined. "The unwarranted
extension o f the purely quantitative to encompass the whole o f experience is eventually
to create a dead universe in which quality, meaning, and life have no place. The

’While modem science has proved itself amazingly efficacious in addressing
many aspects o f human life in the world, its power is limited—modem science unable to
answer to our ultimate questions and concerns. Huston Smith (1982) in Beyond the
Post-Modem Mind identifies some o f those extremely important aspects o f human
experience, essential to human experience, before which science stands ineffectual:
value, which is internal and normative rather than instrumental o r explanatory; purpose
(and intentionality), a response to the question "Why?"; meaning (significance),
involving issues that are existential and universal in scope; and quality, drawn from life
experience and feeling and varying levels o f consciousness.
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exclusive preoccupation with quantity,' Lewis Mumford has written, has 'disqualified the
real world o f experience,' eliminating all that makes human life worthwhile and driving
the human being 'out o f living nature into a cosmic desert'" (p. 11).
Sloan calls it a "disqualified universe," where all that matters is quantity, where
the impersonal presides. It is a universe marked by the conquest, the surrender o f the
person. Humanity is reduced to a machine-mechanistic metaphors pervade even in the
realm o f human aflairs, with all their complexities and idiosyncrasies. Like Adam and
Eve, we clothe ourselves in the aprons o f a scanty, shallow rationality: the narrow
technist reason o f instrumentality has been equated with the whole o f human thought and
being in the world. Though Einstein, scientist par excellence, does not make an explicit
indictment against modem science or the modem world, and though he does not lay the
charge o f this Logic o f Death upon humanity, he states the case, perhaps unwittingly, o f
that to which humanity has been brought, and calls it by its rightful name; he says:
"Whoever remains unmoved, whoever cannot contemplate or know the deep shudder o f
the soul in enchantment, might just as well be dead for he has already closed his eyes
upon life" (cited in Stassinopoulos, 1978, p. 137). In despiritualizing the world, in
effecting its disenchantment, we ourselves have turned our backs upon life, invoking
suicidally the death o f humanity.
The philosopher Hans Jonas (1979), discussing contemporary ethical quandaries
in relation to the joint advancements o f technology and biology, calls it the "metaphysical
neutralizing o f man" in which we have deprived ourselves o f any valid image o f
humanity, lost any understanding o f what it means to be human. Made in the image o f
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the divine, we have killed that image, marred the face o f the earth, and inadvertently lost
any mirror with which to reflect upon ourselves. Our modem notions o f reality omit the
significance o f persons, o f the human being. Thus, Jonas warns that we are not ready to
responsibly handle the possibilities o f genetic technology, dangerously capable of, in fact,
altering beyond comprehension the nature, mind and body of humankind.
Yet, humanity has already been altered, we might observe. For the cosmos—and
with it, the real—has been altered. The real is not only certain but that which can be
broken down into separable parts and ordered—organized logically and manipulated
technologically. Guiding principles, integrating purposes (i.e., faith) are irrational, not
exactly "real." Effected is the principle o f non-restraint. If we can invent it, we must
implement it. Progress is the standard by which all is measured. Values, too, become
objects, for in the modem interpretation o f things anything that is must be represented,
and made certain. Wrought through human subjectivity by the establishment o f the self
within the world as picture, values become human needs objectified as goals (Heidegger,
1952/1977b). The overriding need for absolute control, for godhood through certainty,
achieves pre-eminence; the ultimate aim is progress and the ascending path; value, too,
is sucked up as well into the standing reserve; and "life [itself is] judged by the extent to
which it minister[s] to progress, progress [is] not judged by the extent to which it
m inisters] to life" (Mumford, 1934, p. 185).
Value is removed from humanity, from human activity. Kovel (1991) asserts that
it is instead placed in the object, but not merely the object: the object o f progress, the
marketable object—o f which Marx's "fetishism o f commodities" is descriptive. Thus for
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Kovel, capitalism is the culprit-fueled by the driving forces o f scientism and
individualism. It is not simply an economic mode, but a way o f being in the world,
describing a particular stance toward the self, toward others, toward nature and all the
world. It is the "will-to-power," as it were; the desire for power is pre-eminent, perhaps
all-eminent—omnipresent: humanity is motivated by power, driven by and toward
power, compelled to grasp after and establish it. Capitalism is, perhaps, the material and
economic manifestation o f this incessant pursuit for divine elevation.
The theologian Paul Tillich (1957) has further suggested that modem society has
at least as one o f its deities, particularly heightened in the competitive and capitalistic
West, this god o f Success. "It does," he says, "what every ultimate concern must do: it
demands unconditional surrender to its laws even if the price is the sacrifice of genuine
human relations, personal conviction, and creative eros. Its threat is social and economic
defeat, and its promise—indefinite as all such promises—the fulfillment o f one's being”
(p. 3). He adds that much o f modem literature is made religiously important, as it were,
because it is descriptive o f the wreckage and collapse o f this order o f faith. The
pervading metaphor of consumption crops up over and over again in modem novels,
reflecting the modem malaise effected by capitalism's "manipulative mode o f moral
instrumentalism" (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 24). The promises o f this god o f Success, when
met, are found wanting: "Not false calculations, but a misplaced faith is
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revealed" (Tillich, 1957, p. 3). "In the midst o f all that is correct, the tru e ...
withdrawal" (Heidegger, 1962/1977d, p. 26).10
Yet, Kovel (1991) might protest that we cling still to the promises o f this god,
that this order o f faith is, unfortunately, not utterly wrecked. His thought is consistent,
however, with Tillich's in concurring that as the essence o f capitalism, this adoration o f
material wealth, revenue and acquisition wages war against spirit—and thus, against life:
at issue is something spiritual in this sense. He asserts that, in fact, the modem tradition
consists in a repression o f spirit where ever present is "the pressure or tendency in social
institutions to devalue the spiritual dimension, render it irrational, or even suppress it
altogether" (p. 6). We dwell in the thick of a "profound spiritual crisis." There is a
living wholeness to spirit that the logic of severing cannot endure. The deadness o f
despiritualization ever threatens humanity in modem circumstances. Establishing the rule
of a science that is against all that is spiritual and repressing fundamentally what it means

"Heidegger (1962/I977d) explicates this difference between the correct and the
true in his essay on "The Question Concerning Technology." The correct is the truth (in
terms o f unconcealment) that is revealed in the mode o f a challenging-revealing, in
ordering. In this mode, other possibilities of unconcealment are blocked, and there
stands a heightened danger o f humanity misinterpreting what is shown to it. For
example, Heidegger suggests that even God in this case threatens becoming the god o f
philosophers, represented in a cause-effect understanding; the divine then loses its
distantial mysteriousness, its exalted and holy character. "In a similar way the
unconcealment in accordance with which nature presents itself as a calculable complex o f
the effects o f forces can indeed permit correct determinations" (p. 27), but the truth o f it
is not reached. For an in-depth critique of Heidegger on the ethos o f the true versus the
correct, and his perspective on the modem subject in its relationship to modem
knowledge as the science o f technology, see Richard Bernstein's (1991a) "Heidegger's
Silence? Ethos and Technology" in The New Constellation: The Ethical-Political

Horizons of Modenuty/Postmodernity
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to be human, it "displaces the core o f human activity from human beings to things"
(P- 11).
Not only, then, has God been lost in this Logic o f Death that reigns, and the
world fallen prey to its violence, and human frith and value and action been distorted out
o f measure by it, but so too has humanity itself succumbed to its effects. With all the
world, humanity has, in short, already undergone a kind o f alteration. We may call it the
impact o f human objectification, reduction, quantification, disqualification, or
despiritualization. Heidegger (1962/I977d) goes on to explain it in terms o f his concept
o f the standing reserve. Maintaining that the "unity o f objectness" is preserved but also
transformed in the continuity o f the standing reserve, he says again that the object itself
also vanishes into humanity's storehouse. The pure relational character o f subject and
object is seen as all is ordered, fixed, commanded, stored and regulated in the standing
reserve. With the disappearance o f the object into standing reserve, it is not long before
the subject is sucked up with it as standing reserve—which does not mean that the duality
o f the subject/object relationship vanishes but rather—claims Heidegger—that it reaches
extreme dominance. Beyond the godward advance o f humanity via this knowing which
separates from and sets upon nature to reveal its truth, this challenging act comes back
to us; it sets upon us: We too are challenged forth, compelled to become standing
reserve—human resources. Rather than achieving the liberation and wisdom promised in
clutching the fiuit o f the knowledge o f good and evil, we ourselves are brought into the
clutch's grip and dominated by it. This is why Heidegger can call our way o f knowing,
our ever-striving after this knowledge-grasp, and the essence o f modem technology,
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"enframing" and a means o f "enframing," which ironically entraps us, humanity, in its
regime.
Enframing is the "challenging claim” that calls upon humanity to order, to
control the happening o f truth and fix and establish it as standing reserve. The real
becomes the standing reserve. In the modem age and in contemporary times, with the
growing pervasiveness o f technology, humanity is challenged forth in this way strikingly
so, and ever more extremely. Heidegger defines enframing as "the gathering together o f
that setting-upon which sets upon man; i.e., challenges him forth, to reveal the real, in
the mode o f ordering, as standing-reserve” (p. 20). Humanity M s in the very act o f
striving for freedom to achieve it, set upon and challenged and compelled to clutch and
control truth and knowledge, to reign in the world as gods. God, tradition, and the
forces o f nature may have been overthrown, but something other still rules: humanity is
constrained to obey this "challenge"—perhaps the inordinate need, the secret desire for
certainty and perfection, to reign as god; perhaps the incessant drive to know
completely and to infinitely progress, this constant plucking and grasping and ordering;
perhaps the tyranny o f reason's call; perhaps the enduring power of the serpent's defiant
claim, his offer and his challenge. Human freedom, the freedom o f the subjectum, in this
sense, is an illusion, profoundly and ironically related to the antithesis o f freedom, in fact.
The freedom o f the modem subject is lost in the objectivity commensurate with
subjectivity, in the creation o f the standing reserve. With the birth of the human subject
in the world—as constructed by the Logic o f Death through science and technology,
freedom, we see then, is ever at issue.
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Related to Heidegger's notion o f humanity as standing reserve, is Herbert
Marcuse's (1964) identification o f the human laborer (or "human resource") as "one
dimensional." In this sense, where preeminence is given to the ordering o f reserve, to
progress and production, work is paramount but meaningless and the human is reduced
to mere "economic man." Moreover, when technology "becomes the universal form o f
material production, it circumscribes an entire culture; it projects a historical totality—a
world" (p. 9). The human subject is drawn into this totality as well, so much so that
Marcuse goes on to claim that alienation and freedom themselves may not be at issue—
there is perhaps no longer a subject to be alienated or free. The "System"—i.e., the
maintenance and regulation o f the standing reserve—has won; humanity has been bought
off to it, as it were, and identifies with it completely. "People recognize themselves in
their commodities; they have become what they own" (p. 154). Perhaps, meaning no
longer even matters. Humanity is lost to itself and to its own meaning. As Heidegger
puts it in Language. Poetry. Thought (1950/197la), the time is destitute because God is
not only dead, but mortals are as yet unaware o f their own mortality, are not capable o f
taking ownership o f their own nature: pain is a mystery still concealed; death endures as
at issue and dubious; love has yet to be learned. No longer discernable is the trace of
the fugitive gods, o f the holy. At question is whether mortals can still know the holy.
"The destitution is itself destitute” (p. 97), because mortals no longer even experience it.
Yet, we know that they must experience it, and that meaning matters still. While
it is true that the time may be destitute, contemporary times do not entirely reflect
Heidegger's account of oblivious mortals completely out o f touch with the sacred or
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Marcuse's description o f the "Happy Consciousness" o f those who have become one
with the production o f technology, with their own commodities. We somehow resist in
some corner o f our souls materialization, objectification, complete absorption into
standing reserve. Thus, we are not at peace, we are not oblivious, we are not happy.
Study after study and statistic after statistic attest to the fact that all is not well with us:
suicide rates soar, divorces mount in number, mental hospitals expand; and millions
upon millions from all walks o f life testify to a general malaise, the experience o f
meaninglessness and emptiness in their own vocations and lives (Berman, 1981; Kovel,
1991; Sloan, 1983). Consumerism, it seems, is merely a form o f anesthetization, an
anxious compulsion enacted paradoxically in the desire for freedom and meaning.
Robert Bellah's (1985) study o f middle-class America testifies to the fact that the
most advanced society, an exemplar o f modem progress (via science and technology)
and consumerism, while achieving a good measure o f freedom and comfort for a great
number o f its people, has done so at enormous costs: individuals largely experience a
pervasive sense o f meaninglessness in their everyday lives, o f alienation from others in
the absence o f collective commitment and conscious engagement with the concerns o f a
larger community—a result o f the Logic o f Death, and severing.
According to Berman (1981), life in the West today is best characterized by its
increasing entropy, where the death that reigns, as it were, has taken on an alarming
"life" o f its own. All about us we find economic and technological chaos; we dwell in
the midst o f ecological disaster and fight against psychic disintegration. The
contemporary landscape is bleak. What is fundamental to human existence—sadly
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lacking and therefore at issue—is meaning. In the absence o f meaning and wholenessstripped from the cosmos through our prevailing logic—which is expressed humanly most
often in community, comes the collapse o f traditional values and the ensuing void;
revivals follow, fueled by hysteria, or many retreat into a sort o f catatonic state,
anesthetizing themselves through drugs, television, entertainment, tranquilizers.
Therapy is a national obsession in the United States, pinnacle o f the West. It represents
in singular fashion the human search for life in a milieu o f death, a desperate attempt to
ward off the alienation and the "pervasive feeling o f anomie and cultural disintegration"
(p. 17) that threatens to overwhelm the human soul. Depression, perhaps, can no longer
be maintained as an illness, as it is the norm for our age. Walker Percy (1983) in Lost in
the Cosmos is so bold as to assert that it is in fact insane to not be depressed in the world
in which we find ourselves. The only people not depressed—and thus the only
alternatives to depression—are fundamentalists and surfing dudes, i.e., the anesthetized.11
The problems that threaten to engulf us on every side actually
seem to multiply and grow worse with every new advance in knowledge
and its applications. The spoilation o f nature; the continuing suicidal
buildup o f nuclear weapons; a spreading illiteracy, apathy, incivility, and
violence among the citizenry; the breakdown o f personal relations; a

"Maxine Greene, in a lecture at the April 1996 American Educational Research
Association (AERA) conference in New York on "Imagination, Possibility and
Curriculum," discusses the import o f the imagination as a mode o f cognition left out o f
modem discourse on the nature o f human knowing. She speaks o f ours as a time o f
darkness and enormous desperation, a time in need o f social transformation possible only
through love, a love o f the world, and o f life itself. For Greene, an engagement with the
arts is central to nurturing this love, even in the bleakest o f times. She highlights the
aesthetic as that which arouses, that which deepens our awareness and heightens our
consciousness o f qualities that give life meaning, o f open possibilities that give us hope.
She contrasts the aesthetic with its opposite, the anaesthetic; the aesthetic counteracts
this deadness.
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miasma o f low-level depression; a haunting sense o f futility in all that we
do; signs o f a deepening cynicism in individuals and society—the
problems range from the global to the excruciatingly personal, and we
become more daily familiar with them. (Sloan, 1983, pp. xi-x)
In addition, as problems escalate, the solutions offered amount to two equally
dangerous, unsatisfactory and ineffectual choices: to press on more urgently in what
appears to be an ungrounded faith that we will stumble upon some new technology that
will fix all our problems, or to relinquish our search for knowledge completely and focus
wholly upon the concerns o f human existence through an emphasis on values,
commitments, and relationships. For Sloan, the rift—in these proposed remedies,
unacknowledged and unwittingly perpetuated—between human knowledge and human
value is foundational to the problems o f modernity. He says: "One o f the chief problems
o f the modem world is that our conceptions o f knowledge frequently give rise to views
o f reality that provide little place and support for the values and personal-social
commitments necessary for a rich, whole, and life-enhancing existence" (p. x). It is
rather the case where shared loyalties inspiring sacrifice and the feeling o f awe or wonder
are lost, where indifference reigns. Moreover, with the disappearance o f a public world,
the retreat into the private world has intensified; yet, it is a world lacking substance.
Kovel (1991) traces this development via capitalism, in which simple
participation with the production o f life has been surpassed and life is essentially
experienced non-spiritually, a great part o f existence is spent in estranged labor, or
empty leisure to combat the ill-effects o f life devoid o f spirit. It is a view of reality
which—since it works to alienate spirit vital to human existence and also to promote this
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strong sense o f individualism—compels individuals to withdraw and to dissect
themselves, desperate to preserve spirit in some part o f their souls. This stunted
spirituality is then wholly privatized and purely internalized, the soul having retreated
from a despiritualized world in complete inwardness; spirit is relegated exclusively to
the personal, dissociated from that which is social or political, from the external, public
world. Reason itself becomes narrow, technical, despiritualized and cut off from the
whole o f human experience and knowing—a reason that is dead and deadening. Spiritsplit and reason-reduced are hazardous and homicidal. Kovel describes the key contours
o f our social world, surrendered to absolute increase and instrumentalism, and "the
heritage o f an enlightened reason split from spirit" (p. 12): poverty, pollution, waste,
war, Hiroshima, and Holocaust. To keep at bay the horror that pervades, human
existence in a deadened world is something bland, blunted, an innocuous numbness.
"Faced with the holocausts regularly prescribed in the name o f efficiency, order, and
profit, the soul takes refuge in inwardness, or is simply turned off' (p. 13)—cut off slain.
In the course o f historical progress, our consciousness o f our own identity has become
more and more weak, and damaged, the experience o f a fragile identity in a culture of
apathy, at the mercy o f indifference (Metz, 1977/1980).
Individual choice has become the only authority and yet the ideal o f
individualism, o f freedom and equality, has in the pervasive, mechanistic worldview
become little more than a controlling cultural uniformity. Brought to fruition through
the rise o f the modern subject is "the sterility and danger of a quantitative, anonymous
mass culture" (Anshen, 19S7, p. 135). Human equality is levelled to interchangeability,
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that which is numerical. Such conceptions o f freedom deny humanity o f personhood,
and eradicate the irreplaceabilty and dignity o f the human person. Specialization,
bureaucratic organization and the establishment o f hierarchies based on societal function
effect "the sacrifice o f independent intelligence, the sweeping away o f individual
differences, local customs, local diversity, and all the infinite branchings o f humanity that
enrich life" (Nicoll, cited in Sloan, 1983, p. 37).
Heidegger's standing reserve. He makes this bold, frightening statement and
prediction: "Subjective egoism, for which mostly without its knowing it the I is
determined beforehand as subject, can be canceled out through the insertion o f the I into
the we. Through this, subjectivity only gains in power. In the planetary imperialism o f
technologically organized man [sic], the subjectivism o f man attains its acme, from which
point it will descend to the level o f organized uniformity and there firmly establish itself.
This uniformity becomes the surest instrument o f total, i.e., technological, rule over the
earth" (1962/1977a, p. 152).
We continue to play the gods; we see our treasures grow, our power, our
importance, or so we think, and "the shadow o f Hiroshima stretches over the world"
(Serres, 1986/1989, p. 77). The gods author not only life, but death as well. In the
knowing that dominates, propagated technologically, irreversible changes are exacted
upon the cosmos, nature is methodically broken down and with it, the human
community, and the human soul. C. S. Lewis (1947) is said to have predicted this
perversion o f human freedom as power is increasingly exerted over nature and humanity:
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unrestrained scientific power gives those in control o f science and technology license to
exert this power over other fellow beings.
The black ash-cloud o f Hiroshima looms above our heads. The blood-cty o f
Auschwitz rumbles beneath our feet from graves that will not be silenced. Yet, we are
perhaps not only like S.S. men, camp wardens, ordering and effecting death, but like the
Capos, prisoners ourselves, though with special privileges: living under a grandiose
image o f our own power, we are crueller in the exertion of that power, and more
hardened—looking only at the numbers we've inscribed upon human limbs, upon life,
while the dark deafening void within echoes images o f our own death. The German
theologian Dorothee Soelle (1971/1974) evokes a similar image in her exhortation that
we must account for and address this internalized operation in our critique o f modem
society, "the capitalist or the concentration camp guard that is in each o f us" (p. 92).
Kovel (1991) describes that to which humanity has brought itself and been brought in
this manner: "a world order that commits planetary suicide in the search for profit while
driving the majority o f human beings into despair and poverty,... a killing/producing
machine without a spiritual center" (p. 12).12 Indeed, the fruit is plucked and consumed;

“Humanity needs a spiritual center, for we are spiritual beings. Spirituality is a
cosmic affair, a matter o f life and death, as Kovel (1991) says, "the mythopoetic
framework [which makes] existence intelligible" (p. 8). History is seen to bear out this
fact, recording innumerable fights to the death o f spiritual systems at odds. Wherever
human existence is, there also shall be spirituality, for it is the very stuff o f which
humanity, human life in the world consists. Perhaps, the unintelligibility and
senselessness o f life felt by so many today is a result o f the systematic war humanity has
launched against spirit, the logic and reign o f death—first God, then the world, and in its
turn, humanity. Cut off spirit, separate and banish it from all that is, soon all that is is
lifeless, meaningless, without sense or significance, dead.
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separation from (the "death" of) God, the spirit (o f life), the world and all o f creation
effected, or being effected. Curse, crisis and the reign o f death. Enter Cain and Abel
and bloodshed. We shall not only surely die but also be the instruments o f death.
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CHAPTER 3
EDUCATION, THE UPWARD JOURNEY AND THE FAITH OF REASON (1)

I present to you the story o f the education o f a human soul. Give
a listen; look and discern the gift o f education upon our nature, in
contrast to the lack thereof.
It is likened to an experience such as this: Imagine the family o f
humanity dwelling underground in a cave-like abode where there is little
light. Yea, there would be no light at all were it not for a fire burning,
and for an opening equal in breadth to the cave itself though it be a long
way up—far above reach, beyond which great light shines. From a child
has lived there every one, secured in place and position unchanged, bound
at the neck and legs. As the fetters prevent any movement o f the head,
turns either to the right or to the left, the field o f vision is limited to only
that which lies ahead and before. From a fire which bums behind and far
above these human beings, light is afforded them. Behind them, as well,
on higher ground, there stretches a path which leads up to the fire, and to
the light. Observe also that a low wall has been erected along the path,
akin to the screen o f the puppeteer above which he presents his puppets.
Then, see in your mind's eye that upon that wall, and projected
above it, there are people, some talkative and some quiet, bearing
artifacts o f every variety: human and animal relics o f all kinds o f
materials like wood and stone. Except for the shadows cast by the fire on
the wall in front o f them, do these prisoners see anything o f themselves or
o f each other? Can they even, with heads confined, immoveable, for the
duration o f life? And o f the things along the wall that are carried, the
same: shadows only do they watch. We are as they. Should they per
chance be capable o f conversation between themselves, they should think
that the shadow-things they saw passing before them were the things
themselves, and that the words and names they used addressed and
pertained to them in actuality. Moreover, should the wall feeing them in
the prison have an echo, would they not think that whenever the carriers
o f the artifacts passed along the wall talking, they heard the voices o f the
shadows moving before them? Thus, the prisoners would know in all
things the truth to be solely found in the shadows o f those trophies,
nothing more.
Ponder, then, the event o f freedom, being loosed from their
shackles and delivered from their ignorance, how it should be felt and
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received. One o f them, when set at liberty and obliged to rise to his1feet,
move about and turn his eyes up to the light, would at first suffer and be
unable to see the things whose shadows he had viewed before, dazed and
blinded by the brilliance o f the light. Would not this person be astonished
and disbelieving when told that the things upon which he formerly cast his
eyes were without substance and that now since turned toward the things
that are, he sees more rightly? For he can still as yet make no sense o f the
things which now pass before him. If, as well, he were constrained to set
his gaze upon the light directly, it should pain him, and he must surely
retreat to his former place, to the things able to be seen by him, believing
the former things to be truer than that presently being shown to him
Would not this person also if someone carried him away against
his will from those things and up into the sunlight, be angry and distressed
by such handling? N ot one o f the matters said to be true can he see, with
the sun filling his eyes. Time is required before the world above can be
ascertained. Shadows should be at first discerned most easily, followed
by images o f humans and other creatures which the waters reflect, and
then the things themselves. At night, study might be devoted to the sky
itself and those items contained therein—by the light o f the moon and
stars. By day, the light o f the sun sheds light on all things, and at some
point, the man shall behold the sun itself; in its heaven, and learn o f it.
Soon he comes to know that the sun reigns over all things in the visible
world, and is the cause o f those things he formerly observed.
What o f his remembrance of former things? O f his first home and
kindred inmates? O f that taken for wisdom there? O f a certainty, he
should consider himself happy and grieve for the others. Nor would he
esteem or covet the honors bestowed upon those prisoners who best and
most brilliantly recognized or remembered and thus predicted the patterns
o f shadows appearing on the cave wall in front o f them. Indeed, would
he not be like Homer and preference serfdom, poverty and suffering
before again partaking o f their ideas and experiences?
Think on this as well. Should he descend again to his place o f
origin, his eyes would soon fill with darkness, having left the keen and
acute light o f the sun. In a contest o f identifying shadows at the challenge

'Though a retelling o f Plato's "Allegory o f the Cave," in an attempt to be as
faithful to the original telling as possible, I am maintaining the prisoner as a male figure,
with the understanding that, for Plato especially—who posited the intelligence o f women
and their ability to achieve, with men, the status o f philosopher-kings and to make the
upward journey o f the soul, the prisoner is representative o f all human persons, male and
female. Thus, the reader will find, not only throughout the re-telling, but also in the
presentation of Plato's explication o f his allegory, the prisoner made reference to through
the use o f the pronoun "he."
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o f the cave-dwellers, he would surely fail, for needed is some period o f
adjustment, and his sight would as yet still be dim. Might he not even
elicit ridicule and evoke the belief that the upward journey is a most
unworthy one, certain to ruin a man's eyesight? Might not the response
be against him who attempted to free others and lead them to the light o f
the sun, even perhaps violence and the sentence o f death? Nevertheless,
that soul shall ever press upward, for such is the path to truth, to
understanding; it is that soul, then, who acts sensibly, who is most
reasonable.
The whole picture can be fathomed, and what I hope to articulate,
with the understanding that the upward path and the contemplation o f the
things above is the ascending journey o f the soul, its education, unto the
intelligible realm. "Whether it's true or not, only the god knows" (Plato,
ca. 380 b.c./1992, p. 189).
A retelling o f Plato’s "Allegory o f the Cave," from
the dialogues o f Socrates in Republic (c.a. 380 b.c./1992)
What a grand image2 Plato (ca. 380 b.c./1992) paints for us concerning humanity,
our divine journey and destiny and path to wisdom. It presents us with a journey—
though fraught with difficulty—o f ascent, in fact, akin in this sense to the journey we
have presently left off contemplating, the upward or godward quest o f Western
Civilization (see Chapter 2). Further, we might posit even the traces o f an explication or
embodiment—an incarnation, a prototype, a concretization, a mirroring as it were—o f this
very story in the history of the W estern world, or at least in the various tellings o f this
history by W estern scholars. Derrida (1992/1995), as we have seen, in attempting to
elucidate the historical emergence o f the person, the human subject, and the notion of
responsibility to which this emergence is indelibly connected, begins with the daimonic,
humanity’s original embeddedness in and lack o f dissociation from the earth—Plato's cave
dwellers (see Chapter 1). He follows the "evolutionary" route through and beyond, as he

2Although in retrospect, the image Plato here sets forth is, as well, perhaps
inherently ambiguous or even grandly perilous, harrowing, horrific, alarming.
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sees it, Plato's realization o f the political self—perhaps now released from the "cave”chains and yet immersed still in the dark earth o f culture and society or bound in measure
to its path—to the Christian actualization o f the soul alone, internalized, and utterly
responsible before God as absolute Other—i.e., free, or open to the light o f the sun.
Derrida's formulation is especially intriguing in that he investigates and makes central to
this development the repression and thus also envelopment o f former ways o f being in
the world at each new historical advance, hi similar fashion, Ricoeur (1969/1974) sees
a type o f dialectical return as potentially constitutive o f human advance, and yet it is still
advance of which he speaks. His is a mediation via the arrival o f atheism on the
historical scene which might assist religion, chronologically prior to atheism and
critiqued effectively by it, in making its way to frith. For atheism has exposed the selfdeceptions o f religion in taking shadows for substance; yet, freed from the shadows o f
unacknowledged desires projected as real, atheism fails to discern, embrace or realize
what is, ever fixing its gaze upon shadows or statues of things, the cave, what is not and
yet believed to be true. Its "No" in this sense is indeed sacred, and yet it can never come

’In contrast to Derrida's formulation o f Plato, Kenneth Wilber (1995) posits Plato
as a mystic, along the order o f one who has achieved subjectivity, responsibility, yet
without losing the sense o f the connection to all things, the interdependence constitutive
o f earthly life. Plato's political self then, along these lines, more fully represents one who
has ascended to the fullness o f human subjectivity, and in so doing, makes a descending
return to the world of the Many, finding oneself embedded in and devoted to
participation in common life with others in a world. The earth, as well as the human
being, is an embodiment o f spirit, which is one. In this way, the birth o f the human
subject as outlined by Derrida might more accurately signify the moment o f repression,
and dissociation, the alienation o f humanity from the earth, from spirit, from the ties that
bind, as it were—excessive subjectivity, pathological.
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to the articulation o f a "Yes,” as in Nietzsche's three metamorphoses o f the spirit: the
lion is released from the chains by which the camel is bound, with some measure o f light
renouncing them, but only the child seems to have reached the light o f the sun, in foil
possession o f a grand "Amen" to what is (see Chapter 1).
Kenneth Wilber (1995) in his "Kosmos trilogy”4 takes an explicitly developmental
and evolutionary approach in tracing the history o f the Kosmos,5 which is a history o f
spirit and o f humanity and human consciousness in relation to the earth and to spirit.
Including a critique and commendation o f the position o f Western Civilization within
this evolution, he, in fact, alludes to Plato's image o f the "evolution" o f the human soul,
its educational journey upward, to support his explication and interpretation o f
humanity's ontological and cosmological history, hi addition, even concerning the
mythic Adam and Eve and the story o f their "foil" we see parallels with as well as
departures from the Platonic soul and the allegory o f its "rise": Plato asserts that the

'Presently Wilber has published but one volume, Sex. Ecology, Spirituality: The
Spirit o f Evolution (1995), o f a three-volume series on the "Kosmos," which he identifies
as his "Kosmos Trilogy."
IWilber (1995) makes a distinction between the Kosmos and the cosmos. The
cosmos is that totality o f which we speak today, conceived as the whole, and yet
markedly reduced through modem thought, stripped o f its interiority, its depth, o f spirit.
The Kosmos, o f Greek origin, refers to that universal total spoken o f not as the whole
but rather as the "All," with the recognition that never do we fully arrive at that which
we symbolize. It is what we know o f the breadth and depth, encompassing the domains
o f the physiosphere, biosphere, noosphere, and theosphere: matter, life, mind, and spirit.
While we get our term "cosmos" from the Pythagorean "Kosmos," Wilber contrasts their
common understandings: "The original meaning o f the Kosmos was the patterned nature
or process o f all domains o f existence, from matter to mind to theos, and not merely the
physical universe, which is usually what both 'cosmos' and 'universe' mean today" (p. 38).
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human aim in the ascent is to see the good, to realize knowledge; and our garden
representatives also seek, in having their eyes opened, to obtain knowledge, which
definitively includes the knowledge o f good. Yet, in this story the human attempt is
forbidden and cursed, while the Platonic initiative is the human path to eternal bliss. The
destiny carved out and prophesied in the creation myth, which we have traced through
the history o f humankind in the West, is as well all the more tragic for its irony, though
its conclusion is at least foreshadowed, foretold. No tragic premonition o f this sort
taints the Platonic vision6 for humanity, except perhaps should one put weight upon the
displeasure and hatred o f the cave dwellers toward those souls aspiring deliverance from
the cave, to apprehend the knowledge o f the good. In any case, it seems w e enter into
this image of the education o f the human soul in darkness, finding in it a grave contrast
from where we have come: while the project and journey o f Western Civilization is in
many ways congruent with this Platonic analogy o f light and ascension, Plato's is a
pilgrimage in the direction o f the good, the true and the beautiful, and the journey we
have heretofore gleaned turns rather to be a trek o f death, darkness, decline—o f

‘Alasdair MacIntyre (1984), in After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, suggests
that Plato's condemnation o f the poets lies in his opposition to their tragic view o f human
life. Plato, in this sense, the father o f the Ideal realm, is viewed not only as an idealist
but also a perpetual optimist. In line with Socratic thought, Plato seems to believe in the
basic goodness o f the Kosmos and o f man, and conceives o f the source o f evil along the
order of ignorance, the result o f acts o f the human will rooted in thoughtlessness,
irrationality. O f course, while Plato emphasizes the import o f human agency and
freedom, his objection to the poets and their presentation o f the tragic element in human
existence might not exactly signify the denial o f such an element therein, only his distaste
for the way in which it serves to undermine human power, the possibility o f
transformation and the realization o f the good through human effort. Plato also, in some
instances, correlates the work o f poets and storytellers with falsehood, opposed to truth.
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descension in that sense, in which perhaps most apparent is the realization o f the evil, the
false, and the base, vile, or repugnant (see Chapter 2).
Still, the sojourn o f the West has not been utter darkness, and even the T all o f
Man" can be conceived as having been initiated by the human desire for light, as well as
our present deposing or abandonment by sincere intentions to apprehend the good.
Plato's "Allegory o f the Cave" provides the West from early on, in fact, with a beacon o f
light by which to tread its path, even a vision o f the journey7 as a journey o f light, an
effectual and sure ascension by which humanity lays hold o f knowledge, and attains to
the good, the true and the beautiful. Plato's centrality to Western thought is generally

6Plato views human life as a journey o f the soul, a spiritual pilgrimage, if you will-both individually and collectively. A journey is intelligible; it is a lived-out narrative
along the order o f the quest. Seen in this way, narratives comprise the basic structure o f
existence, or at least that structure by which existence is interpreted, understood, given
value. Each o f us, in the course o f living, participate in narratives o f one sort or another,
and comprehend our existence in terms o f the narratives we have lived out, as well as
those o f others. Alasdair MacIntyre (1984), in After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory,
looks at and discusses at length this classical perspective on human life as a sojourn, on
what he calls the narrative unity o f human life, and its relationship to the virtues o f
antiquity. "The unity o f the human life is the unity o f a narrative quest” (p. 219). He
further considers the breakdown o f the virtues in modernity, o f the very concept o f
virtue and o f the narrative unity o f life, o f human life conceived o f as a soul-joumey.
The modem philosopher Jean Paul Sartre, for example, seeks, in feet, to expose the
narrative assumption as false: to represent human life in narrative form is to
misrepresent it; it is to impose a kind o f order upon human action which it does not in
truth exhibit. MacIntyre goes on to interrogate and challenge Sartre: What would true
human actions deprived o f falsifying narrative look like? Sartre himself fails to answer
the former question; moreover, to deconstruct and negate narrative, to prove it in every
case inauthentic, he must in fact do so and does so with the use o f a narrative. Though
the West has lost this sense o f life as a journey, o f history as the collective spiritual
travels/travails (story) of humanity, traces remain: the inheritance o f Plato. MacIntyre
actually suggests that it is not only a historical legacy to conceive o f the self in some
narrative form, but also the natural mode o f self-perception.
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unquestioned, although perhaps resented, forgotten or purposely ignored. Alfred North
Whitehead has gone so for as to say that "the safest general characterization o f the
European [Western] philosophical tradition is that it consists o f a series o f footnotes to
Plato" (1929/1978, p. 39); and Alasdair MacIntyre (1984) has reminded us further of
the strong historical relationship between philosophy and the social, political, cultural
context o f which it is a part.8 Plato is not what we imagine him to be: the first
academician in his ivory tower, lost in thought, oblivious to and ineffectual in the real
matters o f life.9 In a more general sense, as one o f the great-souled ancients is reported
to have said: 'Tor as he [a man] thinketh..., so is he" (The Holy Bible. 1985, Proverbs
23:7). In like manner, as a people think, as a culture thinks, so is it, so shall it be.
Indeed, our thoughts have been formed historically by the thoughts o f Plato.
Yet to what importance may we give this particular portrait o f Plato regarding
the education o f the human soul and the upward path o f light? In what way may we find
its alliance with, its share in, and its elucidation o f the question o f faith we have brought
to bear upon present times and turmoils in the West? We have already suggested and

'MacIntyre's thesis (1984) is that philosophy only loses its central position
historically when it foils in its project to justify morality on the grounds of reason alone, a
project brought about by the changes o f the Enlightenment; yet, such does not mean
that the legacies o f philosophy are not strong, enduring, still operative in the ways we
think and act in the world, the ways we view ourselves and the earth.
•John Dewey (1930/1960) suggests the importance o f looking at Plato, and
criticizes those who promote a Plato o f the "Ivory Tower" variety: He speaks rather o f
the "Plato of the Dialogues, trying one mode o f attack after another to see what it might
yield;... the Plato whose highest flight o f metaphysics always terminated with a social
and practical turn, and n o t... the artificial Plato constructed by unimaginative
commentators who treat him as the original university professor" (p. 13).
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hope to further develop that there are traces o f this image which throughout history have
pervaded our conceptions o f human life, yet still, in this, we have not reached to our own
troubled times, or to the thesis concerning faith we are putting forth. The importance o f
this portrait lies in its relation to a/the central crisis o f our time—a crisis which seems to
be finding expression in a variety o f domains o f existence from popular culture to
political discourse to theological inquiry to philosophical and academic study: a crisis,
for lack o f a better word, a conundrum regarding the import, function, place, and
centrality of reason.
Richard Bernstein (1991b) has called this contemporary crisis or phenomenon the
"rage against reason." Reason, for one reason or other, has been found wanting, and a
certain "retro-romanticism" saturates our present landscape (Wilber, 1995): a
widespread, directed attention to non-Western cultures traditionally not subject to
reason's reign, and an expectant reliance upon these cultures to provide us with answers
to our present woes. Evidence o f the case can be seen in the renewed interest in
questions regarding the quality and meaning o f human existence; the rise o f religious
concerns; the explosion o f New Age spiritualities and alternative medicine perspectives;
the poignancy and pervasiveness o f multicultural issues in educational, political, social,
and cultural arenas and institutions; and the abundant problematizing, denigration,
deconstruction, or outright attack of reason by the various eco, feminist, post-structural,
and post-modern philosophies.10 And what is Plato but the father o f reason—o r at least

‘Given the scope and focus o f this work, it is not possible for me to present,
explicate, or even introduce here these various critiques o f reason—vast in scope and
number, originating in myriad milieus o f thought, and moving in different though similar
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the representative o f its father Socrates, and what is the kernel o f Western Civilization
through him but the pursuit o f reason and an unwavering faith in reason as humanity's
hope for achieving all that is good?
We have previously highlighted the all-pervasive, ever-present character o f faith
in human life as ultimate concern or care in the context o f our finite world existence (see
Chapters 1 and 2). It appears that before humankind is rational animal, or along with so
being we could say, it (he/she) is faith-full animal: that creature who cares; conscious
that its own being is at issue (Heidegger, 1927/1962), knowing its own mortality, it
perpetually goes about making meaning, valuing and judging. Humankind is interested,
involved, engaged, anticipating, venerating, transcending animal, in this sense. Yet, still,
we are not comfortable speaking o f faith and reason together; in fact, we are heirs to
centuries o f debates that have pitted one against the other with the decisive ultimatum:
faith ql reason, one choice. Then, o f course, faith loses its standing even as a viable,
serious opponent, eventually—or is separated from reason altogether and relegated to its
own realm, one o f little consequence in the real world o f affairs or in the advancement o f
humanity. Yet faith is, we have seen, not what it was, and neither is reason. One cannot
speak o f reason, particularly with regard to its present demise and state o f disarray,

directions according to their own particular arguments, aims, and purposes—though
these critiques are important. References to a few such critiques shall be made
throughout the body o f this work, but I have chosen to rely primarily on the work o f
Richard Bernstein (1991b) here because he, quite "reason-ably" 1 believe, steps back to
question, to inquire into and re-think this popular, contemporary "rage against reason"—
rather than, with the academic "masses" as it were, take for granted reason's depravity
and plunge directly into insuring its undoing, ironically ever using the very tool o f reason
to effect such a negation, however unwittingly (something like the dog biting the hand
that feeds it).
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without speaking also about faith. However, faith is a language lost, denied, repressed,
in many respects driven from human consciousness.
The problem can be stated and is perceived in varied and sundry ways: our faith
in or exaltation o f reason is the problem and must be discarded; at issue is reason itself
which, depreciating human concerns regarding quality and meaning and value, must be
marginalized, decentered, at least—if not thoroughly denigrated or annihilated. Or
perhaps the crisis centers more around the issue o f pathological reason, reason gone
mad, made unreasonable. One explanation arising within this line o f thought addresses a
reason reduced: victim o f the Logic o f Death (see Chapter 2), and o f severing, o f which
we have spoken, reason opts for knowledge which has unfortunately been split from
value (Sloan, 1983; Wilber, 1995). We might prefer to call it, in a variant o f the
language o f Freud, the cultural "fixation" o f the West: stuck in reason and having
repressed prior elements o f development fundamental to the full, healthy consummation
and presentation o f reason, we cannot grow beyond reason and reason itself is expressed
unreasonably, perversely, neurotically or psychotically. Reason in a rut—stagnated, and
gone awry.
Whatever the case, whatever the cause, reason is under scrutiny; what we think
o f it, what we do with it, is at issue in our day. It is clear, as well, that this trial involves
more than reason as it is generally conceived; our perplexing situation consists in a
complex nexus o f questions and crises o f freedom, authority, meaning, and frith, among
a plethora o f others. It follows that even as reason is the problem, it is only a part o f it,
and yet that part o f it which seems to have received the most attention, perhaps because
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it is most apparent. For with the Platonic tradition and on up to and past the
Enlightenment, reason is our most prominent and most admired legacy, if not also most
ambiguous, paradoxical, distorted, dangerous. It only makes sense, then, to undertake
an excavation o f sorts—to dig beneath as it were the perceived problem, to attempt an
archeological expedition which begins at the tomb o f Plato. For reason is not only not
what it once was, but we have lost too its grounding in faith; even the later historical
vehemently-heated arguments over reason versus faith—the two having been
antagonized, sides having been taken and those sides having battled it out-are practically
utterly foreign to us.
In any sort o f genealogical endeavor, even in the one to follow—sketchy at best
and necessarily selective, it is pertinent to remember that anything revisited is also
transformed: thus, reason's and faith's interrogation and reconceptualization. The task
we have carved out for ourselves is grand indeed, if not grandiose, and we find the need
to set constraints upon ourselves, to pick our sites carefully, and proceed with our
general aim in mind. It is with that frame o f mind, then, that we highlight this realization:
Plato's expression o f reason is also the expression o f the faith o f reason, and education is
conceived by him as the broad and central avenue through which this faith is manifested,
acted upon—through which reason is aspired to, apprehended and practiced. It might at
first appear strange to modem sensibilities to include education at all in such an inquiry,
but o f course, education, as well, is not what it once was. For Plato, education is
nothing other than this pilgrimage upon this upward path; it is the ascending journey o f
the soul to the intelligible sun, the good, the true and the beautiful—the faith of reason.
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Stranger still, without this grounding, then, is the suggestion o f the centrality o f
education to these questions regarding reason and faith, o f the possibilities within the
educational enterprise today to assist us in these struggles. Education, as we know it or
generally construe it, has become little more than schooling, divorced or at least
sheltered from the larger context o f living, o f human existence in the world, except as
preparation and hopefully insurance for economic and material survival. However, we
see a small measure o f its Platonic legacy now and then, the seed o f this faith; for
example, in the expectations collectively placed upon schools and in the harsh
judgements issued against them when they fail to meet those expectations.11 Clearly,
though, most o f us, most communities, most people-m ost teachers, most students, most
parents, most principals, most educational superintendents, most professors o f education,
most philosophers even—do not generally conceive o f education in this light: it is not a
journey; it is not a quest; it has little to do with the pursuit o f the good, at least as Plato
conceived o f it. Nothing o f faith is to be found explicitly in our discussions about
education, and little o f reason, in fret.
Like weeds devouring Plato's grave, there has proliferated a grand forgetfulness
covering over that foundational insight o f the "fathers" o f education, expressed most
directly in the words o f Socrates: the unexamined life is not worth living. The so-called
birth o f education in the West comprehends no split between knowledge and value,
reason and frith. In fact, education is established, undertaken, taken as an examination

T he work of Jonathan Kozol (1975/1990) is exemplary o f this harsh judgment
against public schools in America and this disappointed frith.
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o f life toward this end o f living that is worthy, toward apprehending and actualizing the
good, true, and beautiful in human life. As problematic as this notion is, there remains
the possibility that this legacy, and these origins, stand in a position to support us in
addressing our present difficulties in regard to faith, to reason, to education—in
addressing the crises o f our times; and certainly to give us insight into them. We pursue
then, with these things in mind, these excavation sites in our archeological expedition,
seeking in Part 1 (Chapter 3): to uncover and brush off this Platonic image o f education
as the faith o f reason and clarify more specifically this notion o f reason's faith, and to
explore broadly the sweep o f this faith in terms o f the Platonic vision as it has been
played out historically and ontologically; and in Part 2, (Chapter 4): to probe into the
ever-smaller context o f its operation in the educational institution, explicitly concerned
with education, and implicitly with the advancement o f reason; the historical
development o f the field o f education, exemplary o f the endurance o f this faith.
I.
But if we are persuaded by me, w ell believe that the soul is
immortal and able to endure every evil and every good, and we'll always
hold to the upward path, practicing justice with reason in every way.
That way we'll all be friends both to ourselves and to the gods while we
remain here on earth and afterw ards... H ence,... w ell do well and be
happy.
(Plato, ca. 380 b.c./1992, p. 292)
None has so profound a commitment to education as has Plato, or so great an
ambition for it. Through education—through perseverance and constancy in a blessed
journey, through the faith o f reason, through the pursuit and practice o f reason as
ultimate concern directed toward the good itself—to do well and be happy, here on earth
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and afterwards, befriending both ourselves and the gods: here is a grand and glorious
aim indeed. This is ambition, indeed, and faith—the ambition and faith o f Plato.
This metaphor o f the upward path which Plato sets forth in the Republic, as we
inquire into it, serves to give us insight into this somewhat foreign notion o f education as
reason's faith. He likens the process o f education to the journey o f underground cave
dwellers out o f the dark enclosure o f their world into the wide world o f light. Not only
does the uneducated person live in the cave, but he is also a prisoner o f the cave: his
neck and legs are bound, he can turn his head neither to the left nor to the right. The
field o f his horizon is the cave wall. Plato vividly describes the conditions o f the cave;
behind the prisoner on higher ground is a fire which both gives light and casts shadows.
The prisoner sees his own shadow and the shadows o f others who walk behind him
carrying artifacts which too cast shadows upon the cave wall. The only truths this
prisoner knows are the shadows he sees before him. He takes shadow for substance: the
shadow is the real; it is his sole reality.
In Plato's explication o f his own metaphor, he first identifies the cave habitat, the
home o f the prisoners, with the sensible or visible realm; and the fire's light within the
cave with the sun's efficacy. The pilgrimage o f ascent from the cave and the exploration
of those things beyond its entrance is likened to the education o f the soul as its journey
upward to the intelligible realm.12 In this sense, we glean that education is here

“Plato's sharp distinction between the sensible and the intelligible realms is
believed to have involved the accommodation o f Heraclitus' insight that all is flux into
Plato's more firmly established foundation in stability, the permanence o f the Forms. The
Forms bear the influence o f Parmenides' notion o f being, die belief that all is one. In this
sense, for Plato, good, virtue, reason, being, god, are all terms for the same thing, that
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developmental in nature, a progression o f the soul from matter to mind, an ascent from
the physiosphere (matter) and biosphere (life) to the realm o f the noosphere (mind).
Education is then also, ultimately, about transcendence. We take note o f and highlight
quickly this fundamental feature in Plato's construction, not only because it resonates
powerfully with our notions o f frith as they are generally construed, but also because it
contrasts sharply with our conceptions o f reason; and yet here it is the case in which
reason figures prominently in acts o f in the aim o f transcendence.
The intelligible, or knowable realm, at its pinnacle, consists in the form o f the
good, sight's finale-arrived at only with great difficulty. The good is realized as the
origin o f all that is true and beautiful; the visible realm's source, too, is found herein as
the good is also the bearer o f light. It directs understanding and apprehension o f truth;
thus, to live most sensibly with oneself and with others, to act in the world in a way most
fitting, it is required o f one to indeed gain this sight o f the form o f the good. For Plato
then, the uneducated can have no experience o f truth. While such an assertion is
generally offensive as it falls on modem ears, in the light o f its own context, it makes
perfect sense because education itself is in part the pursuit o f truth and the experience o f

which is, unchangingly. Obviously in this vein, o f great importance for him is the
maintenance o f an ethical order and the stability o f the concepts o f justice and the other
virtues (Grube, in Plato, ca. 380 b.c./1992). Including the sensible then, yet separating it
from the intelligible, he can leave intact his preference for the all as One, the unifying
Forms, admitting still to multiplicity, diversity, and the reality o f change. With such a
separation of realms, and denigration o f one by the other, it is not difficult to see the soil
in which the seeds o f the Logic o f Death (see Chapter 2) may most easily sprout if left
unattended, and it is at this point, in fact, that Plato has found a great deal o f subsequent
criticism. However, ours is presently to grasp his vision as a whole, his unifying faith,
which in many ways serves to undermine this separation and this bias.
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such. In like manner, the educated are, in fact, the virtuous; for "only really virtuous
people can actually gain genuine knowledge o f ethical truth, because they alone can
achieve genuine understanding o f the good itself (Grube, in Plato, c.a. 380 b.c./1992, p.
xv), and this understanding is o f course achieved only through education.
Plato (c.a. 380 b.c./1992) contrasts his own, perhaps radical, notion o f education
to those o f others:
Education isn't what some people declare it to be, namely, putting
knowledge into souls that lack it, like putting sight into blind eyes.... The
power to learn is present in everyone's soul an d ... the instrument with
which each learns is like an eye that cannot be turned around from
darkness to light without turning the whole body,... cannot be turned
around from that which is coming into being without turning the whole
soul until it is able to study that which is and the brightest thing that is,
namely, the one we call the good.... Education is the craft concerned
with doing this very thing, this turning around, and with how the soul can
most easily and effectively be made to do it. It isn't the craft o f putting
sight into the soul. Education takes for granted that sight is there but that
it isnt turned the right way or looking where it ought to look, and it tries
to redirect it appropriately, (p. 190)
The aim o f education,13by Plato's assertion, is not to put knowledge into a person's soul,
but to change the desires o f the heart; what is required is that the soul must be turned

“The word "educate" is said to have come from the Latin educare. meaning to
rear, to bring up, or to train. In former times, it has been associated with the physical
nurturing or rearing o f plants or animals, and the support o f growth in such (Oxford
English Dictionary. Vol. V, 1989). The Latin fidu&fflfi, however, has also been
associated with our English transliteration "educate," signifying to draw or lead out.
This origin resonates well with Plato's notion o f education as the upward journey o f the
soul—the "student" is drawn or led out o f the cave's darkness, away from lower desires
to higher ones. The term is shown to have been used in a number o f senses including the
leading forth or bringing out o f troops for military battle, a bringing forth into a country
or province, or a bringing forth of, for example, a person o f magnitude. In addition,
educere can mean to draw forth or unsheathe, as in a sword (Oxford Latin Dictionary.
Vol. 1,1984). The link made between educate and educere as a leading forth or drawing
out of intellectual abilities has been traced back to nineteenth century romanticism.
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around, in order to face and thus see light, directed toward the good as envisioned
through the faith o f reason, in order to look upon it and take it in. It is at this point
where human desire becomes central to this notion o f education as reason's faith. Thus,
Plato weaves into his story his belief in the three parts o f the human soul: the appetitive,
the spirited, and the rational. Three different kinds o f desire they are, residing within the
human soul, one o f which generally maintains dominance and thus governs the life o f that
soul, its existence in the social world, hi the appetitive, food, drink, sex, or money for
the acquisition o f things are the goods toward which the soul strives; in the spirited,
honor, victory and the comfort o f a good reputation are its aim; the rational is motivated
by the search to realize knowledge and truth. Education is, then, a transcendent sojourn
o f the soul in which the educated moves from being predominately ruled by the
appetitive part to that divine rational one, with the faith that by the rule o f reason, the
good, the true, the beautiful—virtue, justice, freedom, human and divine friendship,
happiness—can be obtained.
What follows from these three variants o f desire is an embryonic theory o f
psychological types (Grube, in Plato, c.a. 380 b.c./l992), o r at least a schema by which
to characterize souls dominated by these particular desires. Three types are identified:
the money-lover, dominated by desires that are appetitive; the honor-Iover, motivated by
longings that are spirited; and the wisdom-lover, governed by reason, desires that are
rational. The three types are embodied in the social world o f Plato as producers,
guardians and philosophers. That desire which rules the soul, directs the personality, and
much o f what is desired, depends on what the good is perceived to be. For Plato, the
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only claim that can be ultimately14 supported is the claim o f reason upon the soul, the
notion o f the good as perceived by philosophers, o r those along reason's transcendent
path.
To be virtuous is to be a lover o f wisdom—it is to have achieved the place where
the reign o f the soul is in its rational part. Education, then, as it aims in making souls
virtuous, seeks to turn souls from desires that are spirited or appetitive, and to change
those desires, or to encourage and establish those souls already ruled by reason. It
involves teaching the faithful pursuit of true happiness, found in knowledge, truth, the
apprehension o f the good. Education, if successful, makes one virtuous. It is what
happens as the internal rule o f the soul moves from the desires in one part o f the soul to
those in another part, progressively leading to that part o f the soul which is rational. In
this sense, education is exactly not about obtaining a body o f knowledge or acquiring a
set of skills, although such possessions are secondary gains. Education is the way to
inner transformation—and faith in such—that makes virtue possible and that effects a way
o f being, or living, that is meaningful, worthwhile, imbued with value.
In the context o f these human desires, Plato explains the progress o f education in
this way through four stages: first, there are prisoners who see only shadows o f models
o f things, the uneducated who are ruled by unessential appetites; next, where there is
education in a craft o r in music, poetry, or physical training, some of these prisoners are
freed from their chains to see the models o f things and to be possessed only by appetites

"Herein is Plato's faith, as frith directs itself toward care or concern that is
ultimate.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

I ll
that are necessary; then, through education in math and science comes liberation from
appetitive bonds and the authority o f spirited desires—the cave is left behind and, for the
first time, things themselves are seen; finally, education in the dialectic and in the
practical governance o f the city ushers in the rule o f the rational-achieved is the sight o f
the good itsel£ and the greatest object o f study.
Further clarification is made o f four conditions o f the soul, also progressive in
nature: imaging is the lowest condition o f the soul; belief follows as a level above
imaging; next proceeds that which is still greater, being thought; and finally, the highest
of all such conditions is understanding. Imaging and belief are along the order of
opinion, whereas thought and understanding are functions of the intellect. The source
of opinion's care is becoming, while the intellect's is being. Being is to becoming as
intellect is to opinion, as knowledge is to belief as thought is to imaging. Thus, we
have an outline for a general developmental schema o f the soul's journey upward, its
education, and evolution as fleshed out by Plato:
[VISIBLE]
imaging —> belief
opinion/becoming
appetitive
producers

[INTELLIGIBLE]
—>

thought —> understanding
intellect/being

spirited
guardians

rational
philosopher-kings

It seems apparent that Plato privileges being over becoming;15that the path to bliss and

“Perhaps, in this privileging lies the seeds o f repression, o f violence against
becoming, and thus o f subsequent pathology. Plato may in fret be interpreted here as
one who devalues and denigrates imaging and belief, rather than highlighting them as
fundamental to the development o f full-bodied thought and understanding—as prior to,
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thus the course o f education entails a certain betrayal o f the sensible, o f becoming, in the
quest for the intelligible, for being. The implication is that the good cannot be seen in
that which is coming into being, but only in being itself Yet perhaps, as Wilber (1995)
posits, within the entirety o f Plato's thought, the main thrust centers around the
incompletion o f becoming, the need o f diversity, of flux, to find its meaning, and its
completion, in its relationship to being, to permanence, to the transcendent. For the
enlightened, educated soul is charged with the responsibility to return to the cave, with
this larger, greater context, this higher sight, through which to view shadows and
artifacts and models o f things in the cave; is summoned to participate in the creation o f
human life "worth living" by education's contemplative light, with the sight o f the good
that is brought home to the soul only through this journey o f examination.
Hence, we have this quest for being, a striving toward that which is, with the
anticipation o f blessing. In such a quest, too, the one undertaking it is changed,
transformed: the desire o f the soul—the soul itself—has been turned, moved. As the path
to being, Wilber likens Plato's vision to those o f the contemplative traditions the world

foundational to and constitutive o f thought and understanding. The problems of
modernity may be traced to this condemnation, in terms o f a loss o f the symbolic life so
fundamental to thoughtful living, the removal o f the imagination and o f belief from the
production o f knowledge, from what is taken for knowledge. Even Plato must use this
image o f the cave and the human journey out o f it to the light o f the sun to impact the
beliefs of, to evoke thought in, to promote understanding in his readers, his listeners.
We see faith, as well, figures prominently in this debate, as the great mediator o f
becoming and being, of the historical and the eternal; as the state o f being ultimately
concerned, faith engages also the whole person, serving an integrative function which
takes up, frames and brings together images, beliefs, thoughts and understandings.
Plato's faith o f reason and its explication here evidences this integration well, although
perhaps its denial by him too.
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over: it is akin to the path traversed by the mystics—who have spanned the centuries,
male and female, from every religion, culture and walk o f life. His is primarily a journey
o f inner transcendence that achieves this "good” blessed vision and insight o f the Many
encompassed in the One or All, and vice-versa.
O f course, few cast Plato in this light, and more, in feet, diametrically disagree
with such a cast; certainly, Plato is not normally perceived or considered in this way;
rather upon first hearing, it sounds ludicrous even to compare Plato to the mystics at all
or the Platonic tradition to the mystical one. Indeed, should we continue further,
fleshing out his own explication o f the cave metaphor, and the "curricular" and
"methodological" implications he gleans from it, would we not be presented with this
traditionally "narrow" path o f study marked out by reason as we know it? Not exactly.
But it is not our aim here to map out all the details laid out by Plato, delineating from his
cave allegory, regarding curriculum design, pedagogical methodology, etc., nor to make
of Plato a mystic; rather, we seek to investigate broadly his foundational concept of
education as the feith o f reason.
The disciplines o f study, the sequences and methods prescribed therein, are
themselves beneficial, necessary, pursued, in the larger context which aims at moving the
soul through reason to a vision o f the good, and to a life empowered by such a vision.
We simply state that what Plato's exegesis does seem to evidence is the radical import
and influence o f historicity, o f particularity, o f the social and cultural conditions o f
existence, upon the concretization o f an image or narrative such as this, its application or
perceived actualization in human life, in the actual education o f real individual souls, in
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both personal and public domains. For we even read the Republic as a whole and marvel
at the conclusions to which Plato is drawn, or to which he has Socrates come—markedly
different from those we should make given the same images, addressed with the same
questions, even following the same general logic—in fret, we are appalled by many o f his
proposals—such as, for example, separating the young for early educational inculcation,
or the censorship o f stories, tragedies, poets, and storytellers.
What we take note o f here is his radical—and radically different from our o w nportrait o f education. It is the education o f the soul, for one; and it is its transformative,
transcendent ascent to the good, the true, the beautiful—to wisdom, to happiness, to a
life o f meaning and worthwhile efficacy, to virtue. It is its spiritual journey, undertaken
in and through frith—"from frith to frith" (The Holy Bible. 198S, Romans 1:17), as it is
said, the faith o f reason as divine. For, says Plato (c.a. 380 b.c./l992), comparing reason
to other virtues o f the soul: "The virtue o f reason seems to belong above all to
something more divine, which never loses its p ow er..." (p. 190-191).
It may be contested that Plato's notion o f "divine" is markedly different from the
contemporary one handed down to us through Christianity—that, in fret, his notion is
along the order o f mathematics, that Pythagorean divinity centered around numbers and
geometric forms. Yet, such an argument does not hold when we look further at the
specifics Plato lays out in regard to the study o f math and its place in the divine journey,
and at his explicit teleology, the aim and end o f this quest. Plato neither questions the
existence o f the gods, nor their divinity, nor the importance o f the human need for a
relationship to the divine, which is more than numerical if that. More importantly,
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though, we remind ourselves that the key pedagogical and curricular question for Plato is
this: "What subject... draws the soul from the realm o f becoming to the realm o f what
is?” (p. 193). He identifies that which awakens understanding, in this way, as that which
by sense perception brings to pass no sound result. Aporias, perhaps, or paradoxes,
these he calls "summoners,” shooting off into opposite perceptions at the same tim elike a thing that through the senses announces itself as x and as counter-x in one and the
same moment. It is the mysterious, the puzzling, the inexplicable or incommensurate—
the antinomy—which draws us, intrigues us, lures us, evokes inquiry which leads the soul
to and upon this path o f ascent. Again, one judges if a matter is worthy of study in this
wise: the criteria consist in whether or not the study o f such matter shall move the soul
to attend to being, rather than to becoming alone.
Math—i.e., the study o f numbers, ratios, geometric forms—is counted worthy,
then, as an object o f study by Plato as that which directs the soul to truth because it
concerns numbers, where one is able to see the same entity as both one and unlimited,
whole and part, finite and infinite. The danger, he adds, is that calculation and the
various mathematical functions can be practiced for the sake o f a trade alone; and if
pursued not for the sake of knowing, the understanding is not compelled to enter into the
pursuit o f truth. When pursued knowingly, however, this study can drive the soul's sight
to things above, and promote the desired ascent to the invisible world. It is true that
Plato has a certain obsession with numbers and ratios, directly attributable to a
Pythagorean influence, yet probably more a result o f Plato's intense desire for stability, to
define with certainty those concepts o f concern, at issue for him and his society, which
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seem to evade definition, like justice, beauty, etc. (Grube, in Plato, c.a. 380 b.c./1992)~
and numbers can give one this sense o f security and definitiveness. Indeed, the West is
marked by this Platonic desire, indelibly ingrained in it, and much o f its history has been
guided and directed either consciously or unconsciously by this concentrated need.
However, is this Pythagorean study the aim, the end o f the divine journey? Is it
the culmination and crown o f reason divine? Definitively, it is not. Plato vehemently
concludes: "Don't you know that all these subjects [including those which are
mathematical] are merely preludes to the song itself which must be learned?" (c.a. 380
b.c./1992, p. 203). The song is that which dialectic sings, intelligible and echoed in the
agency o f sight. As through sight one may apprehend the visible at its height in
beholding the sun, "whenever someone tries through argument and apart from all sense
perceptions to find the being itself o f each thing and doesn't give up until he grasps the
good itself with understanding itself he reaches the end o f the intelligible" (p. 204).
Dialectic is said to bring the soul to a peaceful abode, in a sense, to the end of
journeying; for the soul has reached the end o f the journey, and its aim. In the language
of faith, the soul has reached the ultimate; its ultimate concern has found intelligible
realization.
Plato, o f course, has developed this method he calls "dialectic" from the elenchus
o f Socrates, a procedure o f examination in which contradictions, inconsistencies in
reasoning, are realized and rectified. And this search for sufficient definitions o f the
concepts of things is pursued with nothing short o f moral transformation as its goal
(Grube, in Plato, c.a. 380 b.c./1992). The habitual performance o f such examination
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assists humanity in worthy living, promoting virtue and blessedness; it gifts the giver,
and those with whom the giver shares this gift, with truth, beauty, and goodness.
Thus, the effect o f pedagogy, in the Platonic sense, is dramatic—concerning such
things as beauty, truth and goodness. First, the soul must be set free—the shackles
removed—and turned from the cave wall toward and brought into the light which shines
through the opening o f the cave above. The aim and intent in education, then, is
liberation, in fact—it comes to set the captives free. The process is described as a
dizzying, dazzling, confusing experience. With it lies the temptation to turn back, to
choose shadow over substance. When the eyes accustomed to shadows first meet light,
they are blinded and still cannot yet see what is. It takes a while to get used to the light.
But once this is accomplished, the vision—the view—is never the same. Curriculum as
conversion? This portrait resonates noticeably with that one of the Christian experience
of St. Paul, blinded by the light on the road to Damascus. Or in more contemporary
terms, curriculum as paradigm shifting, perhaps. O f course, Plato precedes Christ—and
Kuhn—in the chronology o f things. By any comparison, Plato's notion is pretty radical,
in fact, and it is not as absurd as upon first consideration to see something o f the mystic
in him.
More to the point, Plato has a faith which abides: it is the faith o f reason, o f
philosophy, to effect such a profound and blessed transformation o f the human soul, and
through such, o f the human community, as well. True philosophy is that ascent to what
is, for Plato, and education, too, as the upward journey, and the hope o f reason, is true
philosophy, the philosopher’s path. In the Phaedo (c.a. 395 b.c./1951), he fUrther
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describes philosophy as that vigil over death—being towards death, as it were, and care in
such being. It includes that concern and that attempt to reconcile the seemingly
irreconcilable: flux and permanence, the particular and the universal, the historical and
the eternal, mortality and immortality, diversity and unity, becoming and being, being and
nothingness, the Many and the One—in such a way that life may be lived fully, in contrast
to the unexamined life which is little more than the life o f the living dead. In this way,
for Plato, reason—including education as reason's faith and the enactment o f that faith,
directing one to a vision o f the form o f the good—is the ultimate, the object o f ultimate
care and concern, or is at least indelibly tied to the ultimate as the only path for
apprehending such (i.e., the good, true and beautiful, etc.); thus, via education, the
persistent hopeful quest for it, the search for its actualization. Plato's notion o f reason is
constitutive o f the transcendent function. And, o f course, it is, in fact, this whole nexus
exactly within which faith is said to operate.
Now at this point—according to Plato in the unpacking o f his own image, the
saved cave-prisoner, of course, cannot go back to the cave. He sees the world in
altogether different terms. He cannot see as once he did. In fact, he pities those whose
eyes chase after shadows as though they were the substance o f tangible things. If he
were to return to the cave, he would be ridiculed for his poor eyesight. Shadows no
longer signify the real or ultimate to him. In Plato's allegory, he explains that a soul
having seen the light and returned to the darkness of the cave would rather be as Homer
choosing serfdom over the opinions o f dark imprisoned souls; he quotes here, in fact,
from the Odyssey (c.a. 1000-850 b.c./1980), echoing the words spoken by Achilles'
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ghost-shadow to Odysseus during his visitation in Hades (Grube, in Plato, c.a. 380
b.c./l992, p. 189, ftn.). In this sense, likening the cave inhabitants to the dead—the living
dead, Plato is making the claim that education brings life to the otherwise lifeless, dead—
the uneducated. And here we have another image which coincides strongly with the
Christian one o f regeneration—an image found, o f course, in mystical traditions o f all
varieties. Reason is divine.
Thus, the soul proceeding in its education, in due time, looks happily upon the
sun itself rather than just its rays reflected upon the water, and the light o f reason has
dawned. Herein, in Plato's description of education, is presented most clearly the schema
for an "Enlightenment." Within some schools o f thought, Plato's cave metaphor should
be seen as indeed descriptive o f the upward journey humankind has taken historically,
and not just literally (beginning as "cavemen," etc.). The discovery of the rational part o f
man, it would be claimed in this case, marks the birth o f reason and ushers in the age o f
Enlightenment. Clearly, the age o f the Enlightenment is characterized most frequently
and faithfully as the age o f reason, or perhaps more directly as the craze o f reason, and a
neo-classicist revival—although obviously inclusive therein is a neo-reason, and hardly
exactly the reason o f Plato. The phrase we have taken up, "the faith of reason," has in
fact been previously taken up by Charles Frankel (1948) in a book of that name on
Enlightenment thought and the idea o f progress foundational to it and to the present
legacy o f reason's faith. Frankel points out that while such a faith is construed by
contemporaries to be a mistaken one, it involves "a complex and uneasy combination o f
beliefs" (p. 2) which needs careful examining, especially as the predecessor of our liberal
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faith, "the idea o f human improvement through the use o f organized intelligence...
central to liberal philosophies" (p. 4). Thus, we move now from the frith o f Plato, and
his reason, to the archeology o f its significance in the development o f Western
Civilization: a basic and broad exploration into the structures built upon this foundation
as well as the rents and cracks, the unleveling and sinking effects rendered upon it. Our
inquiry concerns the enduring presence o f the Platonic vision, the historical operation of
the frith o f reason, whether manifested via its alteration, denial, repression, inversion or
aggrandizement.
n.

Clearly, the Enlightenment represents a most visible high point in the history o f
this vision in the West (at least seemingly so)—though some 2000 years since its
inception—as the advocate and beacon o f reason, reason's cultural triumph and pinnacle.
Thus, its obvious import in this archeology. Yet, just as certainly by this time, something
has already happened to reason and to the journey o f the soul indelibly tied to it, to the
faith o f reason—things are neither as they once were, nor rarely as they seem. It is
necessary to remember that in early Greek thought, the Kosmos is one (comprised o f all
domains—physiosphere, biosphere, noosphere, and theosphere); all o f its different
aspects constitute an interrelated and unbroken expression o f Spirit, all essential and
intrinsically valuable. Extant is this great chain o f being and this journey from matter to
life to mind to soul, and then to spirit, telos and summit. Wilber (1995) claims, in fact,
that this view o f the world persists in some form until the close o f the nineteenth century.
For Plato, then, reason is the way of human access to spirit: "To be rational [means]
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attunement with the Kosmos" (p. 399). The heart o f the Platonic quest in which reason
is central is this knowledge o f the One, the good, that beyond being, Spirit.16 Such
involves two reciprocal and continuous movements: the ascent from the Many to the
One, the intelligible realm, transcendent spirit; and the descent from the One to the
Many, the visible realm, immanent spirit. The first involves the contemplation o f the
good, the second, participation in the world's goodness.

“Reason, in Greek—logos, is divine. Martin Heidegger (1927/1962) suggests
that, for Plato, logos signifies discourse primarily—constitutive o f the term "dialectic’’ as
well, the meaning o f which is obscured historically, however, through numerous
translations. The logos involves a making manifest in discourse, it is an expression
which allows something to be seen, in a sense by pointing it out, in its "togetherness."
Its relationship to truth, then, is found in terms o f discovery, o f manifestation, in which
something is revealed, is taken out o f hiding. In its function o f letting things be
perceived, it signifies reason. It has the character o f speech, o f utterance—an active,
living efficacy. Divine reason speaks things into being.
Logos is generally translated as reason, judgment, concept, definition, ground,
relationship, reckoning, account, and also as utterance, discourse or speech, mind. In
this sense, it is inward thought itselfj the embodiment o f a concept or idea, the revelation
of a message (uttered or expressed), generally construed as divine: thus, the cause or
ground, divine expression, the Divine itself—God (Oxford English Dictionary. Vol. XIII,
1989; Strong's Exhaustive Concordance o f the Bible: Dictionaries o f the Hebrew and
Greek Words, n d .: Vine's expository dictionary. n.d.l. For Heraclitus, the logos
controls the pattern o f the Kosmos; as the principle o f order in the universe, it not only
determines pattern in the physical world, but also in the world o f events, imbuing all with
purposiveness. The logos is the source o f all human thought, recognition o f truth, and
moral judgment. It is this sense o f order which fascinates the Greeks, especially the
Stoics, and Plato as well, and thus, a devotion to reason. Such is the power which puts
coherence and meaning into the world; it speaks it into being, puts it into motion, keeps
it growing and going. Reason, from this Greek perspective, pervades all things: the
thought o f God branded on the Kosmos; through it, the worlds are made, and all things
therein bear its stamp. Reason is the great mediator between God and the world,
between the divine and the human, between the intelligible and sensible realms (Barclay,
1955). William Barclay (19SS) calls it the priest which brings the soul before God, the
manifestation o f the creating, guiding, directing power o f the divine.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

122
While it is true that in Plato's cave allegory he emphasizes the movement o f
ascension and disapproves o f humanity dwelling solely and persistently in the "cave" o f
the world's manyness, in his explication o f the image he affirms the necessity o f
descension, an enduring response o f the one who has made the journey upward. In fact,
while the father o f the "Ideal realm," Plato likewise is said to have possessed an
"exuberant kind o f this-worldliness" (Lovejoy, 1936/1964, p. 45); Arthur Lovejoy
claims that for Plato, "the shadows were as needful to the Sun as the Sun to the
shadows; their existence was the very consummation o f its perfection" (p. 53). In the
Timaeus (c.a. 360 b.c./1965), Plato speaks o f the Kosmos as a visible sensible God,
spirit-infused—all matter, life, and consciousness. Wilber (1995) calls Plato's journey a
great circle—which we note is a symbol o f wholeness and eternity, and the way o f faith—
in which the upward path and the descending return find communion; the injunction is:
"Flee the many, embrace the one; having found the one, embrace the many as one” (p.
326). In a concrete way, the importance o f this injunction is seen in Plato's intense
concern over establishing the ideal city, the "republic," and his emphasis o f the
responsibility upon philosophers—those having undertaken the upward path—to return to
city life and serve the people. But the West, it appears, has not heard the injunction
aright, or only part o f it. More appropriately then, the Western tradition, in this way, is
comprised o f "fractured" footnotes to Plato (p. 320). Thus, early on, reason as well—the
reason o f Plato—is alternatively construed, or misconstrued, perhaps.
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This two-directional or "circular” nature o f the soul's journey, o f humanity's
education, seems to undergo a kind o f splintering17as early as with the thought and

l7Admittedly, I am here attempting a very broad, impressionistic presentation o f
human history in the West, specifically with regard to humankind's ontological stance
toward the journey which is life, and tendency toward "splintering"--privileging the one,
the universal, ascent fit the many, the particular, descent. In this way, I am, o f course,
guilty o f a good deal o f over-generalization, although such a crime seems inescapable
given my present aim, the nature o f the task I am seeking to undertake. Theorizing, at a
certain level, requires over-generalization—desirable, as well, for a glimpse o f a larger
view, particularly when one is addressing cosmological and ontological concerns. For
example, it is as important to be aware o f and take in the forest as it is to study and
examine the trees, and the bark (o f the trees) finds its meaning, or at least a greater or
more expanded meaning, as viewed within the larger horizon and contextualized
landscape o f the forest.
This is not to ignore, undermine or discount the legitimate criticisms made
against the problem o f theory, particularly against its tendency toward abstraction and
discourse that is universalizing and totalizing, hi this way, clearly, in and of itself such
discourse runs the risk o f violence—silencing, excluding, erasing the multiplicity o f
diverse voices, perspectives, the reality of particularity and difference. Herein, unwilling
to run such a risk, I would like to say from the outset that the following historical
presentation is merely an attempt at an overview o f a particular line o f dominant thought
in the West which seeks to evidence this "splintering" tendency. In this sense, it lacks
the subtlety and complexity required o f a fUll-bodied, in-depth historical study or
investigation o f these time periods, which given the aim and scope o f this work I have
been unable to undertake here. The view set forth is undoubtedly like a view o f the
forest, though not in an attempt to undermine the importance o f looking further at
individual trees and the barks o f those trees to supplement o r challenge that view.
However, today, with attention directed, understandably (as I think the following
presentation will show), so singularly at difference and at the voices and views o f
particular peoples and cultures not represented or heard in the main, the problem seems,
to me, to be more along the order o f missing the forest for the trees, or the tendency to
discount the legitimacy o f the forest altogether.
In addition, it is important to differentiate between the thought of influential
individuals, and their thought as inherited, taken up and propagated by mainstream
culture and by subsequent generations. Plato is not equal to Platonism, nor Aristotle to
Aristotleanism, nor Marx to Marxism. Neither is the complexity o f medieval thought
equal to medievalism, o f Christianity to Christendom, o f modernity to modernism. I am
here focusing on something o f the "isms” which have dominated, the prevailing effects o f
ideas as reduced and assimilated culturally, their social sedimentations and presentations
(or "conventionalizations”). Such is not to deny the margins o f culture, nor the voices o f
dissent and resistance ever present in every age, though I do not deal with them here.
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impact o f Aristotle, Plato's student. Ironically, while Aristotle is traditionally taken as
the "this-worldly" philosopher in contrast to Plato, his Divine—in which we have seen
Reason plays a key role—turns to represent a kind o f Pure Ascension, Transcendence;
god becomes primarily altogether other-worldly. The two paths taken separately are
contradictory—antagonists, opposing directions and journeys. It becomes a matter o f
choosing the world or losing the world-rejecting it. After Aristotle, then, the
upwardness o f the journey takes precedence. Moreover, with the subsequent reign o f an
official Christianity, influenced by Aristotle, the split is decisive and esteemed is the path
o f ascent only (Wilber, 1995). This world, the body, the senses are denigrated, despised,
declared evil. The church's legacy and lineage becomes repression, asceticism; the
violent and dogmatic rule and domination o f Ascension, o f the mind, o f the One as
construed by the Church, at the expense o f and in abnegation o f the Many, o f the body,
o f the import o f Descension. Pathological Ascent.

Since I am relying heavily on the work o f Kenneth Wilber (1995) in this regard, who has
been accused o f reporting a caricature history o f the West, I have felt the need to
comment on these things. My construction, as with Wilber's, is but one story about the
development o f thought in the West, specifically concerned with the notion o f the
universal therein, as well as an attempt at a generalized cosmological and ontological
story o f the West—fully aware that "the West" itself is no simple, well-defined, unified,
unchanging, non-contradictory construct. Obviously, no one story or interpretation o f
history can claim to be truly representative o f reality, and to profess a full and genuine
understanding o f any historical time frame is to make a false profession (Munro, 1996).
The problem o f history—its "appearance o f unity, o f coherence, of order, [which] is
predicated ... on the suppression o f contradictory stories,... this silencing" (p. 3); its
need for origins and ends; and its affection for simple linearity—is the problem, too, o f
human understanding, constituted by narrative selectivity and unity, and in the search for
intelligibility.
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Interestingly enough, however, the ascent promoted by the Church as
establishment is not only severed from any return or descent, and in fact privileged over
against descent, but also this ascent is ironically truncated, thwarted, controlled, cut off.
The seeds are sown for dualism to prevail: body versus mind versus spirit, nature versus
culture, human versus divine. This god threatens becoming absolutely separate from this
world. Wilber calls this god "the unearthly trinity" who, ironically and tragically, is
denied the status o f the truly transcendent, in fact, but is rather made in the image o f the
establishment: anthropocentric, geocentric, egocentric to the core. As the achievement
o f reason at its core is antithetical to such an image,18 perhaps what occurs is the actual
denial of reason, in the name o f reason, and the relentless prevention o f its actualization

"From a developmental perspective o f the human individual, as well as of
humanity at large (like those o f Kenneth Wilber, Jurgen Habermas and Jean Piaget, for
example), reason is seen as an advance, a higher form o f thought, over archaic, magical
or mythical thought—o r sensorimotor, preoperational or concrete-operational function.
Reason represents, in its best manifestation, a transcendence o f the physiosphere and
biosphere into the realm o f the noosphere, o f mind. True transcendence, it should be
noted, does not involve the repression or denial o f these more fundamental spheres but
their negation and embrace in the more significant sphere of the mind, in which we might
also include spirit. Even those who eschew developmental notions o f the person and o f
the history of humanity seem to retain something o f this structure in their discourse.
Reason, for example, correlates with Jacques Derrida's (1992/1995) discussion o f the
birth o f the human subject, marked by this movement toward interiority, and o f
responsibility as the defining element in history, as well as with Paul Ricoeur's
(1969/1974) look at the emergence o f atheism, its critique o f outward form,
unacknowledged desire, and thoughtless practice and belief (see Chapter 1). Kenneth
Wilber (1995) identifies reason with the possession o f "a new interiority to transcend and
operate on the rules o f thought themselves ..., bring[ing] with it a new world o f feelings,
o f dreams, of wild passions and idealistic strivings. It is true that rationality introduces a
new and more abstract understanding ..., b u t... quite secondary to the primary and
defining mark o f reason: reason is a space o f possibilities, possibilities not tied to the
obvious, the given, the mundane, the profane,... the beginning o f the invisible w orlds..."
(p. 231, emphasis in original).
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culturally. At any rate, full transcendence and ascension (in the Platonic sense) is
deemed heresy; the upward journey o f the Christ is forbidden to others, the path
anathema: transcendental reduction, limited ascent under the sole/soul direction o f the
Church. Moreover, the powers that be ferociously and vehemently come against those
who seek the upward path without such imposed limitations; they are mystics or
profanes, whether secular or religious, who blasphemously pull God down from his
throne, or strive pridefolly to reach up to that sacred place themselves, tainting the divine
with their impure touch; they must be extinguished. Many are burned at the stake, in
fact. Reason ripped of reason, truncated—unreasonable reason, if that. Therefore,
instead o f the ascent to the Light o f the Sun, the Dark Ages.
It is at least by this point that "the West was locked into a perpetually frustrated
Ascendant yearning—a yearning for a Goal that would never be officially allowed" (p.
335). The "desperate free," Janus-like, o f the West, as we know it, finds the source of
its present countenance and incessant spiritual hunger, perhaps, here exactly. This
hunger never fulfilled, the blessedness sought in this journey constantly denied, it is not
long before the faith of it, already altered, is further changed, denied altogether even, and
the path itself despised. O f course, this is not to say that reason itself is denigrated—it is
simply not what it was and is becoming progressively other than it was. In fact, reason is
again lauded, yet it has no consciousness o f its own faith, or only a faint one. Incessant
debate has threatened the complete separation o f reason from faith, and the overthrow of
faith—faith, o f course, as defined by the Church to control thought and silence the voice
o f rational criticism. The path o f ascent, via the Church, is delegitimated, has been given
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a bad name, and faith with it in some measure. With the Renaissance and the
accompanying rise o f science, the call o f reason is again taken in hand, the journey as
prescribed by religion rejected or undermined, and a new course drawn up—and with it, a
reversal, a new direction: the journey o f Descent (Wilber, 1995). Reason released and
yet redirected, and the faith o f it lost in the shuffle, and redirected as well.
Wilber identifies the initial shift o f emphasis from ascent or transcendence to
world descent and immanence with the Renaissance and the science o f the Renaissance.
The center o f interest turns around "the great plenitude;" it is now "this" world which
has preeminence, the other world out o f fashion after the long disquiet—failed attempts
to apprehend it. The domination o f ascent is zealously broken, one stunted reason
replaced with another; one insufficient god conquered by another; frith underground
yet likewise re-routed. Renaissance science seeks still the laws o f God, but the logos or
reason o f this descending god—creative, effluxing. Again, only a part o f Plato has been
taken up: in this case, his doctrine o f plentitude. These ideas o f Plato predating the
establishment o f scientific evidence for their support are the aprioris substantiated in the
research program o f the Renaissance. Nature consists in this great chain o f being, the
task of science being to uncover the missing links. The encyclopedia is bom here as
well, classifying, organizing, putting together the pieces to gain a comprehensive view o f
the world. This world is not just the many, but now also the one. The quest gathers
around solely that which can be seen, the exteriors. The rise o f science contributes to
these changes: crude instruments, though partial, purport to reveal all the world. Wilber
calls it the flatland or collapsed cosmos, also and better known as the mechanistic
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worldview. In addition, the second law o f thermodynamics adds to such deterministic
thinking, and the thinking o f descent—the order o f the universe, rather its disorder, or the
universe in decline.
Yet, with Darwin, evolution, and the developmental conception o f the biosphere,
the split that has already occurred is brought clearly into view, even within the empirical
sciences dedicated to the external world alone. The "mechanical" physiosphere is
winding down while the organic biosphere is winding up. Incommensurable descent and
ascent. The Kosmos is now the cosmos, neither spirit-infused nor exactly whole: matter
dead, mind disembodied. Radical efforts are offered to try to restore the Kosmos:
materialism considers the idea that all is matter, phenomenalism suggests that all is mind.
Eventually, however, the natural sciences are separated from the human sciences, natural
philosophy from moral philosophy, and the biological sciences are caught between the
two poles (Wilber, 1995). Things are not as they once were, the path is forked, if still a
path, and even the journey o f descent is not as secure as it at first seemed. Reason's faith
is tom , its aim perhaps conflicted.
Yet still, reason marches on—and underneath, the "everlasting" arms o f faith.
Akin to Derrida's (1992/1995) look at history as responsibility, a human evolution o f
increasing interiorization, the crux o f which he locates in Christianity (see Chapter 1),
Wilber (1995), among others, has considered the history o f the very Kosmos as
evolutionary movement toward greater depth or interiority. Human consciousness is
construed in this way as the manifestation o f the Kosmos conscious of itself. Reason, as
well, plays a key role in this inward turn. Even in its apparent perverse manifestation in
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the West, interiorization seems to utter a particular kind o f wisdom—the wisdom o f the
ancients speaking across time and culture, in fact, whom Wilber describes as "figures o f
the future,” rather than primarily o f the past, prophets o f human possibility. In
concurrence with Derrida's thought, Paul Tillich (1967) has identified Augustine, a
Christian father, as a central spokesman for the West, its rendering o f the soul's journey—
the message: Go within to get beyond. Within is ascent; depth is ascent, which ought
to take the soul beyond to include a descending embrace.
Both Wilber (1995) and Habermas (1976/1979) identify the emergence of this
greater human interiority with the time o f Plato, the "Golden Age o f Greece." A
movement o f the soul from a dominant role identity to the beginnings o f an ego identity
corresponds with this emergence, and with the human "birth" o f reason. However, both
scholars, as well, see reason, this ego identity, the manifestation o f the noosphere,
reaching cultural fruition in the sixteenth century. Also, with the emergence o f the ego
identity comes the accomplishment, in evolutionary terms, o f the differentiation of the
Kosmos: physiosphere, biosphere, and noosphere, at least. Development is seen
likewise as envelopment, proceeding from the most fundamental to the most significant;
thus, to move powerfully into noospheric awareness is movement upward. In this sense
then, the upward path, the journey o f ascent, the telos of transcendence, in some
measure prevails despite the people o f the West, their historical vengeance against it.
Yet with greater advance, and thus also complexity, lies the potential for greater
pathology as well. Differentiation is distinguishable from dissociation or alienation, and
the call o f integration ceaselessly follows upon it. And o f course, there is, in the West,
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already this truncation, this stunted growth, this splitting—the presence o f pathology.
Reason, faith, humankind, is not what it could be. Yet it is interesting to note that in the
sixteenth century, for the first time, reason in the name o f faith is asserted against the
unjust, unreasonable domination o f the Church. The Reformation claims for the
individual the ownership o f this upward journey, the mind to read, interpret and
understand for oneself the divine as expressed in the Scriptures. Still, the splits remain,
grow and perpetuate; historically, it seems, faith is heard for the last time in relation to
reason, and that only peripherally. For faith has already been identified with pure ascent:
that evil, oppressive and controlled sojourn against reason, against the pursuit of
knowledge, against humanity itself. Nevertheless, the faith o f reason is bolstered in this
historical moment, and with it, if only indirectly, the path o f ascent.
Thus, accompanying the Enlightenment, is this resurgence o f human agency and
enthusiasm and passion for reason; with the bold confirmation o f the descending
journey, taken as the whole journey o f reason and the antagonist o f the upward
pilgrimage, the quest o f ascent is likewise unwittingly reinvigorated, "ever-ascending
yearnings for the light" renewed (Wilber, 1995, p. 323). The journey rewritten—
transcendence simultaneously incorporated, denied and translated—becomes the quest for
progress, the sojourn forward. The solution o f the "infinite ahead" as aim seems to
answer the frustration and feebleness, the disheartening dissatisfaction and divisiveness
felt in both the purely ascending and descending paths. Wilber claims that in the
Enlightenment creed o f progress, the intuition o f the infinite is displaced onto the horizon
o f a temporal and disturbed and unquenchable hunger for this material world—infinite
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yearning denying the infinite. In religious terms, Enlightenment faith is idolatrous faith,
attempting to make ultimate that which never can be so.
The eye o f reason's faith is strong and yet strongly directed toward that alone
which can be seen. Ironically, then, the faith and the reason which thrive constitute the
bare bones o f each, in fact, denying their own ground and essence. For reason and faith
by nature concur on at least one point with the "divine” intuitions purported in other
traditions centered in God, the Tao, etc., which is that things are not as they at first
seem; that the cosmos is much more than what the naked eye beholds or the senses
perceive; that beneath the visible world in all its diverse singularities lies some deeper
order (Wilber, 1995), some unifying pattern. By faith, the invisible is beheld; the eternal
is held within the temporal, the infinite within the finite; reason, likewise, is the gateway
to the unseen, the universal, the realm o f multiple possibilities beyond the given and the
apprehension of their interrelationships. However, in the Enlightenment, the zealous
pursuit o f reason is the pursuit o f a reason, in betrayal o f its nature, that regards exteriors
only. Its faith rests in gaining this world alone, minus its interiors. The reason affirmed
is monological reason, the ascension esteemed merely progress forward in the
descending path o f studying the visible world. For, it is this world alone which is real,
and reason which is real is that which obtains this world through empirical science.
Wilber (1995), arguing for reason as a legitimate advance from mythic thought
that is literal and egocentric, summarizes the Enlightenment in this way: "The necessary
collective evolution from mythic to rational was the Enlightenment's great achievement;
the unnecessary collapse o f the Kosmos to the holistic flatland was its great and enduring
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crime" (p. 344). The surface, the interlocking order o f exteriors, is taken for the whole
world. Differentiation, thus, though having been realized, has pushed itself to excess; it
has become dissociation: the interior split off from the exterior, likewise, the individual,
the singular, the organism, being, split off from the communal, the plural, the interrelational, the environment, being-with in the world. Existing uncomfortably, even
antagonistically, together—though more predominantly apart—are the mind and the body,
culture and nature. The Enlightenment advance indicates a strange and mutated
transcendence, in one sense gone too far, into repression—denying nature and the body
(both physiosphere and biosphere), rather than enveloping them in a higher embrace
(negation without preservation); in another sense not gone far enough, into regressioncutting off access to transcendence, having denied also depth and interiority and
qualitative distinction. The charge is not merely against the "gross" reductionism o f
thought that is atomistic, individualistic, or behavioristic; but also the "subtle"
reductionism o f thought that is holistic, functionalistic, structuralistic, systemic,
instrumental. In either case, the "inside" o f the universe is dismissed; attended to is the
material alone. Yet still, the atomists and the holists battle it out over their "cardboard
cosmos" (Wilber, 1995); they war over its most fundamental aspects, and disqualify its
most significant ones. Brought to fore in the Enlightenment is the perplexing problem o f
a subject who can describe an objective world but cannot account for himself or herself,
who has little to say about the consciousness which, in fact, does the describing and
which can render accounts (of the world). As Hans-Georg Gadamer (1960/1992) puts
it, with its "prejudice against prejudice," Enlightenment thought can neither
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acknowledge its faith nor its inner ground—reason working against reason, which is also
reason working against humanity, and ultimately against all the world.
The Enlightenment inheritance is a profoundly paradoxical reason, identified by
some scholars with "the dialectic o f progress" (Horkheimer & Adorno, 1944/1972); its
world holism makes for the atomistic self. Humanity, via this reason, is left with a
"disengaged ego dangling" in "self-autonomous agency," who can't find its place in a
tight-knit closed system o f interlocking objects, an empirical and objective world
(Wilber, 199S). The subject separate from the object and the objectified world in which
he or she lives, and the external world taken for the whole—even ever so subtly through
"holistic" world perspectives regarding structures and functions and systems, not only is
the Kosmos itself under palatial erasure, but also the subject itself—erasing itself in fact,
and this via reason, and the force of reason's faith. By denying the unseen, by
approaching all things through objective empiricism, by construing objects o f awareness
instrumentally as merely parts o f the whole; this stunted, monological, contradictory
reason reigns, in the service o f what has been in retrospect called a "dehumanizing
humanism."19 Such reason compels the subject to become object, the all objectified, and
as value and meaning are functions o f the internal world, o f depths not acknowledged,
they too begin to lose hold, to pass away.

’’Richard Bernstein (1991b), in "The Rage Against Reason," lays out the thought
o f Max Weber, Theodor Adorno and Martin Heidegger—thinkers he identifies as central
to the critique o f reason—with regard to this historical development whereby the West is
left with a humanism that is ironically and tragically dehumanizing He indicts Heidegger
especially for a view devoid o f redemptive possibility: humanism, freedom, and the like
are farces only. Bernstein, however, seeks to redeem reason, and a humanism which
might humanize.
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By the close o f the eighteenth century, then, the dominance and increase o f this
rationality, accompanied ever by a loss o f significance, works to firmly establish world
dissociation and human alienation, the tension building between the human subject and
the world object. In addition, extensive growth in humanity's knowledge o f the external
world via science serves to further overwhelm and undermine the interior world, and
heighten this tension (Wilber, 1995). The reason, then, that brings the West to the
modern age—though with all its promising advantages and genuine achievements—is
evidently problematic, climaxing in this fundamental agonizing enigma concerning
subjectivity and objectivity, the human subject's place in and relationship to the world,
including its relationship to the world o f other human subjects and human communities.
Rather than the realization o f Plato's ideal city, forerunner historically o f a plethora of
social utopian visions never actualized, reason has indeed brought humanity it seems to
eviction from the garden, from Eden as such—ontological homelessness; and to enmity
with each other, the earth, the divine, and oneself as well. In the words o f Martin
Heidegger "How far [modem] man [sic] is from being at home in his own essence ..."
(1953/1959, p. 156). Effected is what Augustine (c.a. 398 a.d./1982), in feet, calls evil:
the journey taken brings humanity to a within that is withdrawn, rather than a within that
transcends and moves beyond (Wilber, 1995); for evil is reflexivity enclosed in on itself
(Taylor, 1989, p. 139). And we are reminded again of the tree o f knowledge—o f good
and o f evil, but sadly evil mostly; the good seems to ever elude us.
Lost, then, somehow is the good and true and beautiful aspired to by Plato, those
aspirations once indelibly tied to the feith o f reason. Truth, in a sense, becomes the only
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valid measure by which to judge things in a world reduced to the "Big It" (Wilber, 1995),
the objective visible realm; o f course, truth, as well, is other than it was, as defined by
this truncated reason apprehending this truncated world; and itself becomes a major
problem in the issue o f reconciling subjectivity and objectivity, humanity with all the
world. Wilber utilizes his concept o f the "Big Three" to highlight the distortions o f
modernity and~we might add—its distorted reason and perverse, pervert-ed faith. First,
objective, interobjective truth, Plato's sense o f the true, corresponds to both the
individual, behavioral, organistic and social, structural, functional, environmental aspects
of the external world—Wilber's "Big it" and the primary realm and "truth" acknowledged
and legitimated in the modern paradigm; second, the good connotes rightness, justness,
mutual understanding, in the intersubjective, internal cultural realm, the "We"; third and
finally, the beautiful is discerned internally as well, though subjectively in terms o f
intention, truthfulness and sincerity centered in the individual, the "I.” Wilber finds his
schema o f three differentiated realms, each with their own claims to reasonable (reason
able) knowledge and validity, analogous not only to those o f Plato but also o f Popper,
Habermas, and Kant.20 Obviously, ideas regarding what constitutes the good, the true,

“Plato's major issues are with the true (concerning objective truth), the beautiful
(concerning the personal-aesthetic) and the good (concerning cultural justice). Popper
speaks o f three worlds: World I (inclusive o f the objective "It"), World II (inclusive o f
the subjective "I"), and World HI (inclusive o f the cultural world o f "We," including,
embedded in, material social institutions and systems). Habermas discusses three
different criteria for validity: truth (regarding objects), truthfulness/sincerity (regarding
subjects), and rightness/justness (regarding intersubjectivity). Wilber (1995) likewise
claims that his three realms correspond in some measure to the critiques o f Kant: o f
pure reason, o f practical reason and o f aesthetic judgement.
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and the beautiful evolve together and in regard to each other, in this sense the "Big
Three" are integrally related: behavior affects intention, structure affects meaning,
cultural notions o f life rely upon existing social bonds and practices, conceptions o f the
self and its narrative forms—and vice-versa. Yet, at his point, the good and the true and
the beautiful, and judgements concerning them, whether repressed, split, dissociated or
delegitimated, have collapsed in a sense—M en to the monological truth o f
representation. The good, true and beautiful are subjected to the criterion o f truth as
defined by the "Big It."
"Modernity as it actually unfolded (and still unfolds) was (and is) heavily
weighted toward the knowing and manipulation o f the first world [the it-world, external,
objective and inter-objective realms], o f a 'disenchanted' and objectified world dominated
by an 'instrumental' or 'technical' rationality (Berman, Habermas, Heidegger,
Horkheimer, Marcuse, Merchant, MacIntyre)" (p. 417). Moreover, the substance o f the
internal world o f the I and the We is increasingly subjected to arrangement as afforded
by the system o f empirical science and this calculative reason. Reason no longer aspires
to attunement with the Kosmos; reason, and its advocate truth, has become simply the
methodology o f mapping out the cosmos. Likewise, behavioral fitness is emphasized
over personal meaning, and social integration or the smooth operation o f the system over
cultural values and understanding.
Herein truly is blind faith, and misdirected. Only that which can be seen is
legitimated, the unseen depths needing interpretation forsaken: humanity's self-betrayalfaith's and reason's as well. As Foucault has said o f modem thought: "If it couldn't be
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laid out on a flat table o f representation, then it didnt exist" (p. 420). O f course, the
consciousness doing the representing cannot itself be accounted for within this frame—
the table's inner drawer whose existence is objectively inexplicable. Even with the
monological world o f a monological reason's construction, a great divide, a rift and split,
persists. And while the modem project is primarily one o f descent via reason exploring
the material world, the path o f distorted ascent endures as well, translated into the path
forward and ahead, the creed o f progress. The W est, then, is saddled still with two gods
(Wilber, 1995), in fact, both wanting. These gods basically purport incommensurable
and antagonistic worldviews, embodying different ideas o f what constitutes the good life
and humanity's ultimate aim and end, different values and corresponding behaviors and
lifestyles, and contrary notions about what it even means to be human. The modem god
is a "schizoid god," irreconcilable forces whose "secret marriage remains secret" (p.
363)—each vying for humanity’s soul. Full ascent is denied, and full descent is lost, all in
the name of reason, and its newborn child, progress.
Even after the "death” o f this god as such (primarily the god o f ascent), in
modem times, the tensions and rifts find no real reconciliation—the aftermath consisting
o f a period, whether slowly or rapidly, waxing worse. The death, in fact, might only
signify the recognition o f the splits and tensions, only the very beginnings of a realization
that it is not well with the soul o f humanity, also possibly with its beloved and central
reason, only unfortunately perhaps signaling a desperate and reinvigorated denial which
actually perpetuates and reinforces the split, inferior reason and inferior faith. In some
instances, reason is lauded against the ascending god; in other cases, reason is seen as
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being operative with the enemy. As Martin Heidegger (1952/1977b) has put it, for
example: "Thinking begins only when we have come to know that reason, glorified for
centuries, is the most stiff-necked adversary o f thought" (p 112). Thus, from then till
now: mounting stress, mounting conflict, mounting confusion. It is "the agony o f
modernity," two warring poles, both right and both wrong: The "ego camp"
(representative o f wayward ascent) radicalizes the ego—the noosphere, the human
individual and mind. In this instance, spirit is relegated to this alone, an absolute subject;
the "eco camp" radicalizes the eco-sphere—biosphere, physiosphere, environment
(representative o f contrary descent). Spirit is consigned to this realm only, an absolute
object (Wilber, 1995).
O f course, historically, the progressive force o f the ego has proved strongest,
thus most visible, including its negative impact on the cosmos and upon the psyche in
hyper-ego alienation. The claims o f the eco camp, then, are partially a reaction and
response to the excesses o f the ego, but the solution offered is partial, and bears as well,
if only unconsciously, the Enlightenment negation o f the internal domains o f the cosmos.
Rightly attacking the Enlightenment heritage o f infinite and unbridled progress, its anti
traditionalism, and its hyper-individualism, eco-advocates conceive o f regression as the
only alternative, and the path o f wisdom. Differentiation is taken in all cases to be
dissociation—and transcendence, repression. Reason slides into disrepute; for it would
seem that it is responsible, that it is reason alone, in fact, which has brought us to where
we are; and this place is obviously wanting, actually terrifying and outright shameful in
its global presentation. The ego camp, aware o f these problems, still cannot concede to
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the dissolution o f noosphere into biosphere, the eco camp actually utilizing egoic
advantage to denigrate the egoic.
Post-modern thought makes attempts at some form o f reconciliation, integration,
or at least aporetic resolution, if only in ambiguity or paradox, and the revival or retrieval
of slighted inner realms; but, in many cases, reason is still seen therein as the ultimate
culprit-like before, the faith construed by the powers that be, the church, once was;
reason is taken to be what Westernism, scientism, materialism, capitalism, an idolatrous
faith, has made it. Remaining opposition to any kind o f ascension, and residual
promotion o f a kind o f creed o f progress, is evidenced perhaps, if only tacitly, in the self
reference and identification o f current philosophies: they are post-modern, poststructural, post-colonial—always "post" and never "trans."
The fetish o f the West for reason thus taken leads it into compulsive, incessant
and often violent argument over dualities: ego-agency versus eco-community, reified
subjects against objects as equally absolutized—and historical, astronomical violence.
And/Or into existential angst and despair and a sharp and biting crisis of reason’s faith:
"No longer protected by anthropocentric gods and goddesses, reason gone flat in its
happy capacity to explain away the M ystery,... we stare out blankly into that dark and
gloomy night, which will very shortly swallow us up as surely as it once spat us forth" (p.
263)—alienation from both source and summit. It is as if having for centuries "binged”
on reason—and something o f a cheap substitute for it (an inferior strain of it) at that, the
West, stuffed and sickened, cries out and calls for a grand cultural purge. And thus we
arrive at Bernstein's declaration of the present historical moment as "the rage against
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reason." Faith goes unscathed, o f course, perhaps unheard, unnoticed; for it was
overthrown long, long ago; still, it too is in dire straits. Forgotten long ago, as well, is
the reason o f Plato, and its faith in the virtuous, good, true, and beautiful journey o f
education. Rather, reason's faith, as experienced today, has been found false; as it is
said, "the sweet dreams o f reason" dying. It is not surprising then, that education, too,
as the designated guardian o f reason, to which we now turn, finds itself presently in
something o f a nightmarish and arresting place, humanity's hopes regarding it profoundly
stressed or already dashed.
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CHAPTER 4
EDUCATION, THE UPWARD JOURNEY AND THE FAITH OF REASON (2)

While in modern times it does not go without saying, the relationship between
civilization (culture, society, etc.) and education is strong-integral, intimate, reciprocal;
many scholars have in fact said such, as well as worked to investigate, evidence and
explicate this relationship (Apple, 1979/1990; Counts, 1962; Dewey, 1899,1916/1966;
Freire, 1970/1993; Giroux, 1992; MacIntyre, 1984; Purpel, 1989; etc.). O f course, an
age dominated by dissociation, repression, the logic o f severing, warring ascending and
descending aberrations, seems to have little consciousness o f such relationships, and
further, serves to sever them. The enduring remains o f Enlightenment ahistoricism
contributes as well, perhaps, to this perforation and lack o f relational awareness.
Without bearing out, then, the whole history o f education in the West, we may yet note
certain points o f parallel development with the path reason, the faith o f reason, has taken
as highlighted in the "biographical" sketch we have just drawn concerning it—though
education historically has been increasingly excluded and separated from such a
biography; it once was the biography. The survey should serve to help us glean insight
into this phenomenon, the state o f education today, as well as into the activity and
influence o f the faith o f reason, even as it has mutated throughout history, in the project
o f education and its institutionalization.
David Hamilton (1990) in his Curriculum History—which is a history o f education
o f which, he argues, curriculum is a central concept, particularly in the development of
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its face in the West—begins his account with the faith of reason (though not with Plato),
humanity's hope in the potential achievements o f the noosphere. Hamilton says:
At some point in its early history, Homo sapiens developed a
capacity to think and to reflect upon its circumstances. Earlier
experiences—stored as memory traces—could be revisited, re-evaluated
and recast. Humans re-imagined the past and, in the process, rethought
the status quo. Thinking became a productive activity—a means o f
grasping the world and rebuilding it in the form o f new (mental)
constructions.... In the process, human beings enhanced their capacity to
make the future something different from the past. The concept o f social
change became thinkable; and the practice o f social change became
doable. As the human species began to appropriate nature (Ingold,
1986), it took over its own history....
Human beings began to pay attention to child-rearing. Young
members ... were given a lifestyle (or culture) by their surrounding adults.
Children did not grow up; they were brought up. Their lives were
shaped jointly by their material circumstances and by the conscious
intentions o f their carers. Just as human beings adopted routines and
rituals to domesticate their environment, they also invented routines and
rituals to domesticate themselves and their successors. And such
intention-laden upbringing entailed a uniquely human activity—education.1
(Hamilton, 1990, p. 5, emphasis in original)
David Purpel (1989) makes central to this intention-laden activity a certain "faith
in the [very] educability of humanity" (p. 10), faith that we can "contribute to the
creation o f a more loving, more just, saner world" (p. x), faith that we can "overcome
the demons" (p. xi). It is the faith o f reason to effect transformation in terms o f what

‘"We are strongly impressed by the fact that wherever men have lived together
there has been some group interest in education” (Frost, 1989, p. 207). Since the dawn
o f humanity, in fact, it appears that people have sought to learn, from others and from
their habitats (Smith & Smith, 1994). The universality of education is here posited and
affirmed, as well as its ancient character, its long history. We might also suggest its
foundational history and nature, for education is tied up with human faith, involving
profound trust and committed action with regards to the ultimate concerns o f humanity.
In this sense, education is prior to, and the ground of, all disciplines o f study and human
endeavor.
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Plato would call the good, the true and the beautiful. Or as Purpel would put it, it is the
human conviction "that we can and should intervene in nature to create a joyful and
abundant society" (p. 54)—an intervention directed, o f course, by some common vision
o f meaning including the good, true and beautiful.
Clearly, at this point, education is felt to be central to human survival: it is
integral to social life (Hamilton, 1990) and to the preservation o f humanity. Children are
taught how to hunt, gather food and prepare it, defend themselves and their people and
war against adversaries. The growth o f customs and traditions brings about the need for
new, more expansive and comprehensive forms of instruction: the elders tutor the young
in cultural lore, religious beliefs and rites of initiation foundational to such education.
Naturally, centers for learning tend also to be places o f worship, and religious leaders
and thinkers first assume the role o f teachers (Frost, 1989). At issue, then, are the most
fundamental and significant questions o f human existence. By its early official "fathers"2-philosophers, for whom education was a major concern—education is deemed to be, in
fact, a matter o f life and death. Wilber (1995) speaks o f the death o f Socrates as a
martyrdom for reason—Socrates lays down his life for reason's faith.3 For Purpel (1989),

JWe refer to the "fathers" o f education, and indeed they were, at least formally,
for women did not have the opportunities o f men at that time (nor, perhaps, even today).
Yet, in fact, the earliest Greek—and thus we might say, Western—educator on record was
a woman named Sappho (c.a. 630-572 b.c.), head o f something akin to a women's
finishing school. Little is known o f her educational ideas and practices, however,
because by the authority o f Rome in 1073 her writings were publicly burned. Only
fragments of her poetry were not lost (Smith & Smith, 1994).
3Of course, such an interpretation o f Socrates' death is not without controversy.
For another view, opposing what is perceived to be the valorization o f the man, see
Smith & Smith, 1994, pp. 13-20.
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the trial o f Socrates is a compelling metaphor for conveying the import and power o f
education, its value and its danger—what we may say, its interest in that which claims
ultimacy. As Plato himself has said: "The virtue o f reason seems to belong above all to
something more divine, which never loses its power but is either useful or beneficial or
useless and harmful, depending on the way it is turned" (c.a. 380 b.c./1992, 190-191).4
Education here encompasses the whole o f the human journey, ascent in aspirations o f the
higher, descent in embraces o f the lower. Its faith is strong, at least unquestioned,
among its advocates.
While not a great deal can be known with certainty regarding the ancient past, it
is true that classical education makes more o f teachers and texts than some formalized
notion of schooling, or codified one of curriculum. There are as yet, in fact, few or no
such notions. Rather, the classical "school" consists in an informal congregation o f
interested persons around a well-known master who teaches a variety o f subjects and
talks equally as much or writes about teaching itself, and learning (Hamilton, 1990).
Teaching appears in the context o f strong personal relationship (Smith & Smith, 1994),
education itself highly personal—in terms o f engagement and investment. O f course, we
have already looked at Plato on the subject, one o f the first to actually elaborate a theory
of education. And it is the philosopher who is the educator—concerned with the nature
o f reality, the meaning o f humanity and o f the Kosmos, in search o f the good and true
and beautiful; once found or believed to be found, the question becomes how others

"Plato, in his Republic, also warns strongly o f the ill-effects of philosophy in the
wrong hands; education must be accompanied with virtue, a sight of the good.
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might be helped to enter into this knowledge, this virtue, this bliss—into reason, and
reason's faith. "And the answer [is] always through education'" (Frost, 1989, p. 209).
For Plato, heir o f Socrates and his dialectic method (aimed at common meaning—that
which could be agreed upon—by delving deeply into issues to uncover their essence or
truth), education is liberation and delivers humanity to happiness; the happiness o f the
individual is consistent with the welfare o f the whole community or society. O f course,
it follows that what can be dangerously if only tacitly justified, then, is education as a
form o f social control, though in the service o f social good.5 The faith in educationmore specifically in control through education—either in the perpetuation o f the status
quo or in the creation o f a new social order is a faith manifested again and again in the
history o f the W est, and one often attacked (Doll, 1993, 1997). We notice, though, that
the ego and eco spheres here are interrelated; personal freedom and social responsibility
are one.
Aristotle, while he agrees with Plato on the aim o f education being virtue in its
social context6—the creation o f good "men" and thus also good citizens, denies in part
the ascending path o f reason, Plato's transcendental soul. As we have said, such in
effect, begins the truncation and severing o f the soul's circular journey encompassing

*For example, some scholars have called attention to Plato's disillusionment with
democracy, following Socrates' disdain for it. The view is "that the soul must order and
control irrational and chaotic impulses within the individual, and philosopher-kings must
order and control the chaotic and irrational individuals in society" (Smith & Smith, 1994,
p. 23).
‘The path o f which is, of course, the contemplative life, which is also "ultimate
happiness," in the words o f Aristotle.
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both upward and downward paths. It is Aristotle who is credited with the first major
theory o f the divisions o f knowledge, knowledge's breakdown into three different
sciences o r disciplines: theoretical knowledge, which includes theology, mathematics,
and physics or natural science; practical knowledge, comprised o f ethics and politics;
and productive knowledge, involving art and craftsmanship, the technical arts. In fact,
the contributions o f this period are generally purported to be not only the proliferation
and preservation o f ideas, but also the formalization o f knowledge, or at least the
beginnings o f its organization (Hamilton, 1990). Herein lies the seeds o f the redirection
o f reason's faith, as subtle a shift as it is. The mapping out o f our knowledge of the
external world, the import o f method, will in time become something o f an obsession,
education's aim and focus, to the exclusion o f all else—faith's object. Yet, Aristotle as a
teacher is said to have encouraged his students to pursue whatever interested them,
whichever forms o f knowledge to which they were particularly inclined (Smith & Smith,
1994)—rather than mapping out for them a course of study.
O f course, rivals o f the times, the Sophists, are said to actually have had a greater
impact upon the educational practices o f the day (Frost, 1989), emphasizing more
strongly the individual, and education as a personal pursuit o f success and happiness—
this, too, perhaps, bearing a seed that would later sprout: individualism and what Tillich
(1957) would condemn in modem times as the false "God o f Success." Whether or not
such is in fact the case, even with the Sophists, education is centered around value:
education is in the service o f encouraging human growth, making a person better in all
ways; the best orator is also the best "man" (Frost, 1989). Individual interests, even

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

147
when central, do not powerfully conflict with the interests o f society and culture. Yet
still, the Sophists perhaps encourage a growing skepticism in regard to the passive
acceptance o f the traditions and beliefs o f the day, what Julian Jaynes calls "the
development of consciousness" (Smith & Smith, 1994).
From the Romans specifically, we inherit the patriarchal underpinnings which
seem to endure in contemporary conceptions o f education. In some ways akin to Plato's
faith, the hope is achieving through education divine guidance for excellence in public
service, a large part of which, however, is military service. Thus, while the mother
teaches in the home, the sons must soon follow the father, or pater and governor o f the
home, who is equipped to teach them the ways o f war and to initiate them into public
life. Several levels o f schooling are available: the ludus (much like our elementary
school), the grammaticus (although the rich prefer hiring in-home tutors), the tirocinium
fori (providing apprenticeship), and the rhetor (oratory training). Cicero, something o f a
paragon o f Roman education, states that the aim o f education should be to produce
"wisdom, patriotism, courage, Aristotelian temperance, moral goodness, and oratorial
eloquence" (p. 39). Such includes a strong working knowledge o f logic, law and
rhetoric, for which the Greek, Aristotle, is especially prized. Yet, in Rome, education is
primarily oratorical, for what seems to be given the greatest weight is the ability to
impress the people with one’s persuasive power (Frost, 1989). Perhaps, Plato's honorlover is more ideal to the Romans than his lover o f wisdom. Still, the quintessential
Roman educator and first hired chair in Rhetoric in the empire, Quintilian, while he
speaks o f the necessity o f eloquent speech and exalted thought, reaffirms the first faith,
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as it were: through study, a person acquires the good, is brought to goodness;
education produces virtuous souls (Smith & Smith, 1994). Even in this, there appears to
be a much more "this-world" oriented approach to education in comparison to the
Greeks, though one which does not last for long. At this time, however, it is the collegia
(the Latin word from which we get "college”), the congregation o f priests responsible for
conducting public worship, who govern the practices o f law and o f keeping legal records
and documenting cultural history—tasks soon to be taken up by Christian monasteries.
Rome undergoes intensive and extensive change with the advent o f Christianity.
The torture o f early Christians and their persistence in the face o f martyrdom, perhaps,
actually serves to give greater force to the movement, stamina—vehement, revolutionary.
Soon, through Constantine, Christianity is made legal and promoted. The "Church" is
bom, now political and powerful and home of the aristocrat. The Bishop claims as much
honor as the Emperor, and the Roman church claims the task o f education in the
broadest sense, preserving and passing on language, law, and custom, creating and
building Rome. Like Derrida (1992/1995), Smith and Smith (1994) say o f Christianity,
however, that:
at the heart o f the new religion was a potential increase in consciousness,
for it stressed ... correct thinking and self-analysis. What one thought
was as important as what one did ... The Christians did not invent the
ideal o f perfection, but they combined it with a powerful frith and added
the notion that anyone—free or slave, poor or rich, man or woman—could
achieve it. (emphasis in original, p. 44)
The ideal realm, the human quest for perfection or completion, what Plato calls rest and
the end of journeying, is re-affirmed and renewed in the Christian turn, and in a sense,
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democratized. Central in consciousness and in discourse is now the virtue o f faith; still,
it is faith in the Word, as it were: in Greek, Logos, akin to Plato's Kosmological Reason.
This early faith urges humanity toward reason perhaps in the pursuit o f peace and
wholeness for all o f humanity against the accepted violence of the journey as
promulgated by the establishment o f the day. Yet, its institutionalization and uptake by
the establishment thwarts, distorts, changes it radically. The potential o f this movement
is little realized. Rather, conflict, debate over differences in interpretation, nationalistic
coalitions around interpretations, and violence abound. Wilber’s stunted ascent, reason
de-reasoned.
The Medieval Period or Middle ages is a misnomer in part, however, because
more than a dark era or an "in-between" period which saw no progress in reason, in
education, no innovation or classical revival, it represents the marriage or synthesis o f a
number o f diverse and powerful practices, beliefs, cultures, worldviews: primarily
Greek, Roman and Christian (rooted in Jewish Culture). This amazingly complex and
conflicted coalition is foundational to the materialization o f the West as we know it, its
influence reflected not only in modem educational structures, but also in many o f today's
other social/cultural institutions. It is the substance, the language, the thought, from
which the West is formed, shaped and created. The best and worst o f our culture, as it
were, can in many cases be traced back to this time in history, as we have already seen.
It is the Middle ages to which we can actually attribute the preservation o f classical
thought, rather than its decline. We note here the contribution o f Cassidorus in
promoting the practice o f collecting the existing fragments o f classical thought and o f
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copying these fragments, o f reproducing texts. Boethius (c.a. 523 a.d./1963), as well, in
The Consolation o f Philosophy, produces a comprehensive look at the philosophy o f
antiquity (Hamilton, 1990). Bishop Isadore de Seville also attempts a compilation o f
human knowledge in his Etymologies (cited in Hamilton, 1990).
Thus, a commitment to study endures throughout Roman and post-Roman
culture, through the possession of both Christian and pagan texts, both drawn upon
though not easily reconciled. In both, however, religious concerns still figure
prominently. Augustine manages to achieve a semblance, at least, o f peaceful
coexistence between these different texts and belief systems in the form o f an affirmation
that theology is concerned with all things, and that all things are helpful in the study of
theology, Christian or pagan. Thus, an updated version o f classical education, in the
form of the "liberal arts" is still promoted, particularly as providing a body of analytical
tools with which to uncover the mysteries o f the sacred texts (Hamilton, 1990). Yet of
Christian education even after Rome's fall, it is said: "Although the Roman empire was
dead, Greek and Roman cultural ideas flourished in Christian schools fastened securely
on Roman underpinnings" (Smith & Smith, 1994, p. 53).
Hamilton (1990) cites "On the Marriage o f Mercury and Philology," a fifth
century piece o f prosaic verse by Capella, as the "seminal representation" o f the liberal
arts. Taken from the myth, the bride Philologia (scholarship) is attended by seven
maidens, each an advocate o f one of the liberal arts. The seven arts include grammar,
dialectic or logic, and rhetoric, corporately called the trivium (with a primary focus on
language, the internal world); and geometry, arithmetic, astronomy, and harmony,
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known together as the quadrium (with a primary focus on things, the external world).
The content and aim o f the liberal arts are seen as practical—the word "art," the Latin
translation o f the Greek techne. from which we get "technique." Hamilton adds,
however, that both Latin and Greek words for "school," schola and ludus are rooted in
earlier significations connoting leisure. Some argue that the liberal arts are not exactly
the pursuits o f free persons as such, but perhaps o f persons with free time, the
contemplative life a luxury afforded few (Piltz, 1981). This "rift" o f sorts—between
thought and action, theory and practice7—is something which will endure and grow and
continue to plague debate over the aim and end of education, even up to the present day.
With the rise of Christianity, re-emphasized, o f course, is education in the service
of something "more divine," in this instance though, increasingly o f the church and its

Tieidegger (1954/1977c) makes an interesting observation about language and
the radical changes which may be effected or at least reflected in translations from one
language to another. For the Greek theoria. from which is drawn Plato's notion o f the
"contemplative" life fbios theoretikos). is viewed as "the consummate form o f existence"
(p. 164). A distinction is made contrasting such with the practical life fbios praktikosl
only insomuch as the practical life is "dedicated to action and productivity" (p. 164),
while the life o f "contemplation," is "the way o f life o f the beholder, the one who looks
upon the pure shining-forth o f that which presences" (p. 164). The way o f beholding is
seen, according to the Greeks, "in its purest form as thinking, the highest doing" (p. 164,
emphasis mine), as a reverent attendance and a watching over truth. Obviously, one with
leisure time may be freed up for this kind o f doing, for time to think, yet the contrast is
not as great as we might assume; this kind o f activity is the consummation o f practical
human existence, not its opposition. Heidegger goes on to explain that with the
translation from Greek to Latin, theoria is transformed into contemplatio. which brings
to the fore the inclination toward "a looking-at that sunders and compartmentalizes" (p.
166). For "this translation, which issues from the spirit of the Roman language, that is,
from Roman existence, makes that which is essential in what the Greek words say vanish
at a stroke. For contemplari means: to partition something o ff into a separate sector and
enclose it therein" (p. 165). In the very work o f human language we see a sort o f
sundering and severing occurring.
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interpretation o f the divine. Reaffirmed is the place o f religion in education, the
centrality o f addressing the cosmological and existential questions o f humankind.
Students as members o f a community o f faith, though, are required to learn its dogmas
and customs and adopt them; instead of the initial Christian impetus toward selfexamination and genuine internal personal belief in the name o f Christ, the Church
secures its representation o f the Christian movement and the spread o f its religion
through inculcation, another case o f education as social control.' The faith here
manifested is in reason to exert power over the minds o f others, to "de-reason" them in a
sense, to maintain the political order, perhaps believed ultimately to be the order o f the
divine. Pagan schools increasingly looked down upon, monasteries appear, grow and
flourish. Some scholars actually credit the birth o f the monastery to a reaction against
the corruption o f the Church. Religious thinkers like St. Benedict are said to have
chosen and initiated the monastic way in order to escape the evils of Rome, free to
pursue fully a pure religious life (Frost, 1989). Others identify the monastery with the
control o f the Church (Hamilton, 1990): well-studied apologists are made and the

*A shift in perspective is, perhaps, represented here: that granted authority is no
longer "truth disclosed to mind and heart" but "an external norm for the obedient will"
(Tracy, 1981, p. 99); authority collapses into authoritarianism, tradition into
traditionalism, and the dogmatic stance bom. Another aspect o f the problem might be
seen in the nature o f institutionalization itself. Practices, religious or educational or
otherwise, it would seem, only endure with the support o f institutions, but such practices
are also threatened by these very institutions. Practices are concerned with internal
goods, while institutions are o f necessity concerned with external goods. The ideals and
creative advances of a practice are, in this way, susceptible to institutional
"acquisitiveness." The competitive nature o f the establishment can undermine the
cooperative care for common goods internal to a practice (MacIntyre, 1984). Heidegger
(1952/1977a), in like manner, defines institutionalization as "the making secure o f the
precedence o f methodology over whatever is" (p. 125).
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pedagogical form o f the catechism is developed, a question and answer strategy, all to
assist in the defense o f the faith, the faith o f the Church.
Under the rule o f Charlemagne in the ninth century, the monastery finds its
institutionalization, as the guardian o f education and reason's faith, largely in service o f
the powers that be and the interests o f the Church—though not always, and often
unwittingly. The Emperor organizes in his court a committee o f "academics" for the
improved management o f his kingdom. Most notable is Alcuin, a lover o f classical
thought, who implemented a program o f sorts for the education o f the people. Inclusive
of the liberal arts, Alcuin is said to have envisioned an academy (in reference to Plato's
school) in France, blessed with what he calls the "seven-fold gift o f the Holy Ghost," the
resurrection o f Athens (Piltz, 1981). Ironically perhaps, and wisely, Charlemagne, in
order to govern more securely, calls for the education o f all, and urges that the monastics
content themselves not with solitary life alone, but with the active service o f teaching
those who can learn. Thus, monasteries become, in every sense, centers o f learning, and
priests open "cathedral" schools in villages and towns throughout the Empire. There are
schools intemi. or internal schools, to prepare one for monastic life; and schools extemi.
or external schools, for the instruction o f those who will return to the life o f the
layperson (Hamilton, 1990). Salvation o f the soul is ever an aim, as well as competence
in the arts, deemed to assist one in the way o f salvation. At issue is whether the faith
expressed here lay primarily in education or reason as the path to inner transformation,
Christian conversion, eternal life, or more profoundly in its power to establish and secure
an empire, cooperative subjects for the-here-and-now. For Charlemagne, it is perhaps
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more strongly the latter, for Alcuin, the former. Not altogether mutually exclusive,
education in both cases profoundly influences human consciousness.
Schools at this time are built around texts more than anything else, for example:
Cicero and Quintilian for rhetoric. Little else can be said o f the "curriculum” the
students received as it were; writing, reading and singing figure prominently. The liberal
arts, rather than comprising a unified and organized course o f study, are probably seen as
an aggregate of instructional materials upon which to draw. Representations of them
tend to be pictorial and suggest no real chronology or sequence, figured in circular
fashion (Hamilton, 1990). The claim has also been made that the quadrivium suffered
until the first millennium, barely addressed, and that dialectic too was excluded: either, if
dealt with at all, not with intellectual rigor but as exercises in rote memory (Knowles,
1962). This disciplinary and intellectual reduction persists in many forms in
contemporary approaches to education, as well. Rhetoric, in good Roman fashion
perhaps, is given pre-eminence at this time. Yet, more importantly, these negations seem
to support the claim made earlier that something has indeed happened to education as
the upward journey o f the soul, to reason and the faith o f reason. With the dismissal o f
the quadrivium, the world o f things are denied, or at least undermined as legitimate
objects o f study—descension repressed, severed from and rejected by ascension. The
absence o f dialectic, however, points to the truncation o f ascension as well—"yes" to
reason, but "no" to it, really.
The liberal arts increasingly fade or are at least expanded and changed with the
onslaught o f new texts and new ideas upon Europe in the thirteenth century, primarily
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from Spain and Sicily, "important frontier posts between Eastern and Western thought"
(Hamilton, 1990, p. 14). O f greatest significance is the discovery o f the later works o f
Aristotle, unknown to the West before this time (his Physics, c.a. 340-323 b.c./19291934; Metaphysics, c.a. 340-232 b.c./1947; Ethics, c.a. 340-323 b.c./1973; and
Politics, c.a. 340-323 b.c./1959), the content o f which becomes "the new logic." The
new logic, new knowledge, new ideas about what constitutes knowledge, rethinking the
old and the new and the horizons o f knowledge—such characterizes scholasticism and
scholastic schools. New interpretations and reinterpretations, especially o f the classics,
are propelled further by acute arguments between those compelled to embrace the
advances and those convinced to hold to the established thought of the day—faith divided
in terms o f reason's aim and effect.
Basically, revived, in some measure, is intellectual rigor, and dialectic, though
seriously reduced and narrowed. It is perhaps not so much a newness, as a renewal—the
enhancement and clarification o f formally existing intellectual practices and methods of
inquiry. Dialectic is again emphasized, most directly as a method of discerning truth.
The Church, o f course, claims possession o f the truth. The orthodox have already
identified faith and reason as irreconcilable, worlds apart—one spiritual, the other secular.
Reason has come to be seen, then, as a threat to faith, the faith of the Church. Yet, with
the path o f reason re-energized, debate over frith and reason abounds throughout the
middle ages. Education directs itself around the interrogation o f the claims o f the
Church with the assistance o f dialectic, or also with this tool, the re-affirmation o f
theological doctrines. Students gather ardently once again around teachers and texts, the
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explication and interpretation o f texts paramount, Christian and classical. Hamilton
(1990) seems to suggest that no normative order yet exists, though, in terms o f
pedagogical method or curricular content—the dialectic studied is itself fluid and diverse
in practice, not much about it agreed upon or set, or maybe even understood. Study
does center, at least, around issues, ideas, topics, customs, that are believed to be of
ultimate concern—they are matters o f faith, whether promoted in the name o f reason
against faith or not.
Even before this time though, Anselm and Boethius, for example, work to
rationally solidify the faith, particularly the belief in the existence o f God, and in the
Divine Trinity as triune and yet one. In addition, during this period, foremost is Aquinas
who, embracing the new forms o f thought and inquiry, claimed that faith and reason
were, in fact, not adversaries; that faith was a matter o f understanding and that theology
required an attitude o f inquiry toward all aspects o f the world and o f life, a
comprehensive view o f reality. Here, however, reason, for many, appears as an enemy
o f the faith. Academically, on the rise is the secularization o f philosophy, its growth
beyond the narrow scope o f strictly Christian concerns, its redirection to the things of
this world (as inspired by Aristotle); many teachers are perhaps more self-consciously
philosophers concerned with the new logic than theologians concerned with religious
thought. Bom is, then, a seed o f anti-Christian sentiment, insurrection against the
monopolization and mutation o f humanity's upward path by the Church. Contributing to
the waning supremacy o f the Church is the rise o f guilds, schools designed primarily for
vocational purposes apart from religious concerns; and the widening appeal o f neo
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classical ideas about education, emphasizing harmony o f the soul, mind, body and spirit
(ex. the school o f Vittorino Da Feltre). O f course, classically, such ideas make no
distinction as such between sacred and secular. The rift, though, is now set in place, a
rift that will endure and increase and pose problems over and over again throughout the
history o f the West, even up to modem times, and not only in the realm o f education.
Through the Renaissance, and the triumph o f reason over faith as now separately
construed, education begins its embrace o f the descending journey, and reason's
paradoxical rejection o f ascension, transcendence and the "invisible world." Religion
maintains a fight for its claim to education, but education primarily falls into secular
hands. With the rise o f the kinds o f separations and reductions, repressions and
regressions o f the Kosmos we have formerly traced, education begins to lose any o f its
former sense as a spiritual journey, but increasingly becomes rather a narrow instrument
o f use in the journey, although humanity progressively seems to lose as well, in this
process, the unified conception o f life as a journey (Sartre, 1943/1992; MacIntyre,
1984), especially as a spiritual one. In line with education's narrowed conception, it is
this time at which the notion o f curriculum is bom and reaches centrality within the
enterprise o f education—specifically in Northern Europe which becomes the primary
patron o f the West, one still dominating educational thought. The new emphasis on the
visible world in all its plenitude, at this point, sets in motion the further transformation o f
the liberal arts, thinkers o f the day in search o f a method by which to map out the
external world, and humanity's knowledge o f it. It is a faith akin to Adam and Eve's:
through human agency, through the human mind grasping, getting hold o f and
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consuming knowledge as its object o f desire, all the world may belong to them. The
good figures here as well, though perhaps not as explicitly, and with lessening reference
to the sacred or divine.
An art is an abundant collection o f propositions.... B u t... in
setting up the various arts a certain, short and direct way, a kind o f short
cut has to be used.... This the Greeks call m ethod... such as may be used
for teaching and communicating. (John Sturm, founder o f the Strasbourg
Gymnasium, 1539, cited in Hamilton, 1990, p. 23)
"Method," according to Hamilton (1990), becomes the catchword o f humanist
educators from the early 1500's on—the shortcut to reason, o f reason, and faith’s
relinquishing o f the infinite, eternal, invisible journey. Method, moreover, is the womb
from which curriculum is bom. This practical emphasis on procedure reflects the
ideology o f order and routine to which scholasticism gave way in the early sixteenth
century. For scholasticism, it seems, breeds too much independence in thought and
belief to fit in with the Europe o f the Counter-Reformation and o f advanced Protestant
dogma. The movement is made by teachers away from individual classroom example to
a more generalized notion o f (what would become) a humanist "curriculum," an interest
in a range o f institutionalized "curriculum" subjects and their arrangement and
organization.
Peter Ramus, whom Hamilton has called "the high priest o f method" (p. 23),
might rightfully bear, as well, the title, "father of curriculum."9 A prominent professor at

’Petra Munro (1996) challenges this gendered perception o f curriculum history,
the predominance o f the "fathers o f the field" discourse pervasive in most historical
renderings, in that it works to perpetuate the subjugation and exclusion of women that
has characterized the patriarchal West, failing to acknowledge and serving to erase
women's contributions to Western thought, culture and achievement. She strives to
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the University of Paris, Ramus gives preeminence to the dialectic, which has come to
mean basically "the careful sorting out of ideas," and begins the grandiose task of
mapping out the totality o f human knowledge, hi the Ramist Method, related "common
places" or topics are clustered in a branching taxonomy. According to Ramus in 1569,
in method "that enunciation is placed first which is first in the absolute order of
knowledge, that next which is next, and so on: and thus there is an unbroken
progression" (cited in Hamilton, p. 22). The earliest recorded use o f the word
"curriculum" in an educational context has been found in a Ramist Map appearing in the
Professio regia, a collection o f Ramus' maps published in 1576. Curriculum is bom of
method, method's child. The educational journey turns into a "course" to be run,10
mapped out and pre-determined.
"What" to teach (the totality o f knowledge) is now presumably given, and the
logical maps o f Ramus appeal to educators as a powerful aid, providing also an answer
to "how" to teach. In addition, Ramus makes the universal claim that his method

recover the female voices in history, particularly in curriculum history, which have been
neglected o f silenced. The task is a difficult one, and the issue complex, for much o f
Western history and thought has been shaped, dominated, recorded and preserved by
men—the accomplishments o f women wittingly or unwittingly left out, lost, forgotten or
passed over. I am not herein, through the use o f the term "father," supporting a
patriarchal view, though the history o f the field o f education has seemingly been
constituted by certain patriarchal ideals, and the academic curriculum field dominated by
men. Ramus is the "father" o f curriculum only in the sense that the first use of the word
"curriculum" educationally applied is attributed to him.
"Curriculum comes from the Latin currere meaning "to run." While once it
signified a course for running literally, or the vehicle for racing itself—the chariot, it came
to be used in the context o f curriculum vitae, the course o f life; from which then was
drawn its educational sense as we know it today: curriculum as a course o f study or
training, or a career (Oxford English Dictionary. Vol. IV, 1989).
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(including the maps produced thereby) is nothing less than the extemalization (the ever
growing emphasis on the external) o f the cognitive processes o f the human mind. An
order unprecedented is brought to teaching; with the series o f templates, the mappedout routes o f Ramus to direct teachers, little more is required but to carry them out,
deliver them to students. With the recognition o f the power and efficiency this kind o f
formalization can bring to schooling, the ideas o f Ramus are widely embraced. The faith
o f reason to control, achieve certainty, gain mastery over the natural world, is
manifested. The "will-to-power" as it were overrides the good, the true, the beautiful as
humanity's ultimate concern.
O f course, Ramus' ideas are not without controversy, and some critics level
against him that his methodization not only irreparably dilutes education but vulgarizes it
as well. Apparently, not everyone wholeheartedly embraces such abstraction o f the
cosmos; such detachment from actual engagement with the real world, visible or
invisible—things and activities and ideas; such objectification and eventual reification of
knowledge and thus also o f the world; nor do all concur with this notion o f the pursuit
o f knowledge or o f world-existence as constitutive o f some pre-packaged, pre-delivered
bundles brought to pre-determined destinations which teachers load faithfully into the
minds of others. Not everyone concurs that education's ultimate concern is adherence to
rule, and delivery, and efficiency o f delivery. Perhaps, there are no short-cuts to
thought, to worthy living. Plato's educative journey o f reason certainly knows none.
Yet, Ramus' success—as "master of the short-cut"—with his new "analytical
apparatus" to create a new order, and absolutism, resonates powerfully with the
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concerns o f the sixteenth century Reformation and is taken up, as it were, by the political
powers coming-to-be. In the disorder o f the times and in the perceived need for
reformation, the positing and promise o f order is compelling. Ramist method not only
links up nicely with the Calvinist emphasis on discipline, but the term "curriculum" is
already in widespread use by Calvinists as curriculum vitae, the course of life. In the
works o f John Calvin we find an idea persists o f life as a course full o f obstacles through
which Christians must traverse, o f course without the idea o f the "shortcut" involved.
This notion, though, is not exclusively Calvinistic, and we might find in any system of
thought tightly tied to the text o f the Christian Bible glimpses o f this life-as-course motif.
The New Testament is full of images o f life as a course, and the follower of Christ a
runner in it (The Holy Bible. 1985, Acts 20:24, Heb. 12:1, 2 Tim. 4:7). Inclusive here,
however, is this holistic notion of life as a spiritual journey uniting all of its different
aspects, a notion under erasure historically, ever fading away, especially in conceptions
o f education, ever narrowing in its scope.
Some historians make the controversial argument that Renaissance teaching and
humanist schools primarily served the social function o f perpetuating the status quo.
They claim that the rote-learning and regimentation was not directed primarily at
character formation and the ideal o f the humane public servant but rather at creating
servants o f the interests in power. What is clear is that by the seventeenth century the
establishment o f discipline is central in matters both church and civil, and Ramist and
Calvinist ideas serve to strengthen and support the ground and growth o f political
absolutism. The world o f absolutism is one o f route-plans and approved destinations,
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and the absolutist underpinning o f the concept o f education as curriculum seems hardly
deniable—the power o f reason used against reason itself, at least by those in power
seeking to dominate the thought o f all. We see, then, this image o f reason’s faith
directed toward control, predictability, certainty—a very stunted faith in a very stunted
reason to apprehend the whole world by merely mapping it out; humanity hopes in its
power through reason to command, determine and fix "the good" and the external world,
rather than behold and experience and participate in them; humanity seeks to gain the
whole world (now, thoroughly external) through losing its soul. Such is an image and a
faith that will dominate the field o f education for some time. Education, via curriculum productive o f reverent, disciplined, methodical and intellectually deferent souls—becomes
absolutist through and through. Of course, even the existence o f "soul" will also
eventually be brought into question.
"Criticism"—the application o f the intellectual powers o f discrimination and
judgment—becomes the catchword in eighteenth-century Europe, and its distinguishing
feature (Koselleck, 1988). Hamilton (1990) suggests that behind the rise o f critique and
dissent, which served as the catalyst for transforming the dogma o f the Reformation into
Enlightenment attitudes, is the extension and growth o f reason. We shall call it the reintroduction of the ascending journey, though an altered and stifled conception o f it, for
reason naturally aspires to transcendence—growth, enlightening development, the
"moreness"11 not discovered by method and material alone. Reason—content neither

uThe term "moreness" used here is taken from an article entitled "Education and
Spirituality" by Dwayne Huebner (1995, in press). Huebner coins the term to express
the reality that there exists always more than we know or can know or will ever know.
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with the material world, nor biosphere, nor physiosphere alone—needs soul and spirit,
inferiority and depth.
Originating earlier, most prominently in the work o f Francis Bacon (1561-1627),
reason begins to replace divine light as the source o f knowledge—the old knowledge or
reason against faith construction. The laws o f nature more telling than divine revelation,
the focus is re-directed toward God's design as it can be extracted from nature rather
than from the sacred revelation o f the scriptures. O f course, later nature would lose its
character as God's design altogether, and the notion o f revelation would be seen as little
more than mythic residue. "Driven by efforts to harness the power o f reason and unravel
the complexities o f nature" (Hamilton, 1990, p. 35), this spirit of critique and freedom is
bom, compelled to question established authorities and accepted truths. To
unquestioningly accept the "method," the map o f knowledge handed down via education,
is blind faith, as erroneous as resting on the frith o f the Church was in former times. The
hope seems to be re-directed in terms o f its emphasis on what humanity may achieve
through reason, how humanity may progress through mind, over what may be secured or
set in stone.
The spirit o f the times addresses the search for new knowledge and its
incorporation into more sophisticated taxonomies, which actually eventually leads to the
increased fragmentation and specialization o f knowledge—and ironically, perhaps, its
reaffirmed reification. Central, though, is the new emphasis on freedom. Out o f it

His moreness refers to the world-presence o f excessive complexity, depth, richness,
strangeness, mystery.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

164
emerges the modem university, founded on an open-minded search for truth, and the
seminar, a pedagogic form constituted by research and discussion rather than by lecture.
In fact, the growth o f criticism has been associated with the rise o f the seminar
(Hamilton, 1990). This form is akin to Plato's dialectic, in a sense, in its faith in
dialogue, study, the work o f reason to reach truth, beyond mere appearance or sight.
Hamilton accents the restlessness o f the movement. With the unity that once
existed between science and theology rapidly disappearing, the secularization o f teaching
rapidly progresses; with the destabilization of once-revered authorities, the field o f
education is characterized by controversy, perhaps more than anything else. Such
restlessness gives rise to certain strands o f thought brought to light and developed after
the Enlightenment in the modem period, what Hamilton calls "post-Enlightenment"
thought, among which includes: the assertion that curriculum is a selection from
available knowledge, a selection made on the basis o f secular purposes, and made to
promote the advancement o f society. Taken up, however, in the service o f an on-going
critique and an assertion o f freedom from the establishment, they can be seen as a
continuation and extension o f Enlightenment thought. Hamilton traces these new
insights back to the initial inquiry o f Herbert Spencer who, in 1859, asked the question:
"What knowledge is o f most worth?"
The question is interesting because the issue o f value has explicitly come to the
fore again; however, it is strictly asked around the context o f knowledge as ultimate
concem—no longer the examination o f life toward the creation of blessed living, or only
tacitly. The curriculum insight may have been that method is not o f most worth, that the
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most worthy is perhaps beyond technique. It may also have been a realization that
efficient social control may not work in the service o f true social progress or human
good. One result is the proliferation o f alternate maps and paths in the curriculum
"course." Hamilton focuses primarily on the critique directed at culture and society from
the seventeenth century to the present and the emphasis upon the individual, and
freedom. A movement in the field toward the experiences o f the learner and away from
the experiments o f curriculum design is described—definitely an inward turn, toward
depth and ascension. The declaration o f Rousseau (1762/n.d.) is picked up and taken
seriously: "Man is born free and everywhere he is in chains" (p. 5). Faith is a matter of
freedom, and where humanity finds itself captive, faith is found to be wanting or false,
but as faith is becoming a concept little thought, attention is turned to reason at least,
and reason seems to rest in the individual, society its hinderance, and its burden.
Hamilton goes on to situate John Dewey in the line o f Rousseau and
progressivism, and to highlight him as a central figure in this curricular turn—the
movement from absolutism to enlightenment, from method to critique; a novel reincorporation o f reason's ascent. Dewey (1902/1964a) says:
We get used to the chains we wear, and we miss them when removed. ..
Unpleasant because meaningless activities may get agreeable if long
enough persisted in.... Yes, that is the worst o f it; the mind, shut out
from worthy em ploy... takes an interest in a cabined and cramped
experience, (p. 355)
While the journey o f reason, through the Enlightenment, has become, for the most part,
the "infinite ahead," progress o f the individual and o f humanity as a whole, its upward
aspirations and its faith are re-invigorated—meaning and worth again at issue, evidenced
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here in the words o f Dewey. Herbert Kliebard (1986), a historian o f curriculum in
America, describes Dewey as something o f a "ghost" hovering over the field o f
education as a whole. For Dewey does not describe himself as a progressive, and fails in
many ways to fit into the currents o f his day, but still exerts a strong kind o f influence
upon it, at least the haunting presence o f his thought felt therein.
Though centuries after the Enlightenment, it is Dewey, in fact, who is credited
with this ascending revival of reason in educational thought. Clearly, at some point in
this history occurs the solidification o f the cultural presence o f the two separate,
distorted gods at enmity o f which we have formerly spoken—broadly described as the
descending god and the ascending god respectively, which war it out in the West over
the centuries over a world no longer quite whole, with incomplete reason, incomplete
faith. Historically manifested, then, is the recurring dominance of one or the other, or
the hegemonic battle between them, even in the realm o f education. Perhaps Dewey fails
to find an identifiable place in the field o f education because of the nature o f his faith in
regard to reason, particularly in an American field that was during his time dominated by
an altogether different one. Perhaps his book, A Common Faith (1934), is inspired by
his awareness o f such incommensurable faiths and by his attempt to reconcile them.
An example of this reversal and recursion (o f descendant versus ascendant
dominance, manifested in innumerable splits, such as practice versus theory, eco versus
ego, etc.) can be seen in the development o f education and educational thought in the
United States, from its foundation destined to become the patron and pinnacle o f
Western thought. With its Puritan absolutist underpinnings, the path o f ascent is lauded
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in the New World yet in fact cut off, akin to the work o f the Church in a Europe o f
former times. The focus being the creation o f a city set upon a hill, the New Zion, with
all o f their infamous practices o f self-examination, the Puritans actually effect a program
o f social control, subduing the wilderness and the evils o f the human mind and soul.
Faith, and the good, features strongly, but it is, perhaps, more akin to what Dewey
(1922/1964b) has described as the "pathology of goodness."12 This legacy endures,
despite the Enlightenment ideals upon which the United States is established, especially
in the realm o f education.
William Pinar, William Reynolds, Patrick Slattery and Peter Taubman (1995), in
Understanding Curriculum, begin the story o f curriculum in the United States with the
publication o f the Yale Report on the Defense of the Classics in 1828. The report,
reminiscent o f pre-Enlightenment faith, emphasizes the importance o f mental discipline.
The rationale for the classicist curriculum is faculty psychology in which the mind is

“Dewey (1922/I964b) describes the pathology o f goodness as that sort of
"goodness" nurtured in the separation o f morals from the reality o f human nature,
physiologically and psychologically, which accounts ofttimes for the"badness o f good
people" (p. 63). For example, the following description is one which we might apply to
Puritanism: "There are others who take seriously the idea o f morals separated from the
ordinary actualities o f humanity and who attempt to live up to it. Some become
engrossed in spiritual egotism. They are preoccupied with the state o f their character,
concerned for the purity of their motives and the goodness o f their souls. The exaltation
o f conceit which sometimes accompanies this absorption can produce a corrosive
inhumanity which exceeds the possibilities o f any other known form o f selfishness” (pp.
65-66). The introspective emphasis in Puritan thought, paired with strong social
imperatives and convictions, may have served to promote such pathology. The
autobiographies o f many o f these believers bear this out, like that o f John Bunyan, as
well as the expository writings o f many Puritan thinkers, for example: Alleine's Alarm.
by Joseph Alleine (1671/1978); Precious Remedies Against Satan's Devices, by Thomas
Brooks (1652/1987); and The Christian's Great Interest, by W iliam Guthrie
(1658/1982).
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deemed to be a muscle in need o f vigorous exercise in order to stay fit and active. Thus,
recitation, rote-learning and memorization are again esteemed as primary instructional
methods in education. Incidentally, Cotton Mather (1662-1727), the founder o f Yale
University, advocates from the start the logical and exhaustive approach o f Johann
Alsted, who published his Encyclopedia in 1630 (cited in Hamilton, 1990), a
comprehensive work which relies heavily upon Ramist diagrams for much o f its
organization, and a foundational resource in most Calvinist-inspired universities
including Yale (Hamilton, 1990). The infatuation is with reason as the power by which
humanity may reign securely over the natural world-taken externally, clarified and
organized; and subsequently, over the social systems built through such mastery.
Notions located in earlier European history resurge, then, in American educational
development and, it would seem, increase in strength.
There are to be found, o f course, voices crying out in the wilderness; the
ascension of Enlightenment reason has also made its way across the Atlantic. Francis
Parker (1837-1902), dubbed by some as the father of progressivism, is one such voice:
he posits the common school as an "embryonic democracy," yet he is largely unheard.
The leadership o f Charles Eliot (1834-1926), a proponent o f faculty psychology, and the
influential committees on secondary and elementary education o f 1893 and 1895 procure
the victory o f classicist ideas in the nineteenth century. G. Stanley Hall (1844-1924),
also something o f a progressive, challenges the status quo and calls for change, positing
education as the major hope o f the world. Education is, however, the hope, too, o f
those who hope to keep the world as it is. Yet Hall's strong faith in progress is coupled
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with an equally strong faith in the role o f social science, which—modeled after science—is
primarily defined by its method, the careful application o f the scientific method to
humans. Even the dissenters perpetuate the notion o f education as curriculum as method
and its preoccupation with order, development, procedure, stability.
William Torrey Harris (1835-1909), commissioner o f education, emphasizes
school as a force for social stability. Hamilton (1990) points out this general tendency in
humanism to lose sight o f the individual, o f the particular, in its gaze upon "abstract
man," real human persons in the concrete world are generalized out o f the picture.
Though primarily secular in name at this point, education serves purposes in accord with
those served by the Puritan forefathers. Curriculum standardization is sought;
curriculum is a powerful tool o f social control, and long forgotten is education as an
inner journey central to the spiritual life o f the student. Rather, it is an institutional
program, a policy to be implemented. It is schooling.
Later in the nineteenth century, and into the twentieth, other faint murmurs
against the faith o f reason as control and masterful method can be detected with the
curricular move toward child-centeredness o f the Herbartians. Johann Herb art (17761841) brings to curriculum the concept o f Bildung. central to educational thought in
Germany. Curriculum is primarily a North European concept extended to the United
States. Bildung, drawing attention to the notions o f social shaping and cultivation, shifts
the gaze o f scholars in the field from the map o f knowledge to the map o f the learner; it
is a movement within, o f depth, transcendence, and yet still a map to be comprehended—
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and unfortunately, perhaps, regulated. The active nature o f the child in learning is
highlighted, and passive rote methods are discouraged.
Yet even the focus upon the child—and curriculum as mapping out, attending to,
and mirroring the developmental growth o f the child—is still bound to the search for the
method in education, or better foolproof methods. Faith is placed, it seems, ever in
reason's capacity to procure the extemalization and regulation o f things. The president
o f the National Herbartian Society, Charles De Garmo, brings Herbart's ideas to the U.S.
for the first time in 1889 with the publication of his Essentials o f a Method (cited in
Hamilton, 1990). Through the notions o f concentration and correlation, the
preoccupation with the development o f curriculum is strengthened. In concentration the
aim is organizing curriculum around topics or concentrations. Such concentration—and
the advocated correlation of all subjects, an attempt at curriculum coherence and unity—
leads to the schematization of a general and clearly defined route to be followed in both
curriculum planning and implementation. The well-paved path consists of a series of
sequential steps to be taken: preparation, presentation, association, generalization, and
application. Curriculum becomes almost synonymous with method and continues to
focus on design to the exclusion o f all else.
At this time, the landscape is, to be sure, peppered with voices of dissent, the
stirrings o f another direction for faith on the rise, in the numerous predecessors to the
progressive movement o f the early twentieth century. Yet even the movement itself—its
success—is short-lived, not to be fully voiced and articulated in the states until some time
later, falling beneath the fear of reason's power to transform, to critique, to effect
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unpredictable change. Progress is ever the American vision, at least rhetorically. Vet, in
actuality, it conflicts with an enduring love affair with certainty, control, the
domestication o f the North American "wilderness": real progress, deeper thought, could
disturb the content o f the American dream.
In the name o f reason, scientific curriculum making with the aim o f social
efficiency, this on-going absolutism of method, prevails for much o f the twentieth
century. Edward Thorndike (1874-1949), a prominent figure in the field in the first part
of the century, is strongly informed by the behaviorism o f experimental psychology. He
says: "Education is a form o f human engineering, and it will profit by measurements o f
human nature and achievement as mechanical and electrical engineering have profited by
using the foot, pound, calorie, volt and amphere" (Thorndike, cited in Pinar et al., 1995,
pp. 91-92). Such allegiance to method allows for the prediction and manipulation o f
behavior to desired ends, humanity’s quantification. Frederick Taylor's (1856-1915)
theory o f scientific management is readily taken up by scholars in the field in the interest
of efficiency. Through "task analysis," education can be further specialized and
routinized. Factory and labor metaphors abound in an ever-growing "assembly-line
curriculum." In contrast to Plato's notion o f education as the journey of the soul toward
expanded consciousness, it is now the business o f schooling toward dumbing
consciousness down.
Some historians even locate the beginning o f the story o f curriculum in the U.S.
with the publication o f The Curriculum in 1918, a book directed at improving the
performance o f schools, by Franklin Bobbitt (1875-1956). By this time, the field is so
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deeply entrenched in the dogma o f social efficiency, it is taken as a given not to be
questioned. Ralph Tyler’s Basic Principles o f Curriculum and Instruction in 1949
undermines and basically drowns out the criticism o f progressives which had become
audible in the twenties and thirties. Identified by Pinar et al. (1995) as "the single most
influential curriculum text ever written," the book serves to perpetuate the emphasis
upon social efficiency and curriculum as method.
Curriculum is achieved through a series o f steps: the selection and definition o f
learning objectives, the selection and design o f learning experiences corresponding to
those objectives, the arrangement and organization o f those learning experiences for
optimal effectiveness, and the evaluation o f outcomes in terms o f their ability to meet
predetermined objectives and to meet them efficiently. The "Tyler Rationale" inspires
the notion o f curriculum as technique—a functionalist, instrumentalist conception of
education. One might ask, then, what education has become, and if it still works at all in
the service o f life and the human journey. One might inquire, in fact, what education has
to say in modern times about what constitutes life, and the creation o f life worth living,
and how humanity has come to construe human existence in the world.
By the 1950s, and continuing through the 1960s in the U.S., many begin such
questioning. There is a growing discontent in the field with curriculum as method and
technique, with its absolutist underpinnings. Herein, in such disquiet, is the beginnings o f
something very much like an enlightenment within the field of education. The "old" faith
waning, and reason, averse to being strapped down, reconsiders the import o f reaching
the heights and plumbing the depths, the import o f meaning and value. As Hamilton
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(1990) puts it, absolutism breeds its own antithesis and inevitable breakdown. The same
might be said o f any reason, any faith, directed at pure descent or pure ascent. Reason
aspires to higher things, though in preservation o f the lower, thus, may be characterized
as progressive, in a certain sense—which is perhaps why Hamilton associates the growth
and expansion o f reason with critique (o f what is, in the sight o f what could be, with
faith that the mind o f humanity can effect good) and the progressive movement in
education. In its spirit o f critique, the whole notion o f education is problematized, at
least what this notion has become. As Malcolm Skilbeck (1984) has observed: "One o f
the consequences o f the progressive's concerns ... was that the term 'curriculum* itself
had to be reconceived” (p. 24). The god o f disengaged descent is challenged.
A call toward reconception and a renewed interest in the ideas o f Dewey—more
specifically, in the experience o f democracy in education and in the critique o f society
become, then, central features in the movement o f the 1970s in the American curriculum
field, what Pinar et al. (1995) describe as a movement from an emphasis on development
to one o f understanding. Joseph Schwab (1969), a key figure foreshadowing this
movement in the states, pronounces the curriculum field "moribund" in 1969. The
indictment is repeated in the 1970s: Dwayne Huebner (1976) declares it "dead," and
William Pinar (1978) describes the field as "arrested." Definitely, seen here is a crisis o f
faith in education, in reason, at least as it has been construed and manifested in and by
the field. Yet, we might ask. Is the faith utterly dead? Perhaps, but as Nietzsche
(1883/1982a) has said so directly: "Only where there are tombs are there resurrections”
(p. 225). Reason demands, in a sense, the resurrection o f the upward journey, the
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journey o f the inner realms and o f spirit. Coming up from the grave is like coming up
from Plato's cave.
Pinar e t al. (1995) locate the roots o f what would be called the
"Reconceptualization" o f the field in the activity o f the 1960s. Certain lone individuals
are found questioning the basic assumptions underlying work done in the field and
critiquing the dominant Tyler Rationale. The two primary prophetic voices, described as
the "intellectual parents” o f the reconceptualization, are Dwayne Huebner and James
McDonald. Both resist the existing traditional paradigm and stand for the creation of
freedom. Rejecting the dominant technism, methodism, reductionism, they seek new
ways in which to talk about curriculum—ways that may promote personal meaning and
growth and the creation o f a more just society and world. Glimmers again o f the good,
the true and the beautiful, o f the interior realms.
In this movement away from method via criticism, Pinar et al. (1995) place the
beginnings of the Reconceptualization. Rejecting the traditional preoccupation with
method and development, the purpose o f the movement is understanding, o f the land
sought after in the humanities. Before in the grip o f the social sciences, the field is
introduced by these prophets to other perspectives and forms o f inquiry associated with
the humanities, such as history, philosophy, theology, and literary criticism. Herein is
seen a reconstruction o f sorts, of education again as referential o f life's journey, a
unifying effort toward wholeness, a spiritual infusion.
By the 1970s, the field, "moribund," in crisis, is ripe for a metamorphosis of
spirit, or "paradigm shift." The disarray is the culmination o f a number o f factors: the
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discontent stemming back to the 1950s, the fall o f the progressives, and the blow to the
field in the 1960s when the Curriculum Reform Movement essentially ignored curriculum
thinkers (Pinar et al., 1995). O f course, the spirit of criticism is already unleashed at
large with the worldwide protests o f students in the 1960s, calling for cultural revolution
and bringing on "counter-culture." Conventional ideas are not only challenged but the
whole notion o f convention itself. This kind o f challenge is exactly what is levelled at the
traditional field o f education by the Reconceptualists in the seventies (1970s).
Beginning in the academic conferences o f the 1970s and continuing into the
nineties (1990s), William Pinar, a prominent figure in the reconceptualization of the
curriculum field, is called upon on several occasions to define the movement. Such a
task proves to be difficult in one respect: to seek to define the reconceptualization might
suggest a thematic unity not present therein. One point o f undisputed cohesion is in its
criticism o f the traditional field. Agreement centers around the common contention with
the reigning Tyler Rationale as reductionistic, de-politicized, ahistorical, anti-ethical,
esteeming procedures over persons.
What can be said is that a definitive move is made away from an emphasis on
development to an attempt at understanding—away from method to critique. Curriculum
is reconceived along experiential and structural lines; a proliferation o f understandings
are set into motion: autobiographical, existential, phenomenological, political, historical,
racial, feminist, post-structural, post-modern, cosmological, etc. Yet the thousand
voices are united in their criticism o f the absolutist rule o f "methodism,” in their attempts
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to re-humanize education, and in their collective introduction o f a "sophisticated
theoretical wing" to the field.
Counter-attacks are made against the bearers o f this new faith, new line o f
reason-ing, in the field. Denounced as "new alchemists and concierges o f counterculture
ideology" (Tanner & Tanner, 1979/1981, p. 390), the "reconceptualists" are accused o f
attempting to denigrate and overthrow reason. Ironically, the rise o f criticism and
dissent associated with the movement, and its search for new knowledge outside the
limited domain o f social science, suggests that it represents more appropriately the actual
and logical extension and enhancement o f reason. Understanding and "enlightenment"
liberate reason from its cramped, cabined, burdened existence in the narrow confines o f
method, order, procedure, scientism; o f the external world alone.
Yvonna Lincoln (1992) says o f this new line o f thought within the discipline o f
education:
What began [in the 1970s] as a radical but small group o f critics o f
contemporary curriculum theory has now become a groundswell. .. The
reconceivers o f the curriculum studies are not just postulating that a new
world could exist but also creating it—voice by voice, criticism by
criticism, (p. 94)
Yet a world cannot be made solely through critique; curriculum cannot live by critique
alone. The educative journey o f reason strives after a vision of the good. Pinar et al.
(199S) report that as early as the 1980s, the movement begins to lose its cohesiveness:
its opposition to Tylerian conceptions o f curriculum are no longer strong enough to keep
the thousand voices agreeing to speak a common tongue. Perspectives proliferate within
the movement, going their separate ways or turning in upon each other to continue their
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critiquing there. The new "ascension" o f reason prevails, perhaps in a battle won too
well (Another M u re at a descending embrace?). As Pinar et al. (199S) suggest, the
success o f this metamorphosis in the field is also its own demise.
The field today, one could say, is still dominated by this spirit o f critique, and yet,
it is critique ever turning in upon itself it seems. Very soon, in the field, its own ground
in the faith o f reason will come itself into question. It is as if the temperate wisdom of
Socrates has pushed itself to excess: Yes, the unexamined life is not worth living, but
the examined one is sometimes not worth living because not lived, at least, the overlyexamined one. It is Socratic tyranny, Nietzschean madness, and reason's ascending
negation without preservation, and a new battle call, as it were—mounting tension, again.
O f course, in his history, Hamilton (1990) leaves the field o f education as a whole
in the W est (European and American) in the twentieth century, up to the present time,
with this permanent tension (our two gods)—introduced, he says, in the aftermath o f
Enlightenment upheaval: the attempt, on the one hand, to re-establish the world of
absolutism with certain methods, maps, routes and destinations; and the effort, on the
other, to redefine curriculum thought along progressive lines with a primary interest in
the autonomy o f teachers and students—the inner freedom and unhindered growth o f
persons. Both sides defend their position in the name o f reason, at least originally, with
the view o f the opposing side as reason's adversary.
While the tensions and disputes over education persist at large, and the public
faith in education waxes and wanes, the faith o f reason to promote the "best" for and in
humanity has tended to hold, until the most recent times. This faith is directed toward

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

178
education generally though, primarily through schooling, whether such is reasonable or
not—truly representative and supportive of, in the service of, human reason or not. The
dis-integration o f the Kosmos which has occurred has led to the virtual dis-integration o f
all things, including education, the faith o f reason, life, as a unified, spiritual,
transcendent journey o f the soul; in fact, the idea o f the soul, having basically been
replaced by the notion o f the "self' in modem times, even falls prey to the divisive-ness
o f critique, claims regarding any unified view of the self regarded as "essentialist." The
arrival o f the "self' itself represents a reduction and amputation of what soul once was—
individualistic and separate from the Kosmos.
Such dissection is attested to in the matter o f education—o f faith, of reason. In
relating its history, even broadly and briefly, a cosmological perspective is lost over time;
in chronologically or progessively marking time, it becomes increasingly difficult to
maintain the grip o f this perspective, because education itself, as conceived and
explicated and practiced, loses this hold, ever narrowed, relegated to small, incomplete,
specialized domains. Where we begin with life, the examination of life toward meaning
and worth, and the upward journey o f the soul, we end with curriculum, a scholarly
"field," and schooling, a state "institution," a kind o f economic insurance policy. Thus,
evidence o f the dissolution and division o f the human journey is manifest, stunted ascent
versus stunted descent. In the now small world o f education, it is evidenced most clearly
in what seems to be this irreconcilable rift and war between practice and theory. The
changes here traced, then, particularly from the modem period, occur primarily in the
scholarly field o f education alone; schools remain little changed, and an absolutist
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conception o f education endures in them in the mainstream, even today—the same
managerial, mechanistic metaphors dominate (predominantly in the United States). In
this sense, the examination o f life has been almost completely separated from the living
of it.
Some educational scholars have, perhaps wisely (especially given the state o f
schools as they are), supported the maintenance o f a certain distance from the schools to
prevent the field's reduction to only what is, on the surface o f existing institutions. This
position evidences the call o f reason, a universalizing structure which aspires to
transcendence, the transformation o f what is through a vision o f the good. The work o f
the theoretical wing, a scholarly sector in the university, is construed, in this way, to be
grounded in but not limited to educational experience. Such grounding, it is hoped, will
prevent the field's collapse into discourse.
Yet the present situation threatens, in a sense, just this kind of collapse. Having
lost its paradigmatic unity, the field, even within itself apart from the practice o f schools,
suffers from something o f a fractured identity. As we have said, curriculum cannot live
by critique alone. The field risks being tom apart by sectors knowing neither how to
speak to one another nor listen; the field risks balkanization with its contemporary
tendencies toward localisms and particularisms (Pinar et al., 1995). Thus, the small
comer o f refuge in the realm of education, for reason, a reason which again, it seems,
seeks the upward path, some vision o f meaning and value, some examination toward the
worthy and the good, some view of a larger cosmological context, loses sight, too, o f
this search. Battling internally, it finds itself ineffectual, in a crisis o f sorts, in which
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reason comes to be seen as the culprit. Reason, it seems, is not multi-cultural, is not an
advocate o f the marginal and disenfranchised, is not consistent with freedom. Reason, it
appears, is rather European, white, male, patriarchal (Pinar, 1997). Mainstream
educational thinkers plod along, attending directly to the problems o f school and its
narrowed context, in which case reason is not really brought to task or questioned, nor
the faith upon which their work is grounded. The program is simply carried on in the
schools, regardless, it seems, o f what is happening, what anyone is saying or feeling.
Clearly, though, by all the "war," the division, is felt in term's o f reason's emptiness: its
split from value, meaning and goodness. Education, the faith o f reason as such, has not
brought humanity to life worth living; rather, as we have seen, death seems to achieve a
global reign (evidenced in the rise o f pollution, toxic waste, violence, suicide, divorce,
feelings o f hopelessness and despair, anomie, etc.; see Chapters 2 and 3). Education is
blamed, but not wholly, because it now sits somewhat ambiguously in its relationship to
smaller personal issues and larger social and cultural concerns.
David Purpel (1989), in The Moral and Spiritual Crisis in Education, stresses this
forgotten relationship between education, culture and society as integral to what he calls
the larger moral and spiritual crisis constitutive o f enormous dangers to the cosmos and
threats to our most treasured ideas about human life. The power o f education is
evidenced, he continues, in the perpetual debates over it between so-called conservatives
and liberals, the most important dimension o f which revolves around the issue o f faith in
the educability o f humanity, a question regarding the very nature and destiny of
humanity. Clearly, education is a source o f political and pragmatic power, which can
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operate in the service o f humanity's liberation or captivation, o f perpetuating existing
power relations or o f challenging them. In this sense, education can be construed as
both the child and parent o f culture.
Yet, its narrowing in all this world dis-integration, and its adoption o f the illusion
o f neutrality, has made education appear to have little to do with culture or society or the
fundamental questions o f human existence—the orphaned child, the cast-off parent.
Education is schooling, a cultural vestige o f little import. Purpel calls it the trivializatinn
o f education, evidenced in its discourse and in its proposed reforms—evading and
neglecting issues o f critical significance through distracting obsessions with the merely
technical. Focusing on the American scene, he chides the contemporary institution o f
education for failing to address or even acknowledge these larger pressing problems in a
time of human crisis—o f meaning and faith and moral courage. He complains:
The public is trying to grasp what is fundamental to life, liberty and the
pursuit o f happiness, and in response educators give them more
standardized tests; the culture yearns for meaning and hope, and the
schools suggest more homework and a longer school year. The world
teeters on the edge o f a new holocaust and our leaders urge us to
consider merit pay. (p. 22)
The trivialization o f education is also its vulgarization and its abnegation o f
responsibility. Educators, in an attempt to avoid moral choices, are making them
nonetheless, though without thought, or are unquestioningly submitting to such choices
already made; thus, the field o f vision is the confined and cramped "accessible present,
... vocational preparation and economic need" (p. 2)—the vulgar god o f success (Tillich,
1957). Schools are not neutral, are not peripheral or inconsequential to the spiritual
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crisis at large. They ignore the search for wisdom, truth, meaning, goodness, and rather,
choose to propel and embody this empty faith: materialism, secularism, scientism,
technolatry—progressive representatives o f a culture in its worst, most unreason-able
aspects. As such, schools prove themselves to be, according to Purpel (1989),
"intellectually and morally bankrupt": enhancing the growing sense o f alienation and
meaninglessness, contributing to mindless instrumentalism, perpetuating the reification
and externalization o f knowledge—and reason's split from faith and value, and antithetical
even to the true spirit o f science, and o f reason, which encourages serious inquiry. It is,
in fact, without reason, irrational, to discuss education or to engage it apart from the
spiritual concerns o f humanity, from some moral vision o f who we are and what we hope
to be and become, o f the culture we would like to make for ourselves and the world.
While such a realization is articulated by few, it is felt more and more by many, as this
crisis of our faith in education, and in reason as that journey to human good.
Henry Perkinson (1977), however, in The Imperfect Panacea. American Faith in
Education. 1865-1976. argues that to "convert" social problems to educational ones is,
in fact, a way for adults to abnegate responsibility. The schools are saddled with all the
ills of society. Such, in effect, diminishes the already limited authority o f schools,
making them subject to interest groups o f every variety. Perkinson also makes the
distinction between the faith o f educators in education as a panacea for the world's ills,
as the answer to society's problems and progress, and of the general public, parents with
desires for their own children specifically, as an avenue by which to personally escape
social ills.
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Yet, his argument appears as something o f a covert affirmation o f Purpel's
position. In each instance, social ills figure prominently, whether viewed from a
personal/individualist perspective or from a public/communalist one. The views
themselves represent this educational problem as a social one in which the individual
project is seen as antithetical to the communal one, and vice-versa. He recognizes the
faith o f both in crisis—the efficacy o f education as either a social or personal panacea
now seriously in question, and sorely doubted, which cannot be separated from larger
societal, cultural, and world problems and the felt sense o f crisis they stimulate. He
acknowledges, as well, the problem o f construing schooling as a way to escape from
social evils, rather than as an avenue through which to address them. In contending also
that the school is not the primary advocate o f culture, that extant are a host o f other
informal agencies o f education, and that, unfortunately, the school has come to be
believed in and seen in this light as primary, Perkinson tacitly identifies and disapproves
the narrowing and trivialization of education o f which Purpel has spoken. He has, in
fact, shown that educational concerns are social ones, and social ones, educational.
Perkinson admits, then, to the social power o f education, and to an allencompassing faith—here, o f Americans—in its political function, traditionally in the
preservation o f civilization and in the preparation o f the young for economic survival,
more—he feels—than in a true sense of progress. As a panacea in service o f the national
purpose, though imperfect, schooling has been, for most o f its history, effectual for
white, middle-class America, sustaining its position, the status quo. Yet even this has
been brought under duress not only with the generations o f middle-class students
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rejecting the values o f their parents and the educational institutions which are seen to
embody those values, but also with the public indictments o f revisionist historians and
curricularists against schools as sites o f oppression and indoctrination and moral
abnegation (Apple, 1979/1990; Giroux, 1992; Purpel, 1989; Kozol, 1975/1990; etc.).
Some o f the stronger critiques have argued that education actively promotes injustice
and inequality, the capitalist virtues o f exploitation and manipulation and powermongering. Moreover, education seems to no longer insure security and power for even
the privileged. These things serve to only deepen and darken the crisis o f faith in
education. The conclusion is: schools actually hurt humanity; thus, they must be
radically altered or abolished altogether. And according to Perkinson, "with this last
wave o f radical critics we reach the edge o f educational nihilism" (1977, p. 235).
Education is not as far from culture as we thought. The question of, the search for,
"worth" echoes again in Perkinson's final questions, questions for which he says none o f
us seem to have responses: What then are schools for? What is education even about?
What knowledge is worth knowing?
And we are drawn back to the major premise o f the Platonic quest that through
examination humanity might find w orth-life worth living, that education as the upward
journey o f the soul by the faith o f reason might bring humanity to an apprehension o f the
good and true and beautiful. O f course, this premise, if remembered, is seriously in
doubt. The examined life, it turns out, is also not worth living; in fact, reason
seductively lures one in an infinite regress away from life: the examined life seems to be
unlived—worse still, against life. This time, then, faith, if any remains, is aimed against
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reason as the obstacle which has prevented the human race from valuable, meaningful
worthy axistcnoc and thwarted the reafaation ofgoodness, truth sad beauty. Or at least
its faith is stumbling, undergoing greatrials of jamsease doubt-the frith of reaaon on
trial.
Richard Btnmdn ( 1991b). in attempting also to understand this contemporary
rage against reason, associates its movement with Nietzsches genealogical unmasking of
reason’s history. In the Nietzscbean critique, our reason takes us to nihilism, and does so
logically. At this point, it is not surprising to us at all to find reason, whffiin and the
death of God within the same nexus. Reason is (fivine, or some might say dttDQOic. and
has been operative through a fiuth involving uhonacy. Bernstem seeks to tdl the story,
as it were, of reason in Western civilization through four characters, philosophers he
finds central to the tefling of it: Condoccet, Weber, Adorno, and Heidegger.
Admittedly, he sayi, the tale is partial,11for it is not yet told out, the narrative of reason's
development incomplete and also held together by lots of tension.
‘’The tale is perrial, as well, obviously in the sense that Bernstein makes no
attempts to inchide in Ins inquiry critiques of reason made by yeomenor people of color,
for example. Yet, in las defense, he is drawing on thinkers he feels to be GfiBBll to the
teUagofthe story ofieesoo in the West. Clearly, women and people of color have not
been given centrality traditionally in any Western mem ratrarive, particularly that of
reaaon-4tek involved in the Eafightenmem project, outright silenced or exduded from
it, or relegated to its marpna. Via the cult of reason, many voices, lives, stories,
cultures, have been excluded obviously, invafidatcd by the rational center which has
determined what counts as lagjtimale knowledge (Monro, 1996). Thus, many of the
ooniflfHporaiy cnuQim 01fw o ii u v t pmd h m
nw n.
" " " " n mpt iI t , | . " I F
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bem usri to juatifr mate donainarion over women, to rarionaliaa it away as "natural"
They have also pointed out the potential violence or injustice to which any totalizing
discourse is a wrapribIs (Hey, 19—). Perhaps, however, what is primarily being attacked
is the baggage with which the notion of reason has bean saddled, the assumption of the
autonoaoua selfand of absolute freedom; foe denigration of the emotions and etways
of knowing which do not foil within the project of science; and the privileging of certain
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values o f objectivity, neutrality, mastery, hierarchy and control, for example The
problem with some o f these critiques seems to be in the way reason is construed as a
unitary and non-complex construct, as an essentialist idea, the way it is unquestioningly
associated with imposition and reification, and the way it is pitted against meaning and
context and value, and rejected as irredeemably male—linearity, rationality, logic, and
clarity equated with "male"; and non-linearity, non-rationality o r irrationality, emotion,
intuition and ambiguity equated with "female" (Flax, 1990; Harding, 1991; Munro,
1996; Okruhlik & Harvey, 1992; Sawidd, 1991). Even the work o f eco-feminists
which seeks unity, to speak beyond women's concerns solely, for the whole cosmos,
evidences a certain failure to move beyond perpetuating essentialist male/female
dualisms. For example, Irene Diamond and Gloria Feman Orenstein (1990), in
Reweaving the World The Emergence o f Ecofeminism define "our culture's
devaluation o f natural processes [a s]... a product o f masculine consciousness [which
h a s]... denigrated and manipulated everything defined as 'o th er'..." (p. be).
Jana Sawicki (1991) affirms, in response to such problems, a "politics of
difference," with the recognition that there are battles within feminist discourse itself
among the various strains—womanist, radical, and liberal, etc. She also highlights the
"double bind" within which feminist scholars must work: to critique the tradition
necessitates an entering into that tradition and into the very discourse which has
marginalized women in the first place. In like manner, some thinkers have called for a
sort o f reconceptualization o f reason, the creation o f a new epistemology, in which the
traditional standards o f rationality that have served to exclude women are undermined
and new standards, inclusive o f women’s ways o f knowing, are posited (Okruhlik &
Harvey, 1992) In addition, Wendy Kohli (1995), a committed feminist, is also an
advocate of reason, unwilling to give reason over to the rule o f the patriarchy. In the
final analysis, "some notion o f reason hangs behind all scholarship [feminist or
otherwise], scholars speak in the voice o f reason" (Pinar, 1997, p. 6). For it is reason
which makes appeal to human rights, justice, and equality. One cannot fight, then,
against oppression or injustice without some kind of appeal to some idea o f universal
reason (Seigei, 1987). In this way, it might be said that the feminist project has emerged,
in fact, from the Enlightenment project o f reason—it follows a "reason-able" and rational
line o f thought.
There are, as well, many other marginalized groups which have laid indictments
against reason, all o f which are not without poignancy and importance. As someone
interested in the history o f Western thought, however, and in the dominant thinkers
within the modem tradition, I shall focus here, with Bernstein, on such thinkers. The
critiques of reason presented by these scholars—primarily white, European males who
ought to have an interest supposedly in perpetuating reason's reign—are o f particular
import, I think, in shedding light within a much broader frame on the problematic
developments o f reason as construed in the West, the fetal flaws internal to this reason,
productive of oppressing effects universally (upon the earth as well as humanity, for
example), and not just upon particular cultures and classes o f people.
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The amazing feature Bernstein highlights is how this thing we call reason could
once conjure up visions o f liberty, virtue, happiness, justice and goodness; and yet now
call to mind images of repression, oppression, domination, terror and violence. For
Condorcet, a major figure o f the French Enlightenment, "Reason" is humanity's hero, her
savior. Platonic in this sense, Condorcet sets forth a historical perspective on the
development o f the human mind, and reason is that crowning achievement central to the
indefinite teleological progress and perfection o f humanity, to a future utopia.
Reason passes through difficult trials. It must triumph over the devious
tactics o f priests, tyrants, despots, and cunning hypocrites. But in the
course o f history, it gains an overwhelming momentum; [and]... with the
discovery o f printing, the good works o f publicists and especially through
public education, the fUll illumination of Reason spreads to all of
humankind, (p. 33)
Reason makes for virtue, peace and happiness for all o f humanity. By the faith o f reason,
Condorcet (1795/1955) can hope: "The time will therefore come when the sun shall
shine only on free men who know no other master but their reason" (p. 179). O f course,
Condorcet is not the only one throughout history to feel this way about reason, only an
exemplar.
Yet today, reason is viewed with an altogether different eye, is seen in a very
different light, if in any "light" at all. Bernstein (1991b) spends a great deal of time in his
essay with Weber and his biting critique o f Enlightenment thought and its zealous
devotion to reason, because Bernstein, with MacIntyre (1984), feels our age in its
commentary o f itself is principally Weberian. Weber unmasks the "dialectic o f
Enlightenment"—a term coined by Adorno and Horkheimer—and highlights its dark side

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

188
which advances its own self-annihilation. His is the exposition o f the modern
"disenchantment o f the world" (see Chapter 2) via a reason increasingly dominated by
"purposive rationality," oriented to ends and means and results, dominated by science
which is powerless to tell us what to do and how to live, to give us meaning and value.
U s conclusion is that our ultimate concerns (i.e., our faith) can rest upon no scientific or
rational foundation. Paradoxically, this "reason" o f scientific rationality shapes all o f life
in such a way that, rather than promote, it threatens democracy, freedom and the very
existence o f humanity, the autonomous agency o f the individual. Weber thus calls the
future an "iron cage" and perhaps a stage for the drama o f war and oppression.
"Modernity is not characterized by a universal assent to, and institutionalization of,
natural rights, but by a new polytheism o f warring, incommensurable value
commitments, by a new and violent struggle o f gods and demons" (Bernstein, 1991b,
P- 37).

In some ways, Adorno's portrait of reason and its rule in contemporary times is
even more grim than Weber's. All types o f rationality appear to involve attempts to
master reality; thus, at reason's root, at least as reason is conceived in the West, lies the
will to control; hidden is a repressive logic present in and foundational to the genesis o f
Western culture, "identity logic," which Adorno posits is inherently domination, the will
to be rid o f singularity, difference, and otherness. The result is the subjugation, for
example, o f nature, o f women, and eventually o f the self.14 "The Enlightenment has

'T he Creation myth including the "Fall o f Man" begun with in Chapter 2 and
foundational to much o f Western thought is exemplary o f this hidden logic o f which
Adorno speaks. Behind the act o f plucking and consuming the forbidden fruit from the
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always aimed at liberating men from fear and establishing their sovereignty. Yet the hilly
enlightened earth radiates disaster triumphant" (Horkheimer & Adorno, 1944/1972, p.
3). O f course, one might question if the earth is truly fully enlightened, or enlightened at
all. Yet even still, Adomo lays claim to some o f the promises o f the Enlightenment faith
o f reason, for social freedom as inseparable from enlightened thought, for exam pleaware also o f the danger o f the dark side, in this case, the realization o f freedom's
opposite. Bernstein (1991b) calls it the "mimesis o f redemption" which Adorno
presents: the dialectic is radicalized to account for the boundless abundance o f the
promise, able to break the power o f identity logic, to transform social reality through
such bursting. Thus, Adorno self-consciously embraces the utopian ideals and hopeful
aspirations o f the Enlightenment, the frith o f reason, though not in entirety and fully
aware of the dangers. We see here highlighted the risk of faith, and its indelible relation
to the promise.
Heidegger, however, takes the depravity o f reason to its height, according to
Bernstein, where it is travesty and something o f a farce to even speak o f humanism,
liberty, freedom, happiness, anymore—the promise o f good offered through
Enlightenment reason found to be empty.15 Rather, the "prefigured possibilities o f Plato"

tree o f the knowledge o f good and evil is, with this desire for wisdom and the knowledge
o f all things, the will to mastery or control, to identify with God, to possess the identity
o f God. O f course, too, the result is the "curse": the alienation o f humanity from nature,
man from woman, the” soul” o f humanity from itself; and the domination o f humanity
over nature, and o f man over woman—thus, subjugation.
15While Heidegger is without doubt a critic o f reason, particularly as it has been
construed and expressed in the modern West, as it has been played out in the history of
the West, I do not agree with Bernstein's portrait o f Heidegger in this regard. I do not
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have been played out to bring us to the forgetfulness o f being, the "cosmic night" o f
nihilism, wherein only a god can save us. The specter of Nietzsche is obviously found in
all o f these critiques, and given the histories we have traced, and the explications o f these
and other thinkers on the path and destiny o f reason, we can certainly begin to
understand the cries against it, the wrath unleashed upon it.
Yet, despite all this and perhaps because of it, Bernstein finally reaffirms the faith
of reason, those Enlightenment dreams o f freedom, equality, peace and happiness for all
of humanity—hopes actually long preceding the Enlightenment, historically. He claims
that these hopes animate us still, inspiring even the scholars who are reason's utmost
critics. For we note, these scholars make use o f advanced reason, in fact, to discredit
reason and posit alternatives. Says Bernstein: "Many o f us still share [this] faith in the
potential power o f public discussion and education" (p. 35)—education still somehow
seen as a power, and a central conduit o f reason. Bernstein seeks, then, to revive reason
or reconceptualize it—the faith o f reason—in highlighting, with Habermas, the rationality
of communicative action above purposive action.
Habermas complains that the critiques of reason have failed to understand fully
the nature o f social action, undermining the import and primacy o f communicative
rationality, evidenced most clearly in speech which is not directed at success but at

believe Heidegger throws over altogether any talk of human and world hope for freedom
and for good. He does problematize this discourse, the unthought-through notion of
human agency, and in fact, contrasts what has come to be called "reason" with thought,
which he extols. See, for example, Poetry. Language. Thought (1971) and The Question
Concerning Technology and Other Essays (1977) in their entirety.
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shared understanding.16 Instead, undue power and prominence are given to purposive
rationality. O f course, these critiques perhaps have simply recognized that to which
dominance has been given, what reason has become—o r is in threat o f becoming reduced
and narrowed to—in the modem age, in the system o f capitalism's selective rationality.
Nonetheless, while admitting to such selectivity and dominance, and a corresponding
bent toward the disfigurement/contortion o f the life world, he refutes the idea that this
plight is somehow unremittably predestined as the teleological actualization of
Enlightenment thought. Motivated by "the conviction that a humane collective life

II!While I am not ready, as some feminists seem to be, to assign reason to the
masculine domain, to "give" rationality over to men or to describe it as a male construct
or characteristic or function, I cede that reason is clearly gendered, at least existentially
and ontically. However, despite the pathology o f the transcendent or universal function
in Western culture, I am not ceding the necessity or reality o f this function, though it
must be counter-balanced with an acknowledgment o f the particularity, the historicity,
and the temporality o f human existence (including gender, class, race, age, etc.), and o f
all things in the cosmos. This is to say that reason is, as well, a construct which reaches
beyond gender, laying claim by definition to something universal and transcendent. Yet,
a fruitful line o f inquiry regarding the gendered development o f reason in the West might
be found in this distinction Habermas makes between purposive and communicative
rationality. In the sense that reason in the W est has been funneled into the much
narrower expression o f purposive rationality, and that this form o f rationality seems to be
the dominant one exhibited in males, we might associate the reason which has reigned
with the masculine. This is not to say, however, that females cannot or do not operate in
the world purposively, as well. In like manner, females have traditionally been more
inclined to, or more gifted in, the communicative form o f rationality. Developmentally,
girls generally outshine boys in verbal and communication skills at an early age.
However, males and females are constituted by both masculine and feminine principles,
capable o f purposive and communicative expression. Males have typically, in the West
particularly, been described as agentic, aimed at success over or with the Other—females,
in contrast, as relational, oriented toward understanding the Other. In this way, the West
may indeed stand in dire need of the introduction o f the feminine principle, a resurgence
o f communicative reason. It is possible to suggest, as well, that there may be a
biological element at work in the different rational strengths found in males and females—
reflected metaphorically, for example, in the figures o f the phallus and the womb—
although such ideas are hotly debated.
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depends on the vulnerable forms o f innovation-bearing, reciprocal and unforcedly
egalitarian everyday communication" (Habermas, cited in Bernstein, 1991b, p. 45),
Habermas claims that rationality is in fact inherently diaiogical, that communication,
though threatened by contemporary forces, is foundational to, at the heart of, reason.
Interestingly enough, in affirming reason in this light, in attempting to salvage it,
Bernstein turns to Gadamer who not only asserts that humanity by its very nature, that
being-in-the world, is ontologically diaiogical, but also lauds Plato as the great advocate
o f communicative rationality in the West, and works to revive what he calls an
underground tradition and forgotten theme o f the West, and o f reason. Plato, often seen
as the great villain who introduced the West to the dualistic destructiveness o f reason, is
here affirmed as the great hero, the father o f the dialogues, in defense o f spoken and
written conversation, understanding through communication. Bernstein remains in
agreement with the insight o f many "post" philosophical critiques that notions like
communicative rationality, dialogue and community bear with them the potential for
becoming oppressive and imprisoning ideas, and have become such, in fact, in the past,
just as has reason, rationality, truth, etc. Indeed, much can go wrong in the "lines" o f
communication, and in truth, the West has tended to institutionalize monologue rather
than dialogue, a singular conversation~if it can be called that, a false and fixed "We"
violently globally imposed, silencing the "other," the marginal, difference.
Still, aware o f the danger—particularly in our present technological age of
information where communication is often seen as a mere exchange o f data, Bernstein
sees a greater danger, namely, that dialogue is not even possible without something
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shared: beliefs, passions, values, commitments—mutual care, a common faith. Reason
presupposes virtue, as well: the "good will" to listen and genuinely strive to understand
what is different and other, the humble courage to venture one's own treasured beliefs
and ideals. O f course, herein are points o f deficiency and lack, too often denied with the
pretence o f some enforced consensus, imposed mutuality. Moral skepticism has its
place, then, but as critical if not more so, is moral passion—the faith as well as the doubt
o f reason—for this enduring yet broken and vulnerable ideal o f "diaiogical communicative
rationality." The voice o f nihilism must be heard and heeded, says Bernstein, but not the
temptation to fatalistically assign the West to infinite decline and ultimate destitution and
death, nor to write reason's history in an essentialist manner that ends entirely in
undisclosed forms o f violence. The conclusion, in agreement with Wilber (1995) as well
as Plato (c.a. 380 b.c./1992), is that:
The claim to reason has a 'stubbornly transcending power [emphasis
mine], because it is renewed with each act o f unconstrained
understanding' and with 'each moment o f living together in solidarity1
[Habermas, 1982]. But never before has this claim to communicative
reason been so threatened from so many different directions. A practical
commitment to the avenging energia o f communicative reason is the
basis—perhaps the only honest basis—for hope.
(Bernstein, 1991b, pp. 52-53)
Hope, commitment, courage, good will, dialogue, virtue, moral passion, shared
faith—such constitutes Bernstein's ultimate response to the contemporary rage against
reason, cognizant o f the ease with which these ideals may be spoken o f and lauded but
the difficulty o f achieving their realization. Although he does not directly return to Plato
or to that original concern around which reason rallies regarding the examination o f the
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life world in the service of its enrichment, regarding education as the upward journey o f
the soul to goodness and worth, he does affirm anew the faith o f reason (through public
discussion and education). And it is definitely more akin to the reason o f Plato, imbued
with and indelibly tied to value, grounded in a faith, than the reason o f today so decried.
Reason is perhaps, then, not humanity’s ultimate problem or enemy: not the
crime o f Plato, not the failure o f the Enlightenment, not the compost o f modernity, not
the discredited history o f the West. Reason as construed, manifested, operative in
contemporary Western culture has, however, become in many respects antagonistic to
human life as well as the life o f the Kosmos, and thus a problem o f ultimate concern.
Yet, it is a distorted, narrowed, truncated and repressive reason-unreasonable, probably
hardly worthy o f the name. Still, whether reason is raged against for this reason, or
defended, little addressed is the faith o f it, more fundamentally at issue. For the rage
against reason or the desperate attempt to salvage it expresses not primarily reason in
crisis but the crisis o f our faith, o f the faith o f reason—faith being reason's critical ground.
In our excavation, in the historical labyrinths we have traversed, we have
uncovered not only or primarily this Platonic image o f reason, but o f education as the
upward journey o f the human soul in which reason figures prominently—more directly,
the faith o f reason. We have traced not only its enduring power, its rendering, in the
West, and the altercations o f this faith and thus also o f the image o f reason therein, but
also its denial, its reduction, its repression, its deformation—its dis-integration. Most
clearly, we have gleaned it in what education as we know it, via schooling, seems to have
become. For it is barely even, if at all, any more in the service o f reason, splintered
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almost beyond comprehension or meaning, buried beneath the trivial. It is little more
than a dead relic unable or unwilling to attest to Plato's living transcendent journey o f the
human soul.
The sundering and narrowing o f reason, its abnegation o f transcendence on the
one hand and dissociation from the natural world on the other, serve to alienate it from
its ground in frith, to distance it from a consciousness o f care and ultimate concern, of
temporality. Nevertheless, there is the presence and pervasiveness o f some ultimate care,
it has simply been overthrown, in the sense that the whole concept o f ultimacy has been
buried, disavowed, denied. The concept o f ultimacy is seen in association with faith,
which is felt to be operative against reason, that which enslaves rather than emancipates
humanity. By it, humanity loses not only this world, but its soul as well, in search of
some other world, nonexistent, always promised, never delivered. Faith, then, is little
spoken o f or thought about, especially in relation to reason.
Although, with reason disturbed in contemporary times—humanity's new
scapegoat, its centrality and value definitively in crisis, talk o f frith is again beginning to
be heard, though perhaps not always directly (Bernstein, 1991b; Derrida, 1992/1995;
Ricoeur, 1969/1974; Purpel, 1989; etc.; as well as in popular culture through the lyrics
o f musicians and vocalists like Natalie Merchant, for example, and the literature of
widely-read writers such as William Bennett, 1993, 1996; and Mother Theresa, 1995).
For, through reason, it seems humanity is losing itself and all the world. The appeal to
faith, the call o f frith, at large and in the field o f education, entails a common exploration
of the source and summit o f humanity’s ultimate care, or an examination o f life, o f human
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existence, in terms o f value, meaning, worth. This call o f faith is, in this way, an appeal
to Plato's faith o f reason, rooted in that foundational Socratic notion that the
examination o f life may be undertaken toward the creation o f worthy living.
While we must seek to settle our issues with reason, clearly, a response to the
crisis involves, then, more than the interrogation o f reason: its overthrow, reaffirmation
or healing restoration; before and beyond this, it entails the question o f faith, beneath
reason, here not as reason's alternative or opposite but as its ground and guide. The
reason that has reigned—with a subterraneously operative faith, unacknowledged and
misdirected—has shut out in many ways both body and spirit, lost soul. So reduced, this
reason has stripped humanity, the earth and the heavens o f their unknowing mystery and
liveliness and significance: no inspiration, no awe, no wonder before the infinite
temporality and finite eternality o f the Kosmos. Even language by which humanity might
express and reflect upon and dwell in the heights and the depths has been stripped o f its
"glory." Yet, for the ancients like Plato, the very fount o f meaningful knowledge is
found in this presence and experience o f wonder and mystery—reason's alpha and omega,
its beginning and end (Sloan, 1983). It is faith which is reason's energia, axiologically
directive and empowering.
Thus, in the call o f faith, against the backdrop o f this rage against reason, might
lie reason's redemption. It will, o f course, involve a venture into faith, an honest
examination o f that which Western culture has unconfessedly made ultimate, and an
inquiry into the source and summit o f human care in the context o f our temporal
existence, our being-in-the-world together. And it will probably involve repentance,
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literally meaning, as Heidegger would call it, a "turning"17: the reconceptualization,
transformation o f faith, reason, the faith o f reason—negation, preservation, integration,
transcendence. Reason, by a renewed faith, might then be grounded once again in value
and worth, in the language o f vision, in spirit, in education as an enlightening upward
journey o f the soul, the human-soul, the world-soul. Like the reason o f Plato, it might
behold an image o f the good, and live in the light o f this view. For as it is written,
"Where there is no vision, the people perish... " (The Holy Bible. 1985, Proverbs 29:
18), and all the Kosmos, it seems, as well. Indeed, such vision must be self-conscious,
regenerative, akin to Adorno's self-conscious affirmation o f certain Enlightenment ideals.
With reason, then, would come affirmation, a sacred "Amen," a "Yes" to life. For now,
it might be named faithful reason (Phenix, 1981), rooted in "a prior and primary grasp"
(Sloan, 1983, p. 20) o f the Kosmic whole, or reasonable faith. We should, perhaps, call
it post-rational reason, or trans-rational. For, it would be a reason beyond reason, as it is
known this day, able to imagine and seek again the good and true and beautiful in human
life. Only then, perhaps, will reason have, finally, a reason to hope.

17See Heidegger's (1962/1977e) "The Turning," in The Question Concerning
Technology and Other Essavs.
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EPILOGUE: SOJOURNING IN THE LAND OF PROMISE

By faith, he [Abraham] sojourned in the land o f promise, as in a
strange country, dwelling in tabernacles with Isaac and Jacob, the heirs
with him o f the same promise. (The Holv Bible. 1985, Hebrews 11:9)
It is required o f me that I leave this work with a conclusion, a summation o f
sorts, a closing statement in which I disclose to my reader the implications o f this study,
its meaning and significance, or perhaps suggest from it a future path, program, plan, and
destination, particularly with regard to the project o f education. Yet, to conclude is to
intimate completion, closure, a final word. I am presently, however, more accurately
faced once more with the "inner infinity of the dialogue," the "infinity of the unsaid"
(Gadamer, 1960/1992), and the abiding call o f faith: a venir,1yet to come, grounded in
hope and the promise. And gladly so. I am personally wary, too, o f the "immediate
presentation"2 o f thought here occasioned, particularly with respect to standing before

'I have borrowed this french expression from Jacques Derrida (1990), in "Force
o f Law: The Mystical Foundation o f Authority,'" in which he discusses the idea of
justice in its relation to the act o f deconstruction. Regarding justice, Derrida speaks o f
an infinite, irreducible debt owed to the other, a debt we cannot pay and yet a debt
demanding payment. Justice, as law, can only be exercised in a decision that cuts, made
in the "night o f non-knowledge" (borrowing from Kierkegaard), o f non-rule, holding
within it some irruptive violence; thus, he says: "Justice remains, is yet to come, a
venir" (p. 969). Justice is, then, that to which we never arrive, but that to which we
aspire, having the character o f hope and promise. Also, "faith is the sister o f justice"
(cited in Mead, 1989), according to an old Latin proverb.
2Derrida (1989) borrows this phrase, and the cautionary note behind it, from
Martin Heidegger. The context in which he uses it concerns the question o f reading
Heidegger, and is a response to those who condemn and censor such reading because o f
Heidegger's association with Nazism. Derrida unveils the complexity o f the issue,
reiterating the word o f Heidegger in warning against the danger and thoughtlessness o f
"immediate presentation." Derrida says more generally that this means "less ease in
armed declarations and morality lessons, less haste toward platforms and tribunals, even
198
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the Mystery, and seeking to "explain" it to myself o r others, that which is essentially
inexplicable, and yet which is the essence o f life—spirit, the animating principle. I am
again as I was when I began, then, like Abraham, "going out, not knowing whither,” yet
going out all the same, and also sojourning as in a land o f promise, which is a dwelling
with others who are also heirs with me o f the promise. I find such an image to be, as
well, descriptive o f this project we call "education”—once stripped, o f course, o f our
pretensions at certainty and control regarding human knowledge and destiny—o r at least
a compelling image, perhaps, through which to re-imagine what it means to educate.
The Canadian scholar David Jardine (1992) states that education—the word itself
drawn from the Latin educere. meaning "to bring forth"—is fundamentally concerned
with the "bringing forth" o f human life. In this way, we are reminded of Plato's notion o f
education via his "Allegory o f the Cave" in which the uneducated is likened to the dead,
the living dead, and the process o f education to that o f liberating the prisoner and
drawing the life o f the soul out o f its shackles and out o f the confines of the cave to the
light of the sun, to spirit, and fullness o f life. In like manner, Socrates is said to have
seen himself as a midwife, drawing out the inner life o f his students, and as a gadfly as
well, stirring up the lazy and lifeless to thought and understanding. Jardine goes on to
describe education, then, as "essentially a 'generative' discipline, concerned with the
emergence o f new life in our midst, and what it is we might hope for this new life, what
it is we might wish to engender" (p. 116).

if it were to respond to acts o f violence, rhetorical or other" (p. 8).
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Ideally, this new life is the embodiment o f human possibility, the possibility that
we might transcend the actual, that we might aspire to that beyond what is, that life also
might endure, ever begetting newness o f life and transformation. Such is, o f course,
both the problem and promise o f education: how to "educe new life" (p. 116) and yet
preserve what is, and yet also serve what might be. Education involves, then, our
understanding o f and response to life, and its continuity and ever-renewing character,
and our desire for an understanding and faithful response which allows us to continue
living together with respect for what is (inclusive o f what has been) and with hope and
openness toward what is yet to come. It is the faith o f Socrates we affirm, and the aim
of education: that the examination o f life and o f the life-world and our place in it—that
an inquiry into them as they are and as they have been and as they could yet be—might
assist us in the creation o f lives of meaning and worth (aspiring to the good and true and
beautiful), personally and collectively; and that through on-going engagement in this
endeavor, future generations might be heirs too, with us, o f this promise.
It follows that central to the educative process or to pedagogical method is
hermeneutical inquiry, because such inquiry differs from others in that it is by nature
educational, directed toward these very concerns:
Hermeneutic inquiry has as its goal to educe understanding, to bring forth
the presuppositions in which we already live. Its task, therefore is not to
methodically achieve a relationship to some matter and to secure
understanding in such a method. Rather, its task is to recollect the
contours and textures o f the life we are already living, a life that is not
secured by the methods we can wield to render such a life our object....
Hermeneutics wants to recover the original difficulties of life, difficulties
that are concealed... in the attempt to render human life objectively
presentable, (pp. 116, 118)
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Dwayne Huebner (1974) affirms similarly the "Hermes Process” as the pedagogical
process, bringing forth and making present that which is unintelligible or foreign into the
light o f understanding. I would add that a part o f its task, as well, is to elucidate the alltoo-intelligible, familiar and thereby unthought, by making it strange and perhaps
unintelligible. Curriculum content is "Otherness," in a sense, and in one moment, we
make it a part o f us, opening up to it and taking it into ourselves; in another, we marvel
at the Otherness within. In this way, the question o f meaning is ever before us, and the
necessity for ongoing acts o f interpretation. Hermes, from which hermeneutics is
derived as the art o f interpretation, is the messenger-god o f the Greeks, responsible for
communicating with humanity, for presenting to humanity in receivable form, that which
is beyond human understanding; as such, he is a mediator between the human and
divine, and he is also construed as the great trickster, who sometimes trips up the
vulnerable lines o f communication. Where Hermes is present, present also is difficulty
and ambiguity and insaturability, and the call to ever engage anew the question o f
meaning, and as Richard Rorty (1989) has said, to keep the conversation going.
Thus, I am here struggling, for the form o f this inquiry has been hermeneutic, in
order that it might not only be educative in this way, but also in the way o f affirming the
essential ambiguity and mystery o f human life—its depthfulness. and the need for those
who are concerned with the project o f education, who call themselves educators, to
dwell within this affirmation and this difficulty. Herein, as well, is my resistance in
writing a conclusion, and in seeking to directly apply what I have gleaned through this
work to educational goals and practices, or concretize its implications in terms o f
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curriculum content and design, teaching and pedagogical method, or classroom
procedure and the practice o f schooling. To many it is unclear if schools actually
provide education at all, or are even concerned with the process o f educating human
beings; in fact, some assert that schools actually mis-educate, or serve to hinder the
educational process. Yet, if so, it does not follow that this has to be the case. I do not
wish here to enter into this question, although it is related to the problem to which I am
alluding. Schooling, as an institution, tends to give method and procedure precedence
over all things, to make human life, and education as the bringing forth o f human life,
something "objectively presentable." This is to say that the overriding concern seems to
find expression in an attempt to pin life down, to fix the educational enterprise, in such a
way so that it might be certain, so that there is nothing left to say, in order to achieve the
final word. Similarly, it appears to me that such activities which attempt to address the
task o f education by breaking it down into these identifiable separable elements which
are then delineated definitively, that a great deal o f the discussions on the goal o f
education or on curriculum content or on pedagogical method, for example, are largely
shaped by this incessant quest for certainty, this faithless or idolatrous need to strip life
of its difficulty, its ambiguity, its mystery. It is the search for this final word, which is
more accurately the death o f the word, an attempt to kill it, which is also the death of
thought, and ironically antithetical, in fact, to the educational impulse.
I concur with David Jardine who speaks, rather, o f education as a hermeneutical
endeavor and hermeneutics as a "returning o f life to its original difficulty [which also] is
a returning of the possibility o f the living Word. It is a return to the essential generativity
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o f human life, a sense o f life in which there is always something left to say” (p. 119).
Prior, then, to any discussion o f teaching or o f curriculum, is an image o f life, and thus o f
education, from which a particular kind o f discussion about these matters is always
generated, or in some cases closed o ff Thus, I have sought first to investigate these
images in Western Civilization throughout this work, and suggest here the primacy o f the
need to not only inquire into the images we hold regarding education, but also to reimagine them, so that the Word might live, so that there is always something more to
say, so that life may in fact be brought forth. Technical, methodological, material and
scientific images, for some time, have dominated, constraining our thoughts about
education, aimed at overcoming or solving life's difficulty and ambiguity, rather than
giving voice to them and entering into them in faith. Honored, in this sense, is the letter
of the law, instead o f the spirit of the Word.
These interests, investigations and affirmations are obviously related to what I
described in the Prologue as a religious critique o f education, concerned with the lack of
depth and loss o f soul evidenced today, the forgotten questions which life is ever raising
about its meaning and regarding concerns o f ultimacy. The religious perspective has to
do with our relationship with forces and powers beyond the known world. Clearly, these
forces shape what is known, and how we know. Religious questions are directed toward
our kinship or affiliation with the cosmos, with what is not known and not knowable,
with what is Other to us, and even with the Otherness we find within—the mysterious
"moreness" (Huebner, 1995, in press) which ever eludes our grasp, beyond
understanding, but yet within which "we live and move and have our being" (The Holy
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Bible. 1985, Acts 17:28). In this sense, the religious attitude is fundamentally
hermeneutical, and gravitates toward questions o f origin, meaning, and ultimacy and calls
humanity to respond to them (Purpel, 1989). Educationally speaking, for instance, if
today we are pressed by the need to address our global ecological problems or the issue
o f multiculturalism, we must reinvite the religious in order to attend to this call. I am
seeking to validate, then, the religious attitude, an attitude I feel is beneath the human
impulse to "educate,” however denied in modem times. Robert Nisbet (1974) speaks o f
"religion's profound relation to the structure o f human society and to the deepest regions
of human consciousness" (p. 157, emphasis mine). Kitard Nishada (1990) has put it this
way: "The religious demand is the demand o f life itself.... Those who think seriously
cannot help but feel an intense religious demand" (p. 152).
Obviously, the task o f education is strongly associated with the task o f thinking
"seriously," with teaching students to think, with exposing students to the thoughts o f
others we deem important, those we have recognized culturally as significant and serious
and thought-ful. Unfortunately, we often forget these thoughts have been judged thus in
their contribution to a particular vision of life, and in their power to speak to present
human need and to the human condition. Education also involves entering into a
reflection with students upon what it, in fact, means to think, into a thinking upon the
very process o f thinking and where such thinking takes us, and upon the products o f our
thought. Yet, for example, I have this encounter one day in the coffee house with a wellesteemed university professor o f science: he inquires after what I have been so diligently
applying myself to day in and day out—the dissertation. O f course, he then wants to
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know the "field" in which I am pursuing a doctorate. The mere mention o f the word
"education" provokes a diatribe by him about the absurdity o f such a field, o f a College
o f Education finding place in the University, o f such a subject being afforded academic
credibility. Teaching is merely a question o f skill and technique, not an intellectual
pursuit, he informs me. He laughs about departments which have their "little" laboratory
kindergartens and concludes with the assertion that all one needs to teach is a knowledge
o f the discipline, a chalkboard and a piece o f chalk.
My first thought is that I would like to throw him into a classroom o f thirty fiveyear old children with nothing more than a knowledge of his discipline, a chalkboard and
a piece o f chalk and see if his hypothesis holds. Clearly, there is a history to this kind of
thinking about education, a history tied up in the Northern European birth o f curriculum
with its emphasis on methodological concerns, a history not shared, for example, in
Germany where the concept o fbildung3 has dominated educational thought, where
practice and theory are not so markedly distinguished, where research is neither sharply
separated from teaching, nor esteemed above it. Clearly, as well, this professor's
attitudes are understandable in light o f the field's attempt to model itself after the
sciences, which is to make o f it a "pseudo-science," and its endearment to images o f a
technical, managerial nature. Yet, what I find to be so disturbing about his stance is, in

5The German concept, bildung. is referential o f an interest in culture and human
development and potential; its history has origins in medieval mysticism, and Herder has
so aptly described it as a "rising up to humanity through culture" (cited in Gadamer,
1960/1992, p. 10).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

206
fact, its thoughtlessness: it is a thinking which has stopped thinking,4 which has found
the final word. The attitude implies that this man is estranged from the very nature o f
what he does as an educator in the university.
The university is founded on the premise o f education, the value o f the openminded search for truth, the necessity and worth o f the practice o f inquiry, o f life
informed by inquiry. Yet, here is a university professor who neither questions the
meaning o f his work, nor the boundaries o f the discipline within which he works, nor
apparently encourages this questioning in his students. He no longer seems to ask
questions regarding what constitutes knowledge within this frame and how it is
constituted, or the value o f what is counted as knowledge therein and its limits. The
assumption is expressed, too, that knowledge is something static that can be finally
gotten and possessed, like some object which then can be passed on to the next
generation with the stroke o f a piece o f chalk. Apparent, as well, is the absence o f any
historical consciousness regarding that in which he engages. He does not consider that
science arose in the West from the practice o f philosophy, and that at one time,
philosophy and education were deemed to be one and the same. His discipline would not
exist were it not for the project o f education—it is a part o f that project—and the original
impulse from which it was generated. I am not here intending to defend the study o f
education against such assaults, but to demonstrate with a tangible example evidence o f

'Evoking the image o f the Logic of Death spoken o f in Chapter 2, Hannah Arendt
puts it this way: "Without the breath o f life the human body is a corpse: without
thinking the human mind is dead" (cited in Waithe, 1995, p. 252, emphasis in original).
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this loss o f depth, Nishada's "serious1*thought, o f which I am speaking, thus the need for
religious critique and the religious attitude brought to bear on the practice o f education,
and to direct myself, for the benefit o f my reader, toward the implications o f such a
critique and such an attitude for education.
These matters come together for me, at least, in Heidegger's (1927/1962) critique
of modernity, characterized by what he calls the forgetfulness or forgetting o f being, or
the loss o f the very question o f the meaning o f being in human consciousness. His
project, in response to this loss, has been described as the "quest for being” (Spiegelberg,
1982; Collinson, 1987), what I would submit is, as well, a religious critique of
modernity—albeit not in name—because he seeks to revive the question o f the meaning o f
human existence, o f life, and being, the lost dimension o f depth or soul. While I do not
wish to take a detour here into the intricacies and complexities o f this critique
(particularly because it is in the same line with Kovel's notion o f the despiritualization o f
life and Weber's discussion o f the disenchantment o f the world we have already fleshed
out in the substance o f this work), I would like to highlight the inextricable kinship and
interrelatedness o f concepts like being, spirit, soul and logos, or word. "Being" as
referential o f life, existence, essence, a person human or divine, is tied to "spirit,"
immaterial being, the animating principle o f life, the vital principle and active essence o f a
human person, the breath o f the divine (Oxford English Dictionary. 1989, vols. II and
XVI, pp. 80,251-253). "Spirit" has likewise been defined as the soul o f a person or
being, and "being" as the active, vitalizing immaterial soul, as well, embodied as the
world soul, or the human soul, or the soul o f the divine (Vine's Expository Dictionary.
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n.d.). Soul, too, is that which is immaterial, and also that which is figurative, symbolic,
mythic.
For Heidegger, the logos, the word, language, is the house o f being and speaks
the mystery o f being. Gadamer (1960/1992) explains it in this way: "The articulation o f
the logos brings the structure o f being into language, and this coming into language is ...
nothing other than the presencing o f being itself, its aletheia [truth]. Human thought
regards the infinity o f this presence as its fulfilled potential, its divinity” (p. 457). Logos
denotes word, and also utterance, discourse, reason, mind—the immaterial force which is
said to direct life, at least life human and divine. It is the expression o f thought, the
creative power which provides inspiration, wisdom, and guidance to humankind
(Angeles, 1981). With the Stoics, logos is intimately tied to destiny, fate, teleology. It is
an active, underlying principle, cosmic and divine. As it is said, "In the beginning was
the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God" (The Holv Bible. 1985,
John 1:1). The Greek logos has here been taken up to refer to the divine Christ, the
incarnation o f the spirit, the embodied manifestation o f the deity, the expression o f the
mind of God (Strong's Exhaustive Concordance o f the Bible: Dictionaries o f the
Hebrew and Greek Words, n d ; Vine's Expository Dictionary. n.d.).
What is then seen is how the forgetting o f being in human consciousness might be
said to coincide with the excommunication o f spirit, the loss o f soul or o f the religious,
disenchantment and the death o f the word, i.e., the institutionalization o f the final word.
Heidegger (1927/1962) describes this mind-lessness or thought-lessness toward being,
particularly heightened in the modem world, a world reduced by the tendencies o f
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science: attention is directed to the study o f specific entities o r beings, rather than being
itself or the meaning o f being. In addition, he asserts that because o f initial
interpretations o f being in Western thought, the question o f being (and its meaning) has
been viewed as self-evident and superfluous. Its neglect has actually been sanctioned.
Yet, primary to the problem, like the ambiguity o f life, is the enigma o f being:
"Everything we talk about, everything we have in view, everything toward which we
comport ourselves in any way, is being; what we are is being and how we are" (p. 26),
yet since we live already in a vague understanding o f being, the question is trivialized,
taken as obvious, self-evident, and thus ignored. Thus, the meaning o f being is still
hidden from us, veiled in darkness; perhaps so familiar, we do not grasp it at all, though
we conduct all o f our activities in and with this unexamined understanding o f being.
I take, then (and I am suggesting), a religious attitude toward teaching, which is
not so much characterized by its particular content or method as by its spirit. It is an
attempt to faithfully dwell with students in "the land o f promise," keeping ever before me
the call to remember being, to acknowledge the presence o f spirit—the "moreness" which
speaks and moves beyond me and my own understanding, to remain open to the power
o f the living Word, to inquire into the meaning o f my work with students, and to address
issues o f ultimate concern in the creation o f a vision where the good, true and beautiful
are ongoingly aspired to, though never fully reached. This is, as well, a critical stance
which recognizes and interrogates the present pervasiveness o f "powers and
principalities" (Huebner, 1995, p. 20; forces tied up with idolatry, commandment and
the reign o f death; see Chapters 1 and 2) which seek to forget being, to exile spirit, to
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say the last word, to undermine questions o f meaning and ultimacy, and to thwart human
vision. O f course, I also seek to encourage such a posture in my students because I
believe it is generative o f life, and because I believe in the possibility o f redemption and
transformation. In this way, my teaching is also an act o f witnessing, of giving
testimony, for I do not believe I could be an educator unless I could attest to education's
potential efficacy in bringing forth life, in contributing to the transformation o f my own
soul.
Students in my undergraduate classes are usually initially very confused by my
call to examine the unexamined, and by my incessant questions of meaning. They are
confused because what I ask o f them seems at first ridiculous, a useless inquiry into the
self-evident. They are confused because they have generally never been asked to think in
this way, to consider the unthought, or even the meaning o f what they are doing when
they are being "educated." Knowledge is all too often split from the question o f value,
and made an object which students are taught to passively receive. Most shutter in
trepidation, though a few thrill with delight, at my mention o f philosophy’s original
kinship with education, at my postulation that the philosophical impulse (perhaps, simply
put as the love o f and search for wisdom) is primary to the notion o f education. I think
at first they suspect that since I love philosophy, I am determined to impose it on them,
even in a course which is not philosophy. The fear is that I will inflict Descartes' A
Discourse on Method (1637/1912) on them, although I would be more inclined to
introduce The Passions o f the Soul (1649/1989), given the deficiencies o f contemporary
culture.
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"What is education?" I ask, for example. "What does it mean to be educated?”
"What do you mean when you speak o f yourself as educated or as being educated?" Or
in the case with preservice teachers, the question is what it is they mean when they
express a desire to be educators and to work in the field o f education. Statements are
made which we seek to unpack and possibly critique, but I wish also to go beyond this to
the soul or spirit behind the statements. Thus, I ask them to conjure up the images they
have o f education, and also images o f education which they feel are promoted culturally
and collectively. I introduce the symbolic, the metaphorical and the mythic. For akin to
the forgetting o f being, "we have forgotten or suppressed that imagination is a
foundation o f our so-called 'givens,' [that] our language, practices, and resources are
merely the embodied or materialized images in which we choose to dwell” (Huebner,
1995, p. 13). We need to consider, then, the images within which we have chosen to
dwell, whether by explicit intention or unconscious inheritance, if we are to participate in
ever re-imagining. Are they tabernacles o f faith and promise in which we can peacefully
together dwell with hope?
Students are then allowed to play these images, personal and societal, against
each other and against other images, as well, held in the memory and tradition of
Western culture, and ideally o f other cultures too. These images may include, for
instance, Plato's "Allegory o f the Cave," or Boethius's vision o f Philosophy (the great
educator, and mother o f all disciplines o f study). Visiting and talking with Boethius in
prison, she is an enchanting and beautiful figure who enlightens and comforts him, and
gives him a clearing through which to transcend his plight—to obtain freedom o f the soul,
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though body is bound. There is, as well, the first known representation o f the liberal arts
o f the fifth century, "On the Marriage o f Mercury and Philology," from the myth
describing the bride Philologia (scholarship) who is attended by seven maidens,
advocates o f the liberal arts. Ramist maps o f knowledge and Tyler's rationale (see
Chapter 4) are also images implying what it means to educate, though more demythified,
literalized, perhaps manifesting the suppression o f the imagination, or what Huebner calls
the "hegemony o f technical language" (p. 13).
I believe endeavors like this are important (and we can ask these questions o f all
the disciplines, o f the practice o f study and o f the act o f teaching, as well) because o f this
forgetfulness, this human condition I share with my students. I feel it in my own
experience o f education; I see it in the experiences o f my students; I hear it in the
dominant educational discourse which trivializes what it means to educate and forgets
the most significant questions and problems with which the task o f educating is
challenged. Pervasive are mindless processes, unquestioned assumptions, and empty
promises. Students, remembering autobiographically, speak o f fragments o f meaningless
names and dates and facts, rote exercises lacking personal investment, and uncaring
teachers or professors. More often than not, they have never even thought to ask what
education, or teaching, or history, or study, etc., has been, is to them, ought to be, or
could be. It is the danger o f sheer socialization into that which exists, which is taken as
given, which limits the imagination and the future (Huebner, 1974). Even then, in such a
case, we do not really know what is, and "so long as we do not, through thinking,
experience what is, we can never belong to what will be" (Heidegger, 1962/I977e).
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O f course, I am reflecting here on that which needs redeeming. There are
experiences to be remembered from which to draw hope, as well: moments of insight,
gifts developed and bestowed, and acts o f love on the part o f both students and teachers.
Such probing activities are akin to Socrates' dialectic in which ideas or practices are
inquired into, the actual and ideal are negotiated, and light is shed on the ways in which
the legacy o f the past has shaped both what is and that to which we aspire, the
possibilities and problems we have inherited through it. As well, we are brought to the
limits o f our own knowledge with a view o f the amazing complexity o f all things beside
our simple, taken-for-granted representations. We also run up against that which is
beyond our understanding in the aporia, the oppositions and paradoxes which somehow
hold in tension and yet in harmony the many in a complex unity. Boethius is both
imprisoned and yet free. Education socializes us into a tradition and encourages us to
question that very tradition and revitalize it and move beyond it, binding and yet
liberating. William Doll (in press) has captured this activity and aim so beautifully: "This
is an education which questions the being o f all we hold sacred while at the same time
manifests a faith that such questioning will lead us to the sacredness o f being"
(P- 12).
As a teacher, I, too, enter into this questioning, and am opening myself to
newness o f life. I may present students with texts, questions and processes through
which to interrogate that which is under examination, yet they bring to them their own
responses, ideas, experiences and questions. Basically, the act o f teaching is no longer
something I control: covering the material, staying on schedule and insuring that
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students take from me what I intend to give or get across to them is now secondary to
creating a space, opening a clearing, for the happening o f understanding, a happening
which transcends text, teacher and student, allowing us to experience the moreness, the
transformative power o f the living Word. Students draw on their own experiences,
bringing them to bear on the Otherness with which they are confronted, for example,
individually, through autobiographical investigations, essays and commentaries o f texts,
and collectively, through discussion, debate, dramatic interpretation and creative
production. They are making something o f this content, personally and together, making
meaning, which is also a making sense o f life. Yet, I also am doing the same. I question
the taken-for-granted nature o f what they think they know, and how they know it, and
their assumed responses. They are living questions, too, about what I take for granted
(Huebner, 1974). It is my desire that they enter into the discipline (discourse,
knowledge, subject), the riches o f the Other, our collective wealth and the concerns
which constitute the public world, but also that they be not overwhelmed or alienated or
disempowered by the Other. Rather, my hope is that, as with myself, they might be
blessed and enriched and challenged, engaged by the Other, invited to enter into a
relationship wherein they, in turn, may bless and enrich, and participate in the critique
and re-construction o f the public world. Education becomes this sojourning together in
the land o f promise, a living together in which memories, trials, triumphs and aspirations
are shared, and in which we work and play together in the creation o f shared visions and
worlds.
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I have taught, for example, a course in the "Curricular Disciplines: Social
Studies” for elementary preservice teachers at the University for almost three years now.
Not only has my syllabus changed significantly during this period, and the aims and texts
and activities I have drawn upon, but also I, myself have been changed, through having
laid myself open to the questions and before the mystery and through entering into study
with students. One thing I have learned is that if one listens, the call will come. In this
case, I can attest to this question which formed itself and began addressing itself to me,
calling also for my response: How could the teaching o f social studies be imbued with
deep personal and collective meaning? How could teachers and students come to see
and feel their part in the spiritual civilization o f humanity? More importantly, how could
they connect their own personal struggles with the struggles o f others and the pain o f the
world? How could this reality and affect be taken up to make social studies an avenue
for freedom, hope, faith, love, a site to inspire and enable teachers and students to
become active participants in creating a more just, compassionate, beautiful world?
I have not even begun plumbing the depths o f these questions, but I am on this
quest, and I invite my students each semester to become fellow pilgrims with me in this
journey. Every semester is different, every semester I encounter new questions and
another aspect o f the mystery, which includes moments o f fear and disappointment, and
moments o f peace and inspiration. As for my students, those who truly enter in are
changed too, though in ways uniquely their own. Thus, I begin the course with a
welcome and an invitation, and openly confess that I do not know exactly what is in
store for us, only that my hope is that we can faithfully investigate this discipline we call
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social studies and come into some insight about what it might mean to teach social
studies to elementary school children, hi addition, I also encourage them to find out and
develop who they are as teachers and to give themselves fully and joyfully to the art
(their art) o f teaching in the field, as there is a field experience component to the course.
I share my faith, too, that they and I and the children we touch will be blessed and
changed in these endeavors. I find I must usually respond first, o f course, to the anxiety
my express not-knowing creates. A jewel o f Nietzsche's (1883/I982a) has become one I
wear and share: "I say unto you: one must still have chaos in oneself to be able to give
birth to a dancing star. I say unto you: you still have chaos in yourselves" (p. 129).
The challenge is not to reach for the stars, nor to become a star, but to give birth to one
that not only shines but dances as well, to trust in the hidden order and power o f chaos.
What has developed and emerged thus far in this course is broadly an
investigation o f the question: What does it mean to teach social studies in the elementary
school? Such has entailed uncovering the meanings—often forgotten, taken-for-granted,
or obscured—buried in the concepts social studies, teaching, schooling, etc., personally
for each one o f us and collectively as a group. It has meant looking at ourselves as
teachers (or prospective teachers) and as learners, drawing on our own experiences as
students o f social studies, questioning our own attitudes and assumptions and beliefs
concerning different aspects o f social studies like history or geography and regarding
various social and political issues, and involvement with a number o f "materials" and
"methods" connected with the teaching o f social studies. It has meant doing all o f this
together, as well, which has required a willingness to enter into a community, a
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community o f seekers who participate in critical and caring dialogue with themselves,
with others, with the world—to sojourn together in faith.
Students write about why they wish to teach, for instance, inquiring into the
underlying impulse behind this desire. This reflection involves how they conceive o f the
act o f teaching, the life o f a teacher, the practice o f education. They are exposed to the
visions o f others, as well, like Paulo Freire, o r bell hooks, for example. All o f these
images are shared and compared. Groups o f students create collaborative
representations o f the typical teacher, of the "actual" teacher, involving what comes to
mind in the presence o f this signifier and drawn from past experiences as students in
relationship with teachers. Other images are then generated; yet, this time, they are
ideal images which emerge from creatively imagining what might be, from thinking about
the kind o f teachers they would like to be and would like to see their children and all
children know. In doing so, they address not only the characteristics o f the "actual"
teacher in need o f redemption, but also their own inner calls and the calls o f their
classmates and the dreams o f other teachers—perhaps, like Ghandi or Jesus or Mother
Theresa—who have inspired them, in the light o f a vision of education which reflects that
which is true and good and beautiful.
I am all-too-keenly aware, in this whole process, as the "teacher" in the class, of
having set myself up first and foremost as the object o f this critique; it is a position
which is not always comfortable, at times reproving, but always instructive. Yet, I
believe in the value o f self-examination, and as it is said, to attend to the beam in my own
eye before addressing the mote o f my brother or sister (The Holy Bible. 1985, Matthew
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7:3-5). I concur with "Aristotle [who] once said that teaching does whatever it does 'as
to a friend'" (Noddings, 1993, p. 134), which is also as to oneself. I also believe in
"modeling” that which I encourage, practicing what I preach, at least striving to embody
the vision I share, however feebly, and admitting my failures.
This endeavor is akin to the process James Macdonald (1974) advocates as what
the aim o f education should be: "the centering of the person in the world" (p. 104), a
process he asserts cannot occur unless the teacher is also immersed in the practice of
centering. He goes on to describe centering as that which addresses the problem of
alienation from the ground o f one's being (Heidegger’s forgetfulness o f being), a religious
or spiritual experience involving an attitude which "encompasses the search to find our
inner being or to complete [our] awareness of wholeness and meaning” (p. 104). It is
also the work o f self-regulation, reaching for wholeness, for the meaningful integration
o f inner and outer realms, striving toward inner integrity and strength. As a teacher
within this frame, I am ultimately one who is "engaged in the art o f living,... [immersed]
in the process o f living with others [students] in a creative and spontaneous manner,
having faith” (p. 115), keeping vision alive and encouraging the same in students.
What is particularly interesting, in this regard, is that in almost all cases, the
reasons students give for wanting to enter into the life o f teaching are spiritual or
religious in nature, in the way o f some vision, or ideal, some conviction o f the soul.
"Theoretically, the presence o f 'God' in a person's life can be measured by his or her
activity in the direction o f an ideal” (p. 105), says Nel Noddings, in line with Dewey's
thought. It follows, then, especially once students have gone into the schools and seen
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firsthand the lives o f teachers, so consumed by bureaucratic and managerial demands and
standardized test scores and content coverage, that we need to interrogate these forces
in schools, societies, cultures, within ourselves, which seek to kill "God" in the soul, to
bury these visions, to cause us to forget and stray far from these deep original impulses.
In these cases, what is lost sight o f is the ultimate aim o f education, which Macdonald
identifies with the process o f centering, and Huebner (1995) with the journey o f the soul.
These forces, the overall effect o f which I have called the logic or reign o f death
(see Chapter 2), seem to dominate our (social/cultural/political/etc.) world in the present
historical moment. Huebner describes them as the principalities and powers—idolatry
and enslavement, their effect: a "derailing" which seeks to direct the soul's journey away
from the pursuit o f "God" and ultimate concern, restricting and thwarting it, defining it
beforehand. Huebner says:
The principalities and powers bring us into their spheres o f interest where
we serve their ends, rather than the ultimate e n d ,... the pursuit of lesser
ends or outcomes.... They restrict and impede the religious journey,
condition human life to the mundane world, or fixate human life before
the journey is completed, (p. 20)
They promote a false faith, in this way, in denial o f the ultimate and transcendent, and a
faith not our own, imposed on us from without. We find such a journey with aspirations
(if they can be so called) which do not bring forth life, but death. We find such a journey
o f oppression, in which we are enslaved by the edicts forced upon us. Nothing but dying
idols and difficult commandments, once realized.
In many ways, this moves us into further inquiry regarding the meaning of
education, schooling, teaching and social studies, and a critique o f the meanings already
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imposed and constructed. Students role-play various ethical positions taken by teachers
in classrooms (for instance: exclusively neutral or partial, impartially neutral, or impartial
yet committed) in a panel discussion and reflect on them. They conduct a debate in
which they defend and challenge the three dominant traditions which regard social
studies as either citizenship transmission, or social science, or reflective inquiry, in
building their own living tradition. They bring to consciousness their own prior
assumptions and memories o f social studies in school. Together, they create collages o f
these histories, and judge them in light o f thinking about what social studies could and
perhaps should aspire to realize. They engage with texts, critiques o f the dehumanizing
powers-that-be in education which sanction injustice and work against freedom and
perpetuate the spiritual crisis o f modernity, like those o f Jonathan Kozol and David
Purpel, presenting commentaries o f them and participating in class discussion.
What is being done is in kinship with Purpel's (1989) notion o f education in a
prophetic voice: which cries out first against evil, injustice and "sin;" which in
reminding us o f our highest aspirations, calls attention to how we have failed to remain
faithful; and which engages in criticism in the hope o f redemption. Believing it evil to
resign ourselves to evil and faithless to cede to the actual, the prophet not only reproves,
reminds, reconceives, but also participates in ongoing "research" with those exhorted, to
continually develop the qualities and gifts which might contribute to the "possibility o f
justice, community, joy" (p. I OS). In this religious language, it is perhaps the spirit o f
prayer that is aroused, what Dewey calls inquiry, the "seek and ye shall find" attitude
(Noddings, 1992). Students inquire into the ideologies hidden in the information
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presented in social studies textbooks to children, comparing them with primary sources
and different perspectives such as are reflected in children's literature, for example.
More and ever clear becomes the power o f language, o f the word—o f the text, its
promise and its danger. In this sense, too, the power o f education is revealed, o f
teaching, as primarily a being with others in language (Huebner, 1968), encountering
texts with them, and encountering oneself and each other and the world through texts,
and through the word—a force that can, in fact, empower or imprison, enlighten or
anesthetize. To confront the principalities and powers, then, is to not only critique the
images o f being they promote, but also the language used to support them. In a
materialistic age, set on pinning life down, the word threatens materialization in the
creation o f the "reified w ord-thing... [which leaves only] the shell o f the word, [its]
naked corpse" (Bahktin, 1975/1992, p. 292). As teachers, in a system enamored with
the language of technology and bent on reaching the last word, we are vulnerable to this
death o f the word in which it is:
perceived purely as an object.... In such a word-object even meaning
becomes a thing: there can be no dialogic approach to such a word o f the
kind immanent to any deep and actual understanding.... It is completely
separated from the living, ideological power o f the word to mean....
There can be no conversing with such a word. (p. 352)
Certainly, as educators seeking to educe understanding, we must attend to and
care for language, communicate with our students, encourage dialogue and discourse
which "lives, as it were, beyond itself in a living impulse" (p. 292); for we are
commissioned with the "bringing forth" o f human life. Again, we are like "the prophet
[who] is engaged in a battle for language, in an effort to create a different epistemology
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out of which another community might em erge,... [with] the hope that the ache o f God
might penetrate the numbness o f history, in a yearning that grows with and out o f pain"
(Brueggemann, cited in Purpel, 1989, p. 1). I believe this is why I am, as a teacher, so
drawn to the language o f religion which inspires us to surpass our present selves for
something better, to reach beyond ourselves in loving others, and to the language o f the
symbolic, the mythic, the poetic, which seems to open up spaces for the breath o f the
living Word to ever speak. Poetry, drama, art, story and music find their place, then,
even in a social studies class, perhaps, especially in a social studies class. Through them,
the person is touched by the Other in a way which lends itself to the experience o f
empathy and intimacy, an experience which draws us out o f our present selves into
connection with another.
This experience is all the more important because o f the forces at work today
which serve to alienate, dis-connect, provoke indifference-characterized as
despiritualizing, disenchanting, dissecting, deadening. Kovel (1991) says that spirit is
revealed in the overcoming o f splitting, the lived process o f this overcoming, which is
the way o f emancipation and o f life. The concern o f the prophet, which is "with the
search for meaning through the process o f criticism, imagination and creativity" (Purpel,
1989, p. 105), is also, then, the concern o f the teacher: seeking to invite spirit, the
healing balm o f wholeness, into what is splintered, without a sense o f connection and
fullness and significance and solidarity through the logic o f death. Religious language is,
then, also the language o f the personal, bringing the person to deep understanding, and
one must come to the self before moving beyond it. For this reason, I take the central
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constructs o f history and tradition and culture in social studies and invite students to find
meaning therein through personal life history research in which they seek to negotiate
passages between the public and the private and find the connections between their own
histories and larger ethnic, racial, religious, cultural histories. Students engage in
autobiographical investigations, trace family genealogies, interview family members, look
into family records and memorabilia o f all kinds, and investigate the history o f their
family names and the symbologies behind them.
Together we create a picture history timeline o f the world, discussing it in
relation to our personal histories which we share, the impact o f historical events directly
or indirectly upon the quality and character o f our own lives. Later, we critique it in
terms of the voices and histories not voiced in the story we have told, left out o f it, and
bring some o f these voices to our timeline. Reviving the cross-cultural tradition of
storytelling, each student peruses the landscape o f lore, selecting and learning a folktale
from one o f her cultures o f origin. The choice is made not solely upon cultural
background, but also with regard to personal significance.5 The tale is told in class, and
a commentary given concerning its cultural and personal relationship to the person telling
the story. In a sense, we are literally sojourning together, looking at and reflecting on
our past joumeyings, uncovering the problems and possibilities brought to us through
them, and finding that terrain we share-telling the stories o f where we have been, where
we are and where we hope yet to go.

5Ann Trousdale (1994) speaks, as well, o f a kind o f authority that comes from
self-knowledge, with knowledge o f a personal nature. I think we all need this kind o f
authority in our lives, particularly do teachers, as well, in their work.
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In this way, education here is as Dewey (1938) has described it, consisting in the
reconstruction o f experience, or as Madeleine Grumet (1992) has suggested, it "emerges
as a metaphor for a person's dialogue with the world o f his or her experience" (p. 29)—
and with the worlds o f others' experiences. Huebner (1974) has affirmed, in this vein,
"education as concern for the evolving biography of the person and the evolving history
o f societies or communities” (p. 37). I believe going through this process with students
has been my attempt to respond to the questions I had, concerned with endowing the
study o f social studies with personal and collective meaning, and with calling attention to
our place in something larger and beyond us, the spiritual history o f humanity. What
generally develops through it is a strong sense o f community, but one in which a
multitude o f before-hidden differences are actually brought to light, and appreciated, and
which serve to enrich the whole. Yet, beyond this, as we are drawn into the lives o f
others, into their stories o f joy and pain, we are more profoundly left with the
recognition o f our common humanity, that we are bound together in powerful ways
despite our differences.
Nel Noddings (1992), looking at education in this way, conjures up the religious
image o f the congregation, because it involves ecologies o f love and vocation, the calling
forth and confirming o f each other’s gifts and giftedness for the divine, that beyond
oneself. David Purpel (1989), similarly, speaks o f the potential o f schools to be "centers
of inquiry and growth" where those who dwell there can share their different talents and
capabilities in "the pursuit o f the common goal o f creating a culture o f deepest meaning"
(p. 110). I tend to share these sensibilities, although I am not sure schools are receptive
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sites for such activities and aspirations. Both allude, in any case, to the necessity o f
vision, or perhaps I should say, o f visions, or eternal vision-ing. My feeling is that
education might be a kind o f shepherding o f being, in the language o f Heidegger.
Teaching could be a caring for and attending to this journey o f the soul which includes a
concern for the sacred, for the transformative presence o f the mystery in the lives o f
students, and for the creation o f a society which attends to and cares for the sacred. In
this sense, the suffering o f the oppressed and the pain o f the world is a major part o f the
curriculum, and pedagogy involves the active exhortation to participate in the creation of
a world where pain and suffering are no more. It is the call o f faith, as "the substance o f
things hoped for, the evidence o f things not seen" (The Holv Bible. 1985, Hebrews
11:1), which brings vision to life, making that which is not yet but aspired to operative in
the present by bringing it into and holding it in the imagination from which the future
dawns. To educate means, in Hebrew, to commit or to affirm (Strong's Exhaustive
Concordance o f the Bible: Dictionaries o f the Hebrew and Greek Words. n.d).
Thus, I share my vision with students, and invite them to examine and express
their own visions, and also enter into visioning with me. As it presently stands, then, in
this particular course, two new aspects have emerged. The first is that I challenge
students with the very questions with which I have been challenged concerning the
teaching o f social studies: they now spend their time in the field with children
participating in a vision, expressing their visions and encouraging students to envision.
The form these lessons take is open, and highly personal, and dependent on the needs o f
the supervising teachers in the schools. The commission is to make, in their own ways,
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according to their own inner calls, social studies an avenue for freedom, hope, love and
social justice, a creative site to inspire and empower students to actively dream a better
world. As it is written, "Faith without works is dead” (The Holy Bible. 1985, James
2:26). The returns have been, I must admit, delightfully surprising. I could not begin
here to describe all the kinds o f activities I have witnessed as a result o f this open-ended
assignment. Often, in the elementary grades, the subject o f social studies is entirely
overlooked because of the constraints o f time and the attention required o f reading and
math. Often, when it is taught, students are not engaged and meaning is lost. Often,
social studies consists of the "holiday" curriculum almost exclusively, superficial at best.
Yet even one typical Thanksgiving lesson, here, became an occasion for students
to not only share their own holiday traditions in contrast to the Pilgrims, and reflect on
all for which they had to give thanks, but also to consider those less fortunate than
themselves and the life-giving act o f giving. Moved by "The Giving Tree," by Shel
Silverstein, thirty second-grade students came up with the idea to put together a
Thanksgiving basket for the children at the homeless shelter, each student parting with a
favorite toy, article o f clothing, book or snack. On Veteran's Day, fifth-grade students
engaged in a serious discussion about war, and wrote letters to patients in the Veteran's
Hospital, thanking them for their bravery, and asking them questions about the personal
experience o f war. Some also shared their feelings about the G ulf War as children of
men and women who fought. Many o f their letters were answered with powerful effects.
Another lesson I observed in a truly multicultural context—a second and third
grade combination class of African-American, Vietnamese, white, deaf, and handicapped
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children—was a culmination o f their studies in racism. The students had put together a
reader's theater performance centered in the life and activism o f Martin Luther King, Jr.,
and the triumph o f the Bus Boycott. They bad constructed a bus on stage to produce a
visual representation o f the change won. The performance concluded with a reading o f
Langston Hughes' poem, "Hold Fast to Dreams." As one child read, another child
signed. In the discussion afterward, one little girl noticed the different talents which
were exhibited, all needed to put on the show—some were obviously gifted performers,
others attended well to the art o f writing or stage production. Another child liked the
part on the bus because "you could see blacks and whites finally sitting together and it
was exciting." Still another appreciated reading the poem at the end. She thought it was
great to end the play this way because her friend who was signing the poem next to her
was different, not because o f the color o f her skin, but because she was deaf and yet
they were together too. She said that it would be just like racism to have bad feelings
about her because she could not hear. This child, unwittingly perhaps, was pointing to
the universality o f Otherness, and o f the suffering and oppression which often
accompanies it. In truth, however, the beauty, the power, the wisdom, o f those voices
who have suffered, like the African-American people for whom Martin Luther King, Jr.
spoke, evidenced in their culture via folklore and art and song and way o f life, is
primarily found in their movement beyond Otherness, beyond oppression and oppressor,
beyond the self, in transcending and rising above their existential condition. The ability
o f the human spirit to be lifted up in this way is a wisdom, a gift, we all need, regardless
o f race, class, gender, age, time, or place. I was learning some things from this second-
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grade girl, or at least incited to think on these things. There are, o f course, many more
examples I could give.
The last month o f the course the students present what they have done in the
schools, reflecting on the experience and its impact on them and on the children, and
submitting it to class critique and celebration. We also create a four-week storytelling
program for children at the homeless shelter, which is the second aspect o f the course
which has emerged in this way, in which we prepare food to eat together, share folktales
with the children and invite their participation in some drama or art activity. By the end
o f the course, I am no longer teaching my students; rather, my students and I are
teaching together. My hope is that, within these contexts, my students have experienced
something o f the beauty and power o f the transcendent, of participation with others in a
common vision o f meaning, and o f tradition that is vital and flourishing. I trust, as well,
that they have been awakened to the beauty and power o f study and o f Ianguage—o f the
word, the text, the logos, the Other—to move and transform their own souls and the
souls o f others. For my own education has blessed me with these gifts, gifts I would also
like to share. Life with my students is not neutral, then, and generally can never truly be;
the educator affirms visions and inquires into them, as one who contributes to, critiques
and celebrates (Purpel, 1989) humanity's participation in the transcendent, and seeks to
inspire the same in students, hopefully taking part with them in this process o f living in
love, with spirit and faith.
Education, if it is to truly be the bringing forth o f life, then, must dwell in the
mystery, the strangeness, the complexity, the "moreness" which is life. Such entails a
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recognition of our inability to control or contain life, or even this thing we call
knowledge. As creatures immersed in life,
we know more than we can say, and often say more than we know....
There is more than w e ... can know, will ever know. It is a "moreness"
that takes us by surprise when we are at the edge and end o f our
knowing. There is comfort in that "moreness" that takes over in our
weakness, our ignorance, at our limits or end. It is a comfort that cannot
be anticipated, a "peace that passeth all understanding".... One knows of
that presence, that "moreness," when known resources fail and somehow
we go beyond what we were and are, and become something different,
somehow new.... The "moreness" in the w orld... is a "moreness" that
infuses each human being. Not only do we know more than we say, we
"are" more than we "currently are." That is, human being dwells in the
transcendent, or more appropriately, the transcendent dwells in the human
being.... The spirit dwells in us.... The fact that we partake o f the
transcendent means that we are never complete, until death. We can
always be more than we are.... [This "moreness"] is that which
transcends the known, the expected.... It is the source o f hope. It is
manifested through love and the waiting expectation that accompanies
love. It over comes us.... One whose imagination acknowledges this
"moreness" can be said to dwell faithfully in the world. (Huebner, 1995,
pp. 15-18)
What I am reaching for is education imagined in this way, which dwells in hope,
carrying us beyond the limits o f our own knowing, inspiring us to become more than we
are, which waits expectantly for transformation. Herein is just something of what I have
gleaned in this work for the theory and practice o f education. Elliot Eisner has described
theory as "the result o f our desire to create a world we can understand" (cited in Pinar et
al., 1995, p. 863). In like manner, we may describe practice as the result o f our desire to
create a world we can change or act upon, or in the sense encompassing Western
obsession with certainty and method, to order or control. Perhaps, however, "to dwell
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faithfully in the world," to sojourn together in the land o f promise, implies a desire
beyond both o f these, a desire to create a world we can love, respond to with a grand
"Amen"—bringing forth a sacred "Yes" to life. O r possibly rather, this journey-dwelling
inspires the desire to embrace a world beyond all our acting and knowing, within which
we are enveloped in its sacred affirmations.
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